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After the 2008 financial crisis, the financial innovation product Credit-Default-Swap 
(CDS) was widely blamed as the main cause of this crisis. CDS is one type of 
over-the-counter (OTC) traded derivatives. Before the crisis, the trading of CDS was 
very popular among the financial institutions. But meanwhile, excessive speculative 
CDSs transactions in a legal environment of scant regulation accumulated huge risks 
in the financial system. This dissertation is divided into three parts. In Part I, we 
discussed the primers of the CDSs and its market development, then we analyzed in 
detail the roles CDSs had played in this crisis based on economic studies. It is 
advanced that CDSs not just promoted the eruption of the crisis in 2007 but also 
exacerbated it in 2008. In part II, we asked ourselves what are the legal origins of this 
crisis in relation with CDSs, as we believe that financial instruments could only 
function, positive or negative, under certain legal institutional environment. After an 
in-depth inquiry, we observed that at least three traditional legal doctrines were 
eroded or circumvented by OTC derivatives. It is argued that the malfunction of these 
doctrines, on the one hand, facilitated the proliferation of speculative CDSs 
transactions; on the other hand, eroded the original risk-control legal mechanism. 
Therefore, the 2008 crisis could escalate rapidly into a global financial tsunami, which 
was out of control of the regulators. In Part III, we focused on the European Union’s 
regulatory reform towards the OTC derivatives market. In specific, EU introduced 
mandatory central counterparty clearing obligation for qualified OTC derivatives, and 
requires that all OTC derivatives shall be reported to a trade repository. It is 
observable that EU’s approach in re-regulating the derivatives market is different with 
the traditional administrative regulation, but aiming at constructing a new market 
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            “Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, 
         carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”1 
[Warren E. Buffet] 
 
 
In the last forty years, the financial derivatives market has experienced exponential 
growth. The global derivatives market grew from 72 trillion dollars in 1998 to 684 
trillion dollars in June 2008, as measured in notional amounts outstanding.
2
 
Meanwhile, a number of dizzying financial innovation products successively emerged, 
among which the Credit-Default-Swap (CDS) is the most stunning and controversial 
one. In retrospect, CDS was created around the mid-1990s. The banking industry 
claimed that CDS was a very useful tool for shifting burdensome credit risk off their 
balance sheet, and thus promoting the stability and efficiency of the financial system. 
Before the crisis, the trading of CDS was very popular among the financial 
institutions. It is estimated that, at the end of 2007, the CDS market had grown to a 
near-57 trillion-dollars market.
3
 However, beneath this apparent prosperity, huge risk 
had also been accumulated in the financial system. Just as Mr. Buffett predicted, 
CDSs turned out to be the “Financial Weapon of Mass Destruction,” which exploded 
the U.S. financial system in 2008 and caused a global financial tsunami.  
As we have witnessed, in 2008 a number of famous Wall Street financial firms 
failed successively. Firstly, in March 2008, Bear Sterns was taken over by the 
JPMorgan on a fire-sale price due to its losses in derivatives trading, which preluded 
                                                             
 
1
 See Warren E. Buffett, “2002 Chairman’s letter – Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,” available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf, last visited on 13 March 2015.  
2
 European Central Bank (ECB), “OTC Derivatives and Post-trading Infrastructures,” September 2009. 
3
 See Bank for International Settlements (BIS), “Triennial Central Bank Survey, Foreign exchange and 
derivatives market activity,” December 2007. 
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the 2008 financial crisis. Then, on 14 September, Merrill Lynch was emergently sold 
to the Bank of America. On 15 September, the Wall Street fourth biggest investment 
firm Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection. Just the following day, the 
world biggest insurance company American International Group (AIG) fell into 
liquidity crisis, and the U.S. government had to bail it out as AIG is “Too-Big-To-Fail.” 
The failure of all these firms is related with the losses in CDSs transactions. It is 
therefore that CDS suddenly became notorious and well-known to the public.  
In order to prevent a next crisis resulted from the derivatives market, an in-depth 
analysis from both economic and legal perspective is justified. First of all, we shall 
figure out what roles CDSs actually played in this crisis? We consider that the answer 
to this question will become the founding corner of this dissertation, as the following 
legal researches are based on the result of this inquiry. Hence, in Part I, we are firstly 
going to analyze the relationship between the CDSs and the 2008 financial crisis. 
Secondly, we believe that, although the CDS per se is risky, the underlying legal 
environment that governs the transactions of CDSs and other derivatives is the 
fundamental institutional reason of this crisis. In other words, CDS is a financial 
instrument, which likes other risky materials, is a sword of double-edge. If it is 
soundly utilized, it could benefit the society, while if abused, it would be detrimental 
to the society. In this sense, the deciding factor of the function of those risky materials 
lies in the method of using them. It is evidenced that, driven by the greedy of the 
financial institutions, speculation on CDSs dominated the derivatives market before 
the crisis. So, we are going to question that why CDSs was misused mainly as 
speculative tools? More specifically, which legal rules facilitated the excessive 
speculation on CDSs and other derivatives? Are these legal rules legitimate? 
Moreover, we observed that, in the crisis, the financial institutions often fell into 
insolvency in a very short time span. The extreme example is that the giant insurance 
company AIG exhausted its liquidity in less than a month. Hence, we are wondering 
that why the legal rules that prevent a systemically important financial institution 
from bankruptcy did not work? Furthermore, before the crisis, AIG sold out near 400 
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billion dollars notional value CDSs to various counterparties. Why could AIG sell out 
so many CDSs protections? If credit events happen, AIG should compensate to the 
CDSs protection buyers. It seemed that the counterparties did not worry about the 
creditworthiness of AIG. Then is there any underlying legal reason for this 
phenomenon?  In Part II, we are going to answer these questions, based on a 
comprehensive inquiry into the legal rules relating to derivatives transactions. 
Although in this part, we will anchor our legal analysis on the U.S. laws, the laws of 
EU member states will be mentioned where relevant. In general, the U.S. derivatives 




Thirdly, we also observed that after the 2008 financial crisis the main financial 
regulators have realized that in order to restore the stability and confidence of the 
financial system, it is necessary to re-regulate the derivatives market. In this 
dissertation, we will focus on European Union’s regulatory reforms. In 2008, the 
G-20 was established to coordinate the regulatory response to the financial crisis. The 
main regulatory approaches towards re-regulating the derivatives market were 
developed in the G-20 meetings. Thus, the EU’s regulations shall firstly be in line 
with its international commitments. To have a clear observation, we elaborated in 
detail the European Union’s regulations in respect of the derivatives trading. But 
meanwhile we question that did the EU legislators completely noticed the problem of 
legal failures we analyzed in Part II? And could these newly enacted EU legislations 
prevent a next crisis resulted from the OTC derivatives market? In Part III, we are 




                                                             
 
4
 See e.g., Edward R.Morrison & Joerg Riegel, “Financial contracts and the New bankruptcy code: 
insulating markets from bankrupt debtors and bankruptcy judges,” Columbia Law School The Center 
for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 291, 2006. 
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Part I CDSs and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
Chapter 1 Credit Derivative Swaps and the Market 
Development before the Crisis 
 
1. Definition, jargons and trading structure of CDSs 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) was born as an instrument of “financial innovation” 
around the mid-1990s. In the financial market, it is commonly accepted that the first 
CDS was invented by Blythe Masters, who, at that time, was a banker in the 
derivatives team of JPMorgan.
5
 In 1994, JP Morgan had extended a credit line of 4.8 
billion dollars to the energy company ExxonMobil Corp. Unfortunately, in that year, 
ExxonMobil was facing a 5-billion-dollar fine resulted from the “Exxon Valdez oil 
spill” disaster that happened in 1989. Thus, the creditworthiness of Exxon would be 
greatly affected. In order to tackle with the potential credit risk of Exxon, JP Morgan 
had to prepare a gross sum of risk capital reserve, which was too costly. In this 
circumstance, Blythe Masters advanced the idea of selling the credit risk of Exxon to 
other financial institutions who would like to assume. Finally, JP Morgan found the 
counterparty, i.e. the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
They signed the first credit risk shifting contract, which signifies the entering into 
practice of CDS.
 
Through the risk transferring contract between JPMorgan and EBRD, 
the potential credit risk of one party was swiftly swapped to the other, the credit risk 
protection buyer paying the credit risk protection seller a sum of protection fees 
                                                             
 
5
 See e.g. John Lanchester, “Outsmarted High Finance vs. Human Nature,” The New Yorker, available 
at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/outsmarted>, (last visited on 31 October 2014).  
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calculated through sophisticated mathematic models,
6
 if the debtor of the original 
loan defaults the latter shall pay the prior off, otherwise, the latter would reap the 
protection fees. In this sense, the prominent derivatives law professor Frank Partnoy 
defines a CDS as “a private contract in which private parties bet on a debt issuer’s 
bankruptcy, default, or restructuring.”7  
With the development of the CDS market, a bunch of jargons were formed in the 
financial marketplace. It is notable that the CDS had been becoming increasingly 
complex in the afterwards, notwithstanding, the set of jargons and the basic trading 
structure are still applicable to those more advanced CDS instruments. To best 
understand CDS, a “plain-vanilla CDS” could be seen as an “insurance contract” from 
the economic point of view.
8
 Therefore the professionals in the CDS market also 
developed the jargon system similar with those in the insurance industry. However, 
the derivatives industry endeavored not to call CDSs as insurance so as to avoiding 
regulation under insurance law.  
In a typical CDS contract, the credit risk transfer is usually called the “protection 
buyer,” and the credit risk transferee is called the “protection seller.” The protection 
fee is named as “premium” or “risk spreads,” which will be paid on a quarterly basis 
until the CDS contract expires. The original debt is called “reference debt,” and 
correspondingly, the original debtor is called the “reference entity,” such as Exxon in 
the previous case. The incidents of reference entities’ default, bankruptcy or 
liquidation are direct threat to the benefit of credit risk protection buyers, which are in 
detail provided in the CDS contracts. And these incidents are named as “credit events.” 
The usage of these jargons were accepted and promoted by the OTC derivatives 
                                                             
 
6
 See Brendan Sapien, “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Bucket Shops to Credit Default 
Swaps,” 19 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 411, p.419, (stating that “The bankers at 
J.P. Morgan, relying in the math and science skills of MIT and CambrIbidge graduates to deconstruct 
the credit risk they were carrying, created a complex financial instrument that effectively enables one 
party to transfer its credit risk exposure to another party.”) 
7
 This definition focuses on the economic essence of the CDS, see Frank Partnoy & DavIbid A. Skeel, 
Jr, “The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,” University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 75,2007, 
p.1021.  
8
 Rene M. Stulz, “Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol.24, 2009, p.78  
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industry organization, i.e. International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 
given that most of the CDS contracts are signed under the ISDA Master Agreement. 
In ISDA’s several Master Agreements, these jargons were widely employed.9    
The trading structure of CDS could already be perceived in the JPMorgan-EBRD 
contract, nevertheless, to further illustrate the CDS trading structure and also the 
jargons we just introduced above, it is useful to take a simple example. Assume that 
Lehman Brothers granted a $1 billion 5-year loan to the General Motors (GM). After 
several months Lehman became worried about GM’s ability of repaying the money 
back. For shifting the potential credit risk of GM, Lehman bought a CDS protection 
from the America International Group (AIG). So, Lehman is the “protection buyer” 
and AIG is the “protection seller.” The $ 1 million loan between Lehman and GM is 
the “reference obligation,” correspondingly GM becomes the “reference entity” of the 
CDS contract. If any credit event occurs before the CDS contract is due,
10
 AIG shall 
compensate the losses Lehman would have suffered in the reference debt. 
Regarding the compensation duty of the protection seller, there are two options 
that could be selected. One is “physical settlement,” which means the credit protection 
buyer shall firstly deliver the ownership of the reference debt to the protection seller, 
and then the protection seller shall pay the notional amount of the reference debt to 
the former. In this case, the underlying “reference debt” shall be legally transferrable 
without the consent of the original debt issuer. Essentially, theses transferrable debt 
instruments are securities, like corporate bond, government bond or asset-backed 
securities. And the traditional loan contracts are precluded. The other option is “cash 
settlement,” under which the protection seller only needs to pay the protection buyer 
the losses of the reference debt, namely the difference between the notional value and 
the market value, and the protection buyer will retain the ownership of the reference 
debt. The second approach is more convenient for speculative transactions, as 
speculators could enter into the CDS market without really owning the underlying 
                                                             
 
9
 As to the detailed content of ISDA Master Agreement, we will discuss in chapter 5.  
10
 The ISDA 2003 definition of “credit event” covers “bankruptcy”, “failure to pay”, “restructuring”, 
“obligation acceleration”, “obligation default” and “repudiation/moratorium”. 
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debt instruments, and they do not need to buy them for delivering to the protection 
sellers when credit events happen. In this specific case above-mentioned, if GM 
defaults or bankrupts, AIG could only choose the “cash settlement.” And Lehman will 
claim the residual value of the loan to GM, or participate in the bankruptcy liquidation 
procedure of GM. The trading mechanism could be graphed in the following. 
 














It shall be highlighted that the above-described trading structure of CDSs is only 
the basic version. With the continuous innovation of this market, CDSs instruments 
were becoming more and more complex, whose underlying reference obligations 
became extremely diversified, encompassing not just traditional loans and bonds, but 
also asset-backed securities and even financial indexes. Derivatives were also further 
combined with securitization techniques, making CDSs possess characteristics of 
freely tradable securities. These more complex CDSs will be discussed below. 
Nevertheless, they share the same basic structure with the plain-vanilla CDSs as we 
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The evolution of the derivatives, particularly the CDSs, radically changed the 
facade of the financial market. Since then, the different sectors of the financial 
industry, namely the equity, insurance and derivatives market, were tightly 
interconnected. Moreover, the newly innovated CDSs, such as Index CDS and 
Synthetic CDOs, greatly promoted the market liquidity of the CDSs market, and 
thereby facilitating the risk transfer of the banking industry. However, at the same 
time, excessive speculation also dominated this market due to these more innovative 
products, thereby huge risk accumulated in the financial system before the crisis.  
2. CDSs and the relationship with other financial derivatives 
Although we will argue that CDSs played an important role in the financial crisis of 
2008, and other derivatives barely related to the breakout of the crisis, it is warrant to 
clarify the relationship between CDSs and other derivatives, provided that most of 
derivatives-aimed regulations after the crisis cover not only CDSs but almost all types 
of OTC traded derivatives. In the derivatives family, CDS is the newest species with a 
history of only around 20 years. In spite, CDSs share the same basic feature with 
other derivatives, namely, the value of which derives from the underlying assets. 
Actually, this is the reason why they are collectively called “derivatives.” 
In retrospect, the fundamental elements of derivatives have been available for 
millennia, even if the modern financial derivatives are available for little more than a 
century.
11
 The most ancient derivatives could be dated back to 1800 BC, when the 
Babylonians used derivatives contracts to bet on the fates of desert trading caravans.
12
 
In effective, the basic feature of these ancient derivative contracts is very similar with 
“wager contracts”, or, simply speaking, bets. But we could distinguish derivatives 
contracts from purely wager contracts, which we will argue below. Lately, historians 
have affirmed that around 1740 in Japan, exchange-traded derivatives, for instance, 
                                                             
 
11
 See Raffaele Scalcione, “The Derivatives Revolution: A Trapped Innovation and a Blueprint for 
Regulatory Reform,” Wolters Kluwer, 2011, p.3. 
12
 Laurent L. Jacque, Global Derivatives Debacles: From Theory to Malpractice, World Scientific 
Publishing Company, 2010, p.4. 
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futures on rice, have already occurred,
13
 that is almost a hundred years before the 
surge of commodity exchanges in North America. In fact, from the outset, the 
underlying assets of derivatives are basically commodities, like wheat, beef, oil etc., 
thereby they are called commodity derivatives. Then, with the development of 
derivatives market, the underlying assets gradually diversified. Nowadays, almost all 
the assets could become the underlying assets of derivatives, only if they could be 
recognized by the market, ranging from tangible commodities to intangible financial 
indices and even the prediction to weather. Apart from the commodity derivatives, 
other derivatives are commonly categorized as “financial derivatives.”14 According to 
this standard of categorization, CDS is a kind of financial derivative that refers to the 
creditworthiness of the reference entities. Other financial derivatives mostly traded in 
the market include interest rate derivatives and foreign currency exchange derivatives. 
These three types of derivatives consist of the majority trading volume of OTC 
derivatives in the marketplace.   
Apart from the categorization standard mentioned above, there is another 
important approach to differentiate the various derivative products. s. According 
difference of trading structures, derivatives are classified into four basic types, i.e. 
forwards, futures, swaps and options. Forward is the most primitive derivative 
contract, under which the seller agree to sell the underlying assets to the buyer on a 
fixed future date with the pre-determined price. For example, the farmer promises to 
sell 10 tons of rice to the miller in the fall with 1 dollar per kilogram. With this 
forward contract, the farmer and the miller are secured in terms of price volatility in 
the upcoming autumn, which is like buying protection policies for both parties. 
Futures are the standardized forward contracts, which are designed by the futures 
exchanges. It means that futures contracts are standardized commodity contracts with 
                                                             
 
13
 See Ulrike Shaede, “Forwards and Futures in Tokugawa-period Japan: A New Perspective on the 
Dojima Rice Market,” 13 Journal of Banking and Finance 487, 1989, p.513. (Stating that “the 
historians have affirmed that around 1740 in Japan, exchange traded futures on rice had been usually 
traded.) 
14
 But with this regard, we shall be careful that the usage of the terminology of “financial derivatives” 
sometimes could also be extended to cover commodities. 
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fixed terms, including principal clauses of quantity, quality, price of the underlying 
assets and the maturity. After approved by the relevant regulators, future contracts 
could be traded on exchanges, the price of which will be fluctuated corresponding to 
the market demand. Standardized futures saved negotiation cost of private contract 
counterparties, meanwhile could become an investment product in bulk commodities 
due to its available liquidity. Options are the contracts, in which one party has the 
right to sell (“put option”) or buy (“call option”) the underlying assets on a fixed 
future date, and the other party could not decline the exertion of the put option or call 
option of the latter. But the option owner could waive his right. Lastly, Swaps are the 
contracts that the both contract parties trade cash flow streams according to the 
contractual terms in a certain period.
 15
 Under this categorization framework, CDSs 
belong to swaps. As we observed, Forwards are traded off-the-exchange (or often said 
Over-the-Counter), futures are compulsorily traded on-the-exchange. Options and 
Swaps are traditionally privately negotiated and traded over-the-counter. However, 
standardized options and swaps could also be traded on-the-exchange or 
exchange-like electronic platforms.     
After the 2008 crisis, financial derivatives were often widely criticized and 
blamed by the media as the main cause of this crisis. However, fairly speaking, this 
judgment is not precise, given that the exchange traded commodity futures and OTC 
traded interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange derivatives functioned well 
during the crisis, rather they, to some extent, promoted the stability of the financial 
market as they provided alternative risk-protection choices. The real problem of the 
derivatives market lies in the OTC traded CDSs, which provided a perverse 
stimulation to the securitization of subprime mortgages and the CDSs trading 
information is extremely opaque. This observation drove us focus on the research on 
CDSs, but as a whole, other OTC derivatives would also be referred in this 
dissertation where relevant.   
                                                             
 
15
 See Timothy P. W. Sullivan, “Swapped Disincentives: Will Clearinghouses Mitigate the Unintended 
Effects of the Bankruptcy Code’s Swap Exemptions?” 80 Fordham Law Review 1491, 2011, p. 1495.  
17 
 
3. Main types of CDSs 
By virtue of continued innovation and advanced technology, CDSs themselves have 
also undergone a string of upgrades. More complicated version of CDSs came into the 
market. With the evolution process, three main types of CDSs emerged one after 
another: they are single-name CDSs, Index CDSs, and Synthetic CDOs. The Single 
name CDSs is the most basic type of credit default swaps, yet, before the crisis the 
trading volume of index CDSs and synthetic CDOs increased more rapidly, from nil 
to huge after 2004. The market share change of these three types of CDSs could be 
seen in the following Chart. 
 
Chart 2: The composition of the CDS market 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 




















 100% 10% 100% 100% 
 
Source: British Banker’s Association (BBA 2006 report)16 
3.1 Single-name CDSs   
Single-name CDS means that the underlying reference entity of the CDS contact is 
singular, which could be an individual corporation or a sovereign country. Single 
name CDS is also called plain-vanilla CDS. As depicted in the Lehman-AIG example 
above, the reference entity of the CDS protection contract between Lehman and AIG 
is only one – GM, so such contracts are typical single-name CDSs. Conversely, if the 
                                                             
 
16
 British Bankers’ Association, “BBA Credit Derivatives Report,” 2006. 
18 
 
number of underlying reference entity of the CDSs contracts is multiple, they will be 
called multi-name CDSs. For example, if Lehman had granted loans to two firms, and 
then bought CDSs protection referring to the creditworthiness of both the two firms, 
then this CDS contract is multi-name. In the multi-name CDSs contracts, the 
calculation of the protection fee will be more complex, the protection seller shall take 
into account the occurrence rate of the credit events in the two underlying loans. The 
later developed ones, like index CDSs, are all multi-name CDSs. Anyway, 
single-name CDS is the grounding brick to contract multi-name CDSs.
17
 
In despite of the decrease of the market share of single-name CDS, it is still the 
most commonly traded CDS, because the single-name CDSs are highly customized. 
The counterparties could negotiate specific risk transferring clauses to cater for 
particular needs, which usually vary from different protection buyers. This advantage 
could hardly be replaced by more standardized CDSs, such as Index CDSs. On the 
other side, due to the feature of high customization, there lacks market liquidity of 
single-name CDSs, and thus they could hardly become speculative instruments, which 
means they are basically served for risk-hedging before the crisis. On this regard, they 
possess different risk character with the index CDSs and synthetic CDOs. 
3.2 Index CDSs 
In 2004, several international banks gathered together created the first CDS index.
18
 
The Index CDS means CDS contracts with multiple indexed underlying reference 
entities.
19
 The constituent entities in the index usually have equal share of the 
notional amount of the index CDS contracts.
 20
 Simply speaking, a CDS index is 
similar to well-known stock indexes such as Dow Jones Industrial Average and 
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S&P500. However, instead of tracing the prices of a group of stocks, a CDS index 
tracks the price of a group of component CDSs.
21
 If any one of the component 
reference entity in the index experiences a credit event, the protection seller, usually 
the market-maker, shall pay to the Index CDSs buyers.
 22
 Therefore, the Index CDSs 
could enable investors to take synthetic exposures to a diversified and standardized 
basket of reference entities,
23
 essentially betting on the creditworthiness of a bunch of 
companies.  
Before the crisis, the most popular CDS Index in the United States was CDX, 
which was constituted by a list of 125 North America based investment grade 
corporates.
24
 Similarly, in Europe, the most active Index is the iTraxx, which 
consisted of 125 European investment grade corporates.
25
 The selection procedure of 
the constituent names (corporates) in the two indexes is almost the same. Take the 
case of iTraxx for instance, the components of the iTraxx index would be innovated 
every six months, based on a vote of the participating market makers, the unqualified 
names will be cancelled out, and the corresponding number of eligible names will be 
added into the index. The maturity of iTraxx contains 3, 5, 7, and 10 years, that could 
be sold to the buyers.
26
 By virtue of the standardization and diversification of 
reference entities, Index CDSs saved much cost for banks that face lots of loan 
counterparties, since that buying an Index CDS is much cheaper than buying a bunch 
of single name CDSs. It is therefore Index CDSs got great popularity in the banking 
industry, and overpassed the single name CDSs in a short time span. It is estimated 
that in June 2009, the index segment of CDS accounted for almost half of all CDS 
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contracts in terms of outstanding notional amounts.
27
 Meanwhile, the price discovery 
provided by CDS indexes facilitated the quick and easy sale of CDS portfolios, 
making the CDS market much more liquid than it would otherwise be.
28
 However, 
from the rapid growth of Index CDSs we might suspect that the trading of Index 
CDSs was more dominated by speculation rather than hedging, which we will reason 
later. 
It is mentionable that, besides the two omnibus indexes we have just discussed, 
there remain a number of other more sector-specific or geography-specific index 
CDSs. Among them, the most controversial one is the ABX.HE, which allows 
speculators directly betting on the price of the U.S. residential housing related 
securities.
29
 When the disclosure rates in the US housing market increased, the 
financial institutions excessively sold out ABX.HE index CDSs suffered huge losses. 
In addition, a market of trading CDS index tranches also developed. CDS contracts 
could be sold with reference to only specific tranches within a CDS index, while each 
tranche relates to a certain portion of losses. For instance, the lowest tranche could 
absorb the first 3% of losses if credit event happens as to the index, and the 
mezzanine tranche absorb the 85% of the losses, and the high-graded tranche absorb 
the reminder.
30
 The tranche index trading is the combination of index CDS with 
tranche technique of the financial engineering. As a result, the tranche index CDS 
trading could further serve more sophisticated market requirement, both risk hedging 
and speculation.  
3.3 Synthetic CDOs        
Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation, for short Synthetic CDO, is a “structured 
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finance product,” which combines the technique of “securitization” and 
“derivatization.”31 In our research, we take synthetic CDOs as a type of CDS because 
we consider that Synthetic CDOs have the same basic character with other derivatives, 
whose value derives from the underlying assets. In fact, the value of Synthetic CDOs 
comes from the underlying securities. Besides, as we cited before, synthetic CDOs is 
usually taken as a kind of credit derivatives by relevant statistics, such as the 2006 
report of British Bankers’ Association. Synthetic CDO was created around 2006, 
whose structure is based on the “cash flow” CDO. Through the sale of cash-flow 
CDOs, the originator, usually the banks that granted mortgages, intended to raise 
money from the public investors. In other words, cash-flow CDOs are the 
securitization product that links capital to the underlying assets, namely the mortgages. 
Therefore the cash-flow CDOs sellers could raise money and then grant to the 
mortgage loaners. The investors of CDOs could participate in the housing market, 
which is very attractive to normal investors that could not speculate directly through 
buying and then selling houses.  
Compared with cash-flow CDOs, the originators of Synthetic CDOs do not sell 
the mortgage related assets to Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV, which could be seemed 
as a securitization machine), but only buy CDS protection from the SPV and remain 
the mortgage related assets still on the banks’ balance sheet. Then the SPV utilizes the 
premium fee from the originators to create mimicked CDOs and sold them to the 
public investors, which has the same procedure with selling cash-flow CDOs. 
Investors buying the Synthetic CDO equals to selling CDS protection to that portion 
of CDO securities. In other words, the Synthetic CDO transfers the default risk of 
underlying securities to investors who bought the sliced Synthetic CDOs, and once 
default happens, the payment orders according to different seniority of the slices.
 32
 
To illustrate, a typical trading structure of Synthetic CDO is graphed below. The 
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originators, i.e. the banks, only intended to get rid of the credit risk of the underlying 
assets pool constituted by “mezzanine tranches” of various Mortgage Backed 
Securities (MBS). Firstly, the originator buys CDS protection from the SPV. As 
exchange, the SPV receives a sum of protection fees. Then, the SPV securitized 
different tranches of CDOs according to the risk exposure transferred from the 
originator. These sliced CDOs will be successively sold to public investors, ranging 
from investment firms, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies and also 
some high-net-worth individuals. With money received from the investors, the SPV 
bought low risk financial investment products, usually rated AAA grade, such as the 
U.S. Treasury bonds. These low-risk financial assets SPV invested formed an asset 
pool, which could get periodic interest. Public investors in the sliced Synthetic CDOs 
could get periodic interest from the receivables of the asset pool, and if there is no 
credit event happened until the expiry of the synthetic CDOs, the investors could 
retrieve their principals and reap the pre-fixed premium. However, if any credit event 
occurs as to the reference underlying mortgage securities, the SPV shall sell the assets 
in the assets pool to compensate the originator, and corresponding losses will be 
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Hence, through the issue of Synthetic CDOs, the underlying mortgage risk of the 
banks could be firstly transferred to the SPVs, but actually such risk is transferred to 
the CDO investors, in the form of sliced CDO securities. Compared to a traditional 
CDS contract, usually one financial institution is the credit risk protection seller, in 
Synthetic CDOs, public securities investors are the ultimate risk protection seller. It is 
important that, be different with cash-flow CDOs, the creation of synthetic CDOs 
does not require the actual existence of the underlying assets in the originators’ 
balance sheet, therefore, the originators could buy as much as CDS protections from 
SPVs, and thus transfer many-fold risk to the public investors. It is reported that, 
around 2006 when the U.S. housing market was irrationally hot, all wanted to invest 
in the housing market or in the housing related CDO securities, yet, the quantity of the 
underlying mortgages was not enough to create CDOs so as to satisfy the investors, 
and just in this background, the synthetic CDOs were created. In this sense, we 
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a more active role in the breakout of the 2008 financial crisis because they multiplied 
the losses of the whole market.
33
 This argument will be further elaborated in the next 
chapter.       
4. Economic Functions of CDSs 
4.1 Hedging 
From the economic perspective, hedging existed credit risk in the banks’ balance 
sheet is the first and foremost function of CDSs, and this is the reason why they had 
been created.
34
 Potential credit risk is the main threat to banks. Credit risk refers to 
that the banks could not be repaid by their counterparties they had loaned money to.
35
  
In the sense of hedging, the CDSs could be deemed as insurance policies that bought 
by banks or other companies to avoid possible future credit risk.
36
 In fact, CDSs 
attributed these banks and other companies another risk-manage tool, which is very 
useful when, for example, the banks think they had taken too much risk exposure to a 
specific company or a specific sector. In other words, CDSs buyers could shift their 
risk exposures that have been heavily taken. One might wonder that, in this case, 
banks could assign the loan that they do not want to maintain any longer. 
Theoretically it is viable, but practically speaking, almost all banks will not do so 
because banks usually do not want to jeopardize the good relationship they have 
accumulated with their clients, provided that if the bank transfers a loan to a third 
party shall notify the debtor and that would usually imply the decline of the 
creditworthiness of the debtor in the financial market. So, the debtor would be 
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strongly against such behaviors of the banks.
37
 However, through the usage of CDSs, 
banks could transfer the credit risk of certain debtors without letting that debtor be 
informed, although which has the same economic function as assigning the loan. 
Therefore, CDSs have unique advantages in hedging credit risk and this is why they 
became very popular among the banks. Not to mention that banks could transfer credit 
risk of a basket of debtors through buying relevant Index CDSs, saving a sum of 
hedging cost.  
It is mentionable that an important underlying motivation for banks to hedge 
credit risk through CDSs is that their capital burden required by the Basel Capital 
Accord could, to some extent, be released, particularly when the loan amount is quite 
huge and the risk is rising.
38
 Banks, in turn, could channel the released capital to 
more profitable activities.  
4.2 Speculation 
CDSs could also be used for speculation just like exchange-traded shares and 
commodity futures. This is exactly the most distinguishing difference with insurance 
policies. While policy-holder could only buy the insurance when he actually possess 
the underlying assets, for instant the real estate, and face potential losses, CDSs 
buyers could buy any quantity of CDSs protections against any reference entities that 
do not have any relations with the buyer. Namely, the buyers of CDSs could be purely 
speculators, betting the happening of credit events. Or, the speculators could sell the 
CDSs when the CDSs price, i.e. the premium fee, gets higher. This is the same with 
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the trading strategy in the stock market: buy low and sell high. 
We highly appreciate the function of hedging-purpose traded CDSs for the whole 
financial system as they provided an efficient and swift risk transferring mechanism, 
yet we believe that excessive and unregulated speculative CDSs trading could destroy 
the market. However, unfortunately, before the crisis, the trading volume of 
speculative CDSs transactions greatly surpassed the hedging ones. It is estimated that 
almost 80 percent of the credit default market was traded by firms that do not own the 
underlying debt.
39
 It was also argued that with the value of the CDS market, larger 
than the bonds and loans that the contracts reference, it is obvious that speculation has 
grown to be the most common function for a CDS contract.
40
Although lack of precise 
statistics, we are confident that index CDSs and synthetic CDSs are more traded as 
speculations than the single-name CDSs because they are more standard and liquid, so 
the speculation cost would be much lower than the single-name CDSs. As 
commentated by Gillian Tett that “due to the change of the trading purpose, the 
market had become extremely perilous.”41 
How CDSs could be popular speculative instruments in the financial market? 
Several reasons could be perceived. Firstly, CDSs could enable market participants to 
take long or short positions on the credit quality of any reference entity, including 
firms, sovereign states and even mortgage securities, without actually holding the 
underlying assets, namely the relevant bonds and securities.
42
  
Secondly, the speculations on CDSs would be more efficient and cost-saving than 
speculations on the economically-relevant securities. For example, a speculator who 
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takes a long view towards the subprime mortgage, he can sell CDS protections against 
the mortgage securities. This is what had been done before the crisis by a bunch of 
financial institutions. In selling such CDSs, these financial institutions did not need to 
buy mortgage-backed securities; instead, they only need to promise to compensate the 
CDSs buyers if credit events really happen. By doing so, they could save the capital in 
directly investing in the securities market. And for the CDS buyers who take a short 
view against the mortgage, they also did not need to actually by the mortgage-backed 
securities, but paying CDSs protection fees to the relevant CDSs sellers. When credit 
event happen, the CDSs buyers could get the notional amount of the mortgage-backed 
securities, which is much more than the protection fees and thus be attractive to these 
investors. As the protection fees are less than the notional amount of relevant 
securities, for the short investors, a sum of capital could also be saved.  
Besides, the CDSs contract buyer could also transfer these contracts to investors 
if the buying price of the same CDSs becomes higher, namely the premium or the 
protection spread is increased. In this case, CDSs contract is like stocks, but they are 
not the same because they comply with different assignment rules that we will discuss 
later. Thus, the market liquidity has given CDSs buyers another way to withdraw from 
the market in advance of the maturity date. Just because of the availability and 
flexibility of CDSs, speculative transactions could become perversely prosperous 
before the crisis. Doubtlessly, those speculations promoted the happening of the crisis 
and increased the volatility in credit spreads during the crisis. 
5. Features of CDSs 
5.1 High leverage 
Although CDSs, from the economic perspective, have become very similar with other 
securities since that they share commonality as investable financial products, CDSs 
have some distinguishable features, which make them more dangerous to the financial 
system. We shall take caution of these special features.  
28 
 
Firstly, CDSs are transactions with high leverages. We believe that Loss is often 
the fuse, and the high leverage is the real bomb. As a common used strategy of 
commercial firms, leverage describes the ability to use one dollar to control multiple 
dollars of assets as well as the ability to use one dollar to capture the return of 
multiple dollars on any given asset.
43
 For short, leverage refers to the ability to carry 
what scale of transaction with per capital. In this regard, CDSs are financial 
instruments with higher embedded leverage. To illustrate, the annual premium fee of a 
typical CDS contract with maturity of 5 years is around $ 70 cents in relation to 
notional amount of $100 reference assets. The total premium fee the protection buyer 
would pay to the CDSs seller is $3.5 if no credit event happens. However, once any 
credit event happens, the protection seller shall pay out $100 to the buyer, which 
means that the leverage ratio in this CDS contract is 100:3.5, approximately 30:1. The 
high leverage brought lots of speculators enter into the CDSs market as they only 
need invest little money while waiting for potential much bigger returns. However, 
the most dangerous thing is that the inherent high leverage of CDSs could directly 
lead to “jump-to-default” risk to those financial institutions excessively sell CDS 
protections, especially in an environment of scant regulation. In practice, many 
financial institutions highly involved in the CDSs market, betting the depreciation of 
mortgages or seeking the premium fees. As reported, in 2007, Bear Sterns had the 
leverage ratio of 33 to 1; and Lehman Brothers had the leverage ratio of 40 to 1.
44
  
5.2 Off-balance trading 
In the common accepted accounting practices, financial derivatives transactions are 
usually not listed in the balance-sheet, sometimes they might be annotated outside the 
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balance-sheet. This is because that derivatives trading do not involve tangible physical 
exchanges. Like other financial derivatives, CDSs trading is also an off-balance sheet 
according to normal financial reporting standards.
45
 Therefore, the CDSs transaction 
information of a company could not be disclosed by the financial statements, which 
means that the neither shareholders of the company, the creditor banks nor financial 
regulators could fully understand the potential risk of the company due to derivatives 
trading. And the counterparties could also appreciate the derivatives trading situation 
of these companies. Therefore, they could not evaluate the risk exposure of 
derivatives trading of their counterparties. Namely the creditworthiness of their 
counterparties could not be evaluated by themselves, but the market participants could 
only rely on the grading of the Credit Rating firms, like the Moody’s. So, if the 
grading of these rating firms is problematic, all the financial transactions would be 
based on misleading information and could be risky to the whole financial system. 
Hence, the off-balance accounting practice of CDSs transactions is also one of the 
reasons, making the CDS market opaque. The opaqueness inhibited financial 
regulators timely and efficiently intervene into this market after the 2008 crisis broke 
out.    
5.3 Over-the-Counter trading  
As we have mentioned above, CDS is a kind of over-the-counter (OTC) traded 
derivatives, which is different with on-the-exchange traded commodity futures or 
share price index futures. The most distinguishing feature of OTC traded products is 
that they could be negotiated by the counterparties in terms of concrete contract terms, 
thus they are more apt to accommodate individual specific trading objective. 
Moreover, they also have an advantage of confidentiality. Without the consent of the 
counterparty, the other could not disclose the concrete content of the contracts. This 
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inherent character of OTC CDSs trading, to some extent, has been changed when 
more standard Index CDSs and synthetic CDS came into the market, provided that 
these CDSs are usually traded on the electronic platforms of the market makers, i.e 
the qualified banks. So, part of the trading information could be obtained by these 
banks that operate the electronic trading platform. However, before the crisis, these 
newly arisen trading venues were out of the regulatory purview, therefore trading 
information was not efficiently maintained by these platforms and regulators could 
not timely access to the precious trading information of CDSs.
46
 Therefore, the 
opaqueness of the CDSs market has already been determined by the intrinsic feature 
of OTC trading.  
6. Legal nature of CDSs 
6.1 Contracts or securities 
For the legal analysis, we shall firstly accurately determine the legal nature of these 
CDSs products.
47
 However, as they are newly grown up financial products and many 
aspects of CDSs have been under evolution, so there is no consensus to this question. 
An urgent question to answer is that “are they normal contracts or securities?” For 
sure, these single-name CDSs privately negotiated and traded OTC are contracts, but 
as for the index CDSs and other more standardized CDSs contracts, the answer might 
not be definite. Yet, if we could not carefully solve this problem, we could not 
ascertain which regulatory rule shall apply to these CDSs, and which financial 
regulator shall be responsible for monitoring these CDSs. 
Someone argued that index CDSs and some other standard CDSs products could 
be deemed as securities because they could be easily assigned to third parties, which 
is just like buying and selling exchange-traded stocks. For professionals in the 
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financial market, they also do not care about the difference between the legal nature of 
securities and CDSs, for them, they are all commonly called the financial 
instruments.
48
 Moreover, as the index CDSs are traded on the electronic platform, 
whose prices could be timely indicated.
49
 Besides, the index CDSs contracts are, in 
fact, assigned several times before the contracts maturity is due. Hence, viewed from 
the appearance, they are really akin to securities, i.e. that are movable property. So, 
many people are confused about the legal nature of such CDSs. 
Nevertheless, we consider that, legally speaking, the Index CDSs are still 
contracts, not movable securities. The reason is simple. Although index CDSs could 
be easily assigned and they have prices like other movable property, the transfer of 
which shall still comply with the general legal rule of contract assignment, namely, 
only the credit right could be transferred with a notice to the obligator, and obligation 
could not be transferred without the consent of the creditor.
50
 But a privately owned 
securities or movable properties could be freely transferred according to one’s own 
willing. In practice, the time of assignment of index CDSs contracts has been greatly 
shortened according to the request of the derivatives industry, but the contract parties 
still need to obey with the contract assignment rule, i.e. the index CDSs buyers shall 
get consent from the index CDSs sellers, usually the market-makers. Nevertheless, we 
think that the legal of index CDSs and other similar standard CDSs is blurred by the 
practice, and they might be considered as one special type of securities under 
securities regulation and supervision. As to synthetic CDOs, they are sold in the form 
of securities with the inner essence of derivatives; we could call them securitized 
derivatives. Hence, for synthetic CDOs, they should definitely be regulated according 
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to the securities law regime. 
6.2 Insurance contracts 
The legal nature of CDSs contracts could also be confused with insurance policies, 
especially in relation to the single-name CDSs. From the economic perspective, 
buyers of CDS contracts bought credit risk protection from the CDSs sellers, which is 
exactly the same with buying property insurance policies.
51
 However, according to 
insurance law, the policy holder shall possess “insurable interest” in relation to the 
object of the insurance, i.e. property or health and so on. It means that the policy 
holders shall have direct interest with the insurance object, if any losses occur in 
relation with the insurance object, the policy holders will incur economic or physical 
losses as well. This principle aims at avoiding “moral hazard.” For example, if you do 
not own a house but you have bought a fire insurance policy against the house, then 
probably you would burn the house, deceiving the insurance company so as to get 
compensations. But in the CDSs market, the protection buyers are not required to 
really have the potential risk, namely the reference debt. So, anyone could buy CDSs 
contracts from the seller and any quantity of CDSs protections could be bought. And 
these transactions without holding underlying risk are exactly the speculative CDSs 
transactions. In this sense, speculative traded CDSs contacts are intrinsically different 
with insurance policies.  
After the crisis, people have realized unregulated CDSs could generate huge risk. 
Thus some scholars proposed that CDSs trading shall be regulated under the legal 
framework of insurance law. In this way, speculative CDSs transactions will be 
inhibited by law. However, this proposal received little resonates, neither from the 
regulators nor from scholars. Generally, there are two antagonistic standpoints. One is 
that appropriate speculative transactions could promote market liquidity and thus 
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reducing the hedging cost of buying CDSs contracts. Another one is that most of the 
market participants in the derivatives market are financial institutions that usually 
have the ability to protect themselves. Yet, in the insurance market, lots of insurance 
policy holders are individuals who need more protection from mandatory law. This 
difference of market composition could justify that CDSs are not suitable and 
necessary strictly regulated just as insurance. 
6.3 Gambling contracts  
Are CDSs contracts gambling contracts? Many people would wonder that CDSs 
trading is similar with gambling, or betting, especially as to those speculative 
transactions, considering that the buyers of the CDSs just want to get the final 
compensations if credit event happens or to seek for the inflation of the CDSs prices if 
they assign them before the maturity date; meanwhile the CDSs buyers are betting 
that no credit event would happen and then they could reap the protection fees. 
Economically speaking, they are actually the same with bets. This claim has also been 
affirmed by the famous derivatives Professor Stout, who stated that “derivatives are 
literally bets – agreements between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money 
determined by whether or not a particular event occurs in the future. Buying CDSs is 
just as buying a betting ticket at the racetrack for horses.”52 
Nevertheless, whether they should be legally viewed as gambling contracts, i.e. 
game contracts in civil law terminology and wagers in common law, is problematic. 
Firstly, as to the hedging CDSs contracts, they should definitely not be considered as 
gambling contracts because the core goal of them lies in hedging risk rather than 
betting. Secondly, for those speculative CDSs, if they are considered as gambling 
contracts, the performance of which would not be legally supported, and thus 
speculative CDSs trading would be greatly inhibited. This might be good for 
controlling potential risk due to excessive speculation, but it would also damage the 
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market liquidity of the CDSs market and correspondingly raise the hedging cost of 
buying CDSs. There is always a value-balance between security and efficiency. 
However, considering speculative CDSs as gambling contracts seems outdated, and 
which might not be a wise option for regulators towards re-regulating the CDSs 
market.  
7. Market development of CDSs before the 2008 financial 
crisis 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the market size of CDSs experienced huge growth. 
To quantify the market volume of CDSs, we looked into the statistics collected by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which took semiannual and triennial survey 
in relation to OTC derivatives as of the end of 2004.
53
 These statistics provided two 
types of data: the notional amounts of the outstanding OTC derivatives and the gross 
market values of the outstanding OTC derivatives. The notional value is the quantity 
that we usually used for describing the market size of the outstanding OTC 
derivatives, including CDSs. It has been revealed in the data of BIS that at the end of 
2004, the aggregate notional amount of the outstanding CDSs is 6,396 billion US 
dollars, which doubled each year after that and the its size peaked in 2007 to 57,894 
billion dollars. In other words, the CDSs market increased almost 10 times in less than 
4 years, which obviously is the rapidest growth one among all OTC financial 
derivatives.
54
 However, the notional amount of the CDSs contracts does not mean the 
total market risk, as notional amount value only refers to the aggregation of the 
notional value of all CDSs contracts, namely the aggregation value of the reference 
debts, specifically, the aggregation value of the underlying loans, bonds and 
securities.  
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Chart 4: The size of CDSs market (in billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: Bank for international Settlements 
 
However, as we know, in the marketplace, traders of CDSs could buy 
countervailing CDSs contracts to offsetting original ones when they do not want to 
keep the former risk exposure any more. In this case, there would be two equal 
notional amount CDSs in the market, and the notional value of which will both be 
calculated into the aggregate market notional value. Yet, with exactly opposite 
directions, the risk exposure of the countervailing CDSs could be offset and would not 
harm the market if proper multilateral off-setting arrangements have been laid down.
55
 
Therefore, the BIS provided the net notional amount data to reveal real money losses  
if default happens, that is the aggregate payments that would be made in the event of 
the default of a reference entity, assuming the market value of defaulting bonds is 
equal to zero.
56
 At the end of 2008, the net notional amount of the whole CDSs 
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market is 5.65 trillion US dollars, which is nearly 1/10 of the gross notional amount. 
This gap between gross notional value and net vale was greatly contracted since the 
wider usage of compression service after the crisis. According to Vause (2010) the 
gross notional value of the CDSs has more than halved since the peak of 2007 
because of the great development of compression mechanism, while CDS trading has 
continued to grow even after 2007. Over all, the notional value is more appropriate to 
indicate the risk exposure to the counterparty, namely the counterparty risk; while the 




The gross notional value had been much bigger than the net notional value also 
indicated that speculations dominated this market as the buyers tended to assign the 
CDSs contracts to reap the arisen spread price. But before the crisis, multinational 
netting mechanism was not widely used in this market, so the traders of CDSs usually 
face the counterparty risk and a “risk chain” was formed, in which market participants 
know their direct counterparties but not the parties further down the chain.
58
 
Meanwhile another important market feature of CDSs has also been observed. 
Although the market is active, most of the market participants are financial 
institutions, especially the CDSs market dealers. It is estimated that 88% of the 
protection buyers and 86% of protection sellers are banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies.
59
 Even further, the CDSs transactions were concentrated 
among the biggest market dealers, according to the 2005 data of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States, 96% of the total notional 
amount of credit derivatives business were transacted by five largest commercial 
banks, and more than 99% were transacted by the top 25 banks.
60
 This situation is the 
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same in Europe, the top ten counterparties of surveyed large European banks account 
for 62-72% of their CDS exposures.
61
 Furthermore, as the CDSs market was highly 
concentrated within a limited number of financial institutions, i.e. large banks, 
investment firms, hedge funds and insurance companies, the whole financial market 
was tightly interconnected through the chain of CDSs transactions. Without 
appropriate multilateral netting arrangement, counterparty risk could be evolved into a 
systemic contagion risk, one party’s default would trigger “domino effect” along the 
CDSs trading network, which became the biggest concern of the banking industry.
62
  
It is mentionable that the European Union has become the most important region of 
OTC derivatives transactions. According to the report of British Bankers Association 
(BBA), Europe took over 44% OTC derivatives market share globally, while the US 
took over 38%.
63
 Particularly, as for CDSs, global market share of counterparties 
located in the EU is 35%, while this data is 21% in the US.
64
 In fact, the OTC 
derivatives market is a highly-international market. As long as local market regulation 
does not impose access barriers, participants can connect and trade remotely and 
seamlessly from around the world, e.g. from their London trading desk to the 
Eurex-Exchange in Frankfurt.
65
 And in order to compete for more market share, EU 
and the US even struggle to provide least regulation as to derivatives trading, though 
not clearly spoken out. Nevertheless, this is exactly the scenario before the crisis 
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Chapter 2 CDS and its role in the 2008 global 
financial crisis 
 
In chapter 1, the basic information of CDSs market has been illustrated, from which 
we might have already be conscious that CDSs trading is risky, and without 
appropriate regulation, they could threaten the safety of the financial system. But, are 
they really related with the breakout of the 2008 financial crisis, as widely blamed by 
the media or some scholars, or they are just the scapegoat, namely not the real cause 
of this crisis?
66
 Notwithstanding, we would like firstly assume that the happening of 
this crisis is, for sure, the result of the combination of a bunch of factors, ranging from 
the regulatory failure, macroeconomic context and even the greedy nature of human 
beings and so on. We are not going to differentiate which factors are related and 
which ones are extraneous. For our work, we will concentrate on the roles CDSs have 
played in the crisis. To find the answers, we would firstly go through the happening 
process of this crisis.   
1. The evolution processes of the 2008 financial crisis 
In retrospect, the 2008 global financial crisis generally went through three successive 
stages: starting from the U.S. Subprime crisis to the Wall Street banking credit crisis 
and finally evolved into the global financial crisis. 
Before 2007, the U.S. housing industry had experienced a long period of 
prosperity. The prices of real estate more than doubled in more than a hundred 
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metropolitan areas, for example in Los Angeles, Miami, Atlantic City and so forth.
67
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. homeownership rate reached to a historical-high record level of 
68.1%.
68
 In fact, increasing home ownership has been the goal of several US 
administrations, including the Roosevelt, Regan, Clinton and the Bush government. 
Therefore, the homeownership rise was endorsed by US government policies, such as 
the “affordable housing policy” advanced by the Bush Administration.69 Under the 
general background of economy and the government policy, the U.S. real estate 
industry went into irrational prosperity.  
Over the years before the crisis, houses turned out to be not merely places for 
settling down families, but the most-recommended speculative commodity. Just as 
one vividly depicted that it seems the whole country of the United States has been 
immersed into the euphoria of constructing houses and buying houses. While wealthy 
people speculated on houses, normal people also wanted to participate in the 
speculation on houses. When the housing price was rising, the mortgage loan 
standards were greatly declined, householders could easily bought houses borrowing 
money from the mortgage loan banks. It seems that the mortgages would never 
default, and actually in these years before the crisis broke out, the US mortgage 
default rate was historically low. Thus, the mortgage banks went further, downgrading 
the mortgage standards to the “subprime householders” around 2002,70 which turned 
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out to be a big mistake. Lots of people who would not have the capacity to buy houses 
entered into the housing market, which increased the risk of the banking industry. 
When the banks perceived that the risk could make them into danger, they 
irresponsibly transferred them into the financial market. Hence huge risk accumulated 
within the financial system.  
The U.S. housing market was quietly changing after 2004. The US governors 
were worried about the irrational housing market, which had caused high inflation. In 
fact, since 2000 after the breakout of the internet bubble, the Federal Reserve excised 
a very-low interest rate policy aiming at promoting investment and correspondingly 
raising the employment rate. However, after 2004 the first aim of Federal Reserve has 
changed into fighting with high-inflation, though the economic increase was 
moderate.
71
 From 2004, the U.S. Federal Reserve gradually raised the federal fund 
rate from 1% to 5.25%.
72
 In response to the federal fund rate, the mortgage loan rate 
was also climbing rapidly, in particular, the adjustable-rate of subprime mortgages 
suddenly spiked. Suddenly, most of subprime mortgage borrowers found they could 
not afford the mortgages any more, even they found their house value became less 
than the remainder mortgage loans. Therefore, from the spring of 2006, the US 
subprime crisis began float to the surface: lots of subprime householders abandoned 
the houses and the disclosure rate suddenly rose up (See charter 5 below). When the 
houses were disclosed and resold to the market, the housing price accurately went 
down. Till 2008, home prices in many cities of the US declined more than 20%, like 
Phoenix chalked up -32.7%, Las Vegas down 31.7, San Francisco down 31%, Miami 
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down 29%, Los Angeles down 27.9%.
73
 Hence, the mortgage loan lenders, mostly the 
local mortgage banks and commercial banks, encountered huge losses. On 2
nd
 April 
2007, the New Century Financial Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection, which 
became the largest subprime mortgage lender ever to fail.
74
 After that, the housing 
market continued to deteriorate, in July 2007, a number of mortgage-related financial 
institution bankrupted, symbolized the comprehensive eruption of the U.S. subprime 
crisis. Then, the crisis extended to the Wall Street banks, the heart of the whole 
financial system.   
 











Source data: RealtyTrac Press Releases of “U.S. Foreclosure market report” 
As the mortgage lenders failed down, losses rapidly spread to the Wall Street 
investment banks, for that, in practice, the Wall Street banks bought lots of mortgage 
loans from the local banks and then securitized these loans. Moreover, these 
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investment banks not just sold the mortgage-tied securities, but also bought lots of 
these securities and related derivative products, thereby risks passed to Wall Street 
banks via the credit chain. In August 2007, the fifth biggest U.S. investment bank 
Bear Stearns announced the bankruptcy of its two “High-Grade” hedge funds due to 
the huge losses in subprime mortgage-related securities.
75
 The bankruptcy of the two 
hedge funds resulted in a sum of 1.9 billion dollars write-down on Bear’s book, which 
made the counterparties of Bear Stearns began to question its financial stability.
76
 In 
March 2008, Bear’s repo lenders –mostly money market mutual funds – increasingly 
requested Bear to post more collateral and pay higher interest rates. Then other 
counterparties of Bear also claimed the same request, suddenly increased collateral 
requirements directly paralyzed the operation of this famous company.
77
 Just in two 
days, the bank’s capital reserve was depleted. In order to prevent bankruptcy, Bear 
Stearns had to agree the fire-sale price taken-over by JP Morgan Chase under the 
orchestration of the U.S. government.
78
 Due to the similar losses with Bear Stearns, 
all other big names in the Wall Street were endangered. In September 2008, the Wall 
Street crisis peaked. On 14 September, Merrill Lynch was acquired by the Bank of 
America because of the bankruptcy threat. The next day, on 15 September 2008, the 
fourth biggest U.S. investment bank - Lehman Brothers - filed for bankruptcy 
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protection after a string of fruitless capital injection efforts.
79
 On 16 September, the 
world largest insurance giant AIG exhausted its liquidity and applied for the 
government bailout mainly because of the derivatives trading against the 
mortgage-related assets. Everybody shocked as the financial tsunami was coming. 
When the heart of the financial system shut down, the whole capital market abruptly 
contracted. In a borderless financial world, the financial tsunami rapidly spread to the 
main financial centers. The stock market indexes plummeted steeply in the main 
global stock exchanges, ranging from US, the Europe and the Asia.
80
  
After reviewing the breakout process of the crisis, we are convinced that the 
excessive and irrational grant of subprime mortgage loans is the direct reason of the 
2007 Subprime crisis, and then the 2008 financial crisis. Then, what is the role CDSs 
played in this crisis? We are going to analyze that CDSs facilitated the granting of 
subprime mortgage loans which could be one of the underlying factor of the subprime 
crisis. Furthermore, we are going to argue that the CDSs transactions exacerbated the 
crisis because on the one hand excessive CDSs transactions magnified the losses 
related to subprime mortgages loans, and on the other hand irrational CDSs trading 
paralyzed the financial system important institutions. 
2. CDSs promoted the breakout of the 2008 financial crisis   
As we have described the losses in subprime mortgage loans is the direct reason of the 
bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy of many banks during the crisis. But, we would 
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wonder that why these banks extended so much mortgages to the subprime 
householders? And though the housing market is upside before the crisis, didn’t the 
mortgage loaners worry about the credit risk of the subprime debtors? After inquiry, 
we found that the credit risk could be swiftly shifted through securitization or 
derivatives transactions. Thus, the mortgage loan banks thought they could 
appropriately manage the risk while reaping benefits from extending mortgages to 
subprime householders.   
2.1 Securitization changed the traditional counterparty credit 
risk control model of extending mortgages 
Firstly, banks could transfer the risk of subprime mortgages through securitization 
mechanism. In the mortgage securitization market, there are two main kinds of 
securities, namely Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and Collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs). MBSs are securities directly derived from the mortgage loans 
through the securitization process, while CDOs are more complicate, whose 
underlying assets could be MBSs and other asset-backed securities. It is therefore that 
CDOs are usually called “re-securitization financial products.” 81  Although this 
difference, the securitization process is almost the same, and most importantly, both 
these products transferred the credit risk of mortgage loans to the securities holders. 
The securitization of loans is a big step in financial market. In the 1960s, U.S. banks 
found they could not keep pace with the market demand for residential mortgages 
with their own capitals, most from the deposits of their clients. Under this background, 
the mortgage-backed securities market developed.
82
 The rapid growth of this industry 
happened from 2000 to 2006, and this period was characterized as a huge increase in 
what is termed subprime mortgage lending.
83
 Thus, the subprime mortgage loans 
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granted in this period were mostly transformed into MBSs or other related securities. 
These securities were very popular in the financial market, especially the MBSs and 
CDOs created by the quasi-governmental agencies, like, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac 
and Ginnie Mae.
84
 To illustrate this securitization process, let us take a simplified 
example. First of all, the bank extended subprime mortgage loans to, for instance, 100 
householders, itemized as 1, 2, 3 … 99 and 100. The total value of these loans equals 
to 100 million dollars. To securitize them, this bank packaged the loans and sold the 
package to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is an independent legal entity, 
usually created by the bank due to the consideration of “bankruptcy isolation,” from 
the bank per se.
85
 So, the bank assigned the ownership of the mortgage loans to the 
SPV for exchange of cashes. Then, in order to provide funds to purchase the packaged 
100 subprime mortgages loans, the SPV opens the securitization machine, issuing 
MBSs based on these package loans. In order to cater for different risk appetites of 
investors,
86
 the SPV will divide the MBSs into different tranches with different-level 
of loss priority. Usually, the MBSs or CDOs would be sliced into at least three 
tranches: i.e. the senior tranche, the mezzanine tranche and the equity tranche. And in 
this case, the 100 million dollars value underlying assets will be the collaterals for the 
future cash flow to the sliced MBSs, and according to which 80 million dollars senor 
tranche MBSs (rated as AAA rating grade), 15 million mezzanine tranche MBSs 
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(rated as BBB), and 5 million equity tranche MBSs (no rating) would be produced.
87
 
(See below the Chart 6 on the securitization process) Pay attention that the CDO 
discussed here is cash-flow CDO, not Synthetic CDO.
88
   
 
Chart 6: The securitization process           
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Before the crisis, the senior tranche MBSs were very popular because of its high 
credit rating, whereas the mezzanine tranches were less attractive for investors.
89
 And 
the SPV would maintain the equity tranche on its own book due to its very low or no 
credit rating. So, in order to sell out as much as possible the MBSs, these lower rated 
MBSs were re-securitized into CDOs.
90
 For example, the mezzanine MBSs in the 
case above would be re-securitized. Commonly, for instance, 65% of the mezzanine 
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tranche MBSs could be re-securitized into AAA rated senior tranche CDOs, 25% of 
which will be turned into mezzanine CDOs, and the last 10% would become equity 
tranche CDOs after the second securitization process. This means that 90 million 
dollars, that is [100 million * (80% + 65%*15%)], AAA rated securities related to the 
original 100 mortgage loans would be produced ultimately.
91
 (See the 
re-securitization process in Chart 7 below) The risker CDOs are popular for those 
more eager investors, such as hedge funds. In a short time, big names on the Wall 
Street, i.e. Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch 
and so on, all highly participated in the production of MBSs and CDOs. One the one 
hand, they thought they could make huge commission fees through the securitization 
process, as usually called the Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) model, on the other hand 
the underlying risk of subprime mortgages could be mostly transferred to the 
securities holders. However, the crisis manifested that, in effect, the risk had not been 
shifted to others, rather mostly remained in these investment firms. Professor Hull 
observed this and clearly indicated the reason. He argued that while the securitization 
department originated and distributed these mortgage-related securities, the asset 




We believe that the securitization of mortgage loans contributed to the breakout 
of the crisis, for that through the securitization process the credit chain in relation to 
subprime mortgages was prolonged. Traditionally, banks who grant loans directly 
monitor the creditworthiness of the loanees in order to avoid credit risk. However, this 
counterparty-risk control model has been changed. Due to the securitization, local 
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mortgage banks could sell the loans to the Wall Street investment banks for 
securitization. And the Wall Street banks sold the mortgage loans to the SPVs, then 
SPV securitize the underlying mortgages into MBSs or CDOs, which would be 
further sold to the securities market. Hence, the banks directly extended mortgage 
loans would probably decrease their loan-granting standards, given that they, in turn, 
will sold them out to the securitizers.
93
 This is exactly the scenario before the crisis. 
Excessive subprime mortgages, that should not have granted, were extended. The total 
amount of mortgage-backed securities issued almost tripled between 1996 and 2007, 
to 7.3 trillion dollars. The securitized share of subprime mortgages, i.e., those passed 
to third-party investors via MBSs, increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006.
94
 A 
sample of 735 CDO deals originated between 1999 and 2007 showed that subprime 
and other less-than-prime mortgages represented an increasing percentage of CDO 
assets, rising from 5% in 2000 to 36% in 2007.
95
 The mortgage-backed securities 
directly promoted the propagation of US housing bubble that burst in 2007.
96
   
2.2 CDSs facilitated the securitization process 
As we have mentioned above, mortgage-related securities were mostly bought by 
financial institutions, like the investment banks themselves, the hedge funds, common 
funds and others. These sophisticated mortgage-related securities holders did realized 
the potential risk of buying these securities, especially after 2006 when the housing 
market is changing. But they did not stop creating and buying the mortgage-backed 
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securities. Instead, they turned to the CDSs market, buying risk protections against 
these assets. This seems a conventional strategy in the market. Media, like Chicago 
Public Radio, Huffinton Post, and ProPublica etc., reported that market participants, 
including the hedge fund Magnetar Capital, encouraged the creation of CDOs 
containing low quality mortgages, as they could bet against them using CDS, and they 
encouraged their clients to purchase CDOs while simultaneously betting against them, 
while without legal obligation of disclosing the latter bet.  
In short, mortgage-related securities investors could buy CDSs protection against 
the default of these securities, hence CDSs helped to expand the market for the 
creation of MBSs and CDOs. Therefore, the securitization of mortgages and the 
buying of CDSs protection are the two crucial nodes in this credit chain of mortgage 
loans. In practical, huge amount of CDSs had been issued against the 
mortgage-backed securities. While CDSs just came into existence in the mid-1990s, 
their development was exactly in line with the growth of the mortgage-backed 
securities, which peaked in 2007 to 57 trillion dollars of outstanding value. An 
extreme case is that AIG solely sold out near 80 billion CDS protection against CDOs. 
Thus, as also concluded by the report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in 
January 2011, the CDSs facilitated the securitization of mortgage loans, and from 
doing so fueled the U.S. housing bubble. 
3. CDSs exacerbated the 2008 financial crisis 
3.1 CDSs magnified the losses relating to subprime mortgages   
CDSs, as an investment instrument, underwrote by the CDSs sellers in relation to the 
underlying mortgage-backed securities, could amplify the financial losses. In this 
regard, we are going to explain this argument from the selling of Synthetic CDOs. 
From 2006, Synthetic CDOs began to play a more active role in the marketplace. 
According to the U.S. 2011 Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, “before the crisis, firms 
like Goldman Sachs found that it is cheaper and easier to create Synthetic CDOs than 
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traditional CDOs as the supply of mortgages was beginning to dry up.”97 In other 
words, since from 2006 when the US housing market was changing to the downside, 
fewer mortgages could be extended. And therefore the MBSs and CDOs became more 
expensive and less available. In this circumstance, Wall Street firms, like Goldman, 
Morgan Stanley firstly began to issue synthetic CDOs. The synthetic CDOs catered 
for investors’ appetite in mortgage related securities. Even more convenient, 
compared to MBSs, Synthetic CDOs were more customized, because CDO managers 
and underwriters could reference any mortgage-backed securities, and even a 
portfolio of mortgage-backed securities.”98     
Be different with the structure of traditional CDOs, the originator banks, i.e. the 
investment firms, of synthetic CDOs do not really transfer the underlying assets to the 
SPVs, while they intend to shift the credit risk of the underlying assets to the latter. In 
achieving this goal, the investment firms could buy CDS protection in relation to the 
underlying mortgage loans or securities. In exchange, they shall pay a sum of 
protection fees to SPVs. Just based on the CDSs contracts and its related reference 
underlying assets, SPVs create tranched CDOs with different credit rating grades, like 
the same process in producing normal CDOs. Then SPVs used the CDSs premium 
fees and the cash-flow from CDO investors to purchase high quality assets, like the 
U.S. Treasury bond. The purchased assets will be put into an asset pool as collaterals 
for compensating the originator banks if credit events happen. If no credit events 
happen, the assets in the pool would be liquidated and pay the principal and interests 
to the synthetic CDO holders.
99
 
However, the most important difference with cash-flow CDOs, i.e. the traditional 
CDO securities, lies in that creating Synthetic CDOs does not require the originator 
banks really possess the underlying mortgages. This means the SPVs could create as 
many as possible synthetic CDOs with reference to any mortgage-backed securities 
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they prefer, only if they could find the buyers.
100
 Synthetic CDOs actually let the 
originator banks and investors betting on the default risk of the referred underlying 
assets, including mortgage-backed securities. This market is also very big. For 
example, according to the FCIC report, Goldman Sachs alone packaged and sold 73 
billion dollars in synthetic CDOs from July 1, 2004, to May 31, 2007.
101
 And it could 
be affirmed that these Synthetic CDOs created by Goldman referenced more than 
3,400 mortgage securities, and 610 of them were referenced at least twice, which 
means speculation transactions largely existed.
102
 Although lack of accurate statistics 
due to the opaqueness of the CDS market, we could assume that the creation of 
“naked synthetic CDOs,” i.e. the CDOs without underlying mortgage securities, is 
commonly executed by other investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley etc.. The 
consequence of selling naked synthetic CDOs is that more mortgage-related securities 
that should not have existed were created and sold out to the financial market. Hence, 
when abundant defaults occurred in the mortgage market, the artificially created 
synthetic CDOs amplified the losses related to subprime mortgage loans.  
3.2 CDSs pushed down Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs)  
Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) locate in the center of the whole 
financial system. Not just their market scale but also their wide connectedness with 
other players in the financial market make them crucial important to the whole 
financial system. The fail down of a SIFI would immediately affect the stability of the 
financial market. In retrospect, the 2008 financial crisis upgraded substantially after 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. And when the insurance giant AIG asked for 
governmental bailout, the financial market participants and also the US government 
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were shocked. The Crisis peaked afterwards.   
As described above, several Wall Street SIFIs bankrupted or on the brink of 
bankruptcy in this crisis, firstly Bear Sterns in spring 2008, and then Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, AIG in autumn that year. However, it is commonly agreed that the 
failure of these Wall Street investment banks was mainly due to the losses in risky 
mortgage-related securities, not mainly in CDSs trading.
103
 We agree on this 
conclusion, rather as already explained mortgage-related securities directly pushed 
down these investment banks, but CDSs indirectly played the same role. This is 
because that, though actively participated in CDSs transactions, these investment 
banks played the role of both sellers and buyers. Thus, the risk exposure regarding the 
mortgage-backed securities could be partially set off. For instance, Lehman Brothers 
was one of the biggest CDSs market participants. It had hundreds of thousands 
transactions outstanding with about 8,000 different counterparties. Yet when Lehman 
bankrupted, it was even the in-the-money party after netting these CDSs transactions.
 
However, this is not the situation for the pure CDSs protection sellers, like AIG and 
other monoline insurance companies. For example, the net risk exposure of AIG due 
to the CDSs contracts with reference to mortgage-backed securities was incredibly 
huge when it applied for emergent bailout. Actually, the CDSs on MBSs and CDOs 
were not sold by the AIG itself, but its financial product subsidiary, i.e. AIGFP that 
was based in London. By the year-end 2007, the AIGFP had sold out about 533 billion 
dollars net notional value of outstanding CDSs contracts.
104
 This number is more than 
5 times of its parent company AIG’s total equity value at that time.105 According to 
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its own financial report, 71% of its huge CDSs exposure could be categorized as 
representing “regulatory capital” contracts, which generally offered protection against 
credit-related losses on corporate loans and prime residential mortgages.
106
 The 
remainder of AIGFP’s CDS portfolio was classified by itself as “arbitrage” contracts. 
By the end of 2007, the arbitrage CDS portfolio was divided between CDSs on CDOs, 
which amounted to $ 78 billion. And CDSs on collateralized loan obligations that 
about $ 70 billion. Most of the CDOs were written on “super senior” tranches of the 




In fact, by the end of 2005, AIGFP actually realized that the underwriting 
standards for subprime mortgage loans had been unreasonably deteriorated, so a 
decision had been made to stop writing CDS contracts on the risky multi-sector CDOs. 
Nevertheless, AIGFP did nothing to hedge this existed risk.
108
 Till the end of 2007, its 
risk exposure to multi-sector CDSs was still around 80 billion dollars. With the rapid 
deterioration of the American housing market in 2007, rating downgraded in relation 
to these “super senior” multi-sector CDOs. AIGFP was forced to post large amounts 
of collaterals to its counterparties. The financial situation of AIG deteriorated very 
quickly. It is reported that AIG lost a sum amounted to 13 billion dollars due to the 
write-downs of mortgage-related CDSs contracts for the fourth-quarter of 2007 and 
the first-quarter of 2008. In AIG’s report of August 2008 for the second quarter of this 
year, it was disclosed that 17 billion dollars value collaterals, mostly cash and 
Treasury bonds, had been posted for its CDSs counterparties.
 109
   
AIG’s liquidity capital depleted very quickly due to the increased collateral 
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requirements. And this process was even accelerated by the downgrade of its credit 
rating. On the September 15 2008, S&P downgraded AIG’s long-term debt rating by 
three notches. Both Moody’s and Fitch downgraded AIG’s long-term debt rating by 
two notches. As a result, AIG estimated that it would need an emergent sum of 20 
billion dollars for funding collateral demands and termination payments due to the 
CDSs transactions in the following several weeks.
110
 This amount was already over 
its liquidity capital. In this circumstance, AIG had to request the governmental 
emergency bailout otherwise this giant company would fall into bankruptcy. In light 
of the systemic importance of AIG, the U.S. government had to bail it out, which 
promptly decided to inject emergent fund of 85 billion dollars to AIG. Soon after that, 
the U.S. Federal Reserve injected to it another bailout fund of 67 billion dollars, and 
the bailout amounted to 180 billion dollars ultimately.
111
 Even though AIG survived 
and a sudden shut-down of the financial system was avoided, the financial market was 
greatly affected. Panic spread throughout the system. Confidence suddenly 
disappeared, which is a fatal strike to the financial system.   
3.3 CDSs resulted in systemic-risk threat to the financial system 
Why panic could spread throughout the financial system when AIG failed into 
liquidity crisis? We believe that the CDSs transactions have weaved the financial 
system into a tightly interconnected network,
112
 the bankruptcy of AIG if without the 
bailout, could trigger a systemic meltdown. The scenario is like a “domino effect,” 
that counterparties of AIG would incur losses and then the counterparties of these 
counterparties would suffer losses. In the peak of the crisis, such systemic-risk threat 
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greatly exacerbated the crisis, given that every market participants was worrying 
about whether their counterparties trapped into questionable CDSs transactions and 
would be insolvent. Thus, no one would like to extent credit to others any more. This 
is a fundamental reason why the confidence of the market disappeared.  
Systemic risk has been scientifically defined by Professor Steven Schwarcz. The 
systemic risk means that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure 
triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or 
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in 
increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by 
substantial financial-market price volatility.
113
  
According to his definition, we could be assured that the CDSs trading exactly 
caused systemic risk if institutions like AIG failed, and this is also the concern of the 
US government that promptly decided to bail AIG out. But as just argued, the panic 
spread through the market because CDSs have made the financial institutions in a 
network, thereby risk could disseminate from one to another.  
However, this is just possibility because if the counterparties know exactly the 
information of their counterparties CDSs transactions, this widespread market panic 
might not developed. Hence, we consider that the opaqueness of the market is one of 
the critical prerequisites of forming the systemic risk. Unfortunately, the unregulated 
CDSs market is extremely opaque. So the financial institutions in the market stopped 
their credit lending and other transactions due to the fear of probable losses of CDSs 
trading their counterparties could suffer. As Economist Joseph Stiglitz summarized, 
“how credit default swaps contributed to the systemic meltdown: with the 
complicated intertwining of bets of great magnitude, no one could be sure of the 
financial position of anyone else, or even of one’s own position. Not surprisingly, the 
credit markets froze.”114 In this sense, the CDSs trading also exacerbated the 2008 
financial crisis. 
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Till now, we have analyzed the relationship between CDSs and the 2008 financial 
crisis. Generally speaking, this relationship is two folds, namely on the one hand, 
CDSs facilitated the creation and selling of mortgage-backed securities, which drove 
the banks to grant more subprime mortgage loans. Thus, the U.S. housing bubble was 
irrationally propagated and huge risk accumulated. In this process, CDSs promoted 
the happening of the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, CDSs exacerbated the 
crisis when it erupted. In this regard, CDSs are imputable for three reasons. First, 
speculative CDSs transactions, such as naked synthetic CDOs, multiply amplified 
losses relating to mortgage-backed securities. Second, CDSs trading directly pushed 
down systemic important financial institutions, especially the AIG, which directly 
escalated the crisis. Third, opaque CDSs transactions weaved the financial system into 
a tightly interconnected network, thus potential systemic risk had been created. Due to 
the opaque, risky and interconnectedness of this market, panic easily spread over the 
financial system, and the financial system suddenly froze.     
It is time for conclusion, but also for advancing questions. For legal scholars, we 
wonder that what is the role of law in this financial crisis? Excessive speculative 
CDSs on mortgage-backed securities were issued, which promoted and exacerbated 
the crisis. Why the law did not inhibit the speculative CDSs transactions? The 
insurance giant AIG traded huge number of CDSs that far more exceeded its capital. 
Why there is no effective law to control hazardous operation of this company that is 
systemically important? Also it is strange that why the counterparties suddenly 
requested huge scale of collaterals from AIG, and before the market went downside 
they did not ask collaterals from AIG? Moreover, when AIG is on the brink of 
bankruptcy, why its counterparties could possess those collaterals from AIG, Did the 
bankruptcy law debtor-protection rule not function? Taking these questions, we are 
going to looking into the legal origins of this crisis in relation to CDSs transactions. 
Whatever, we believe that the legal environment for CDSs transactions is the 

































     Part II CDSs and the 2008 Financial Crisis: the 
Legal Origins 
 
Chapter 3 The Abrogation of the Common law 
Doctrine of “Difference Contract”  
 
From this chapter we are beginning to analyze the underlying legal origins of the 2008 
crisis. The first question shall be analyzed is what is the legal reason that excessive 
speculative CDSs could be traded? In other words, why the law did not limit too much 
speculation of CDSs?    
Before the crisis, the CDSs grew from nil in 2000 to a near 60 trillion dollars 
market. Speculation, rather than hedging, dominated this market. Hence, it could be 
assumed that legal rules facilitated the proliferation of speculative transactions. 
However, are these legal rules justified, or should these opt-speculative legal rules be 
preserved after the crisis? After investigating the legal history in relation to regulating 
the Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives, we found that speculations on OTC 
derivatives were once prohibited by an important common law doctrine of “difference 
contracts.” However, this doctrine was abruptly repealed in the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), which was enacted in 2000 under the lobby of 
the derivatives industry. In this chapter, we are going to inquiry how this traditional 
common law doctrine against speculative derivatives trading was abrogated, and we 
argue that the abrogation of which gave legal certainty of speculative transactions on 
CDSs. Afterwards, the CDSs market became dominated by speculation transactions in 
a very short time span. So, firstly, we will look into this common law doctrine of 
“difference contracts” and its legal effects.                     
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1 Elaborate the common law doctrine of “difference 
contracts” 
1.1 Definition and historical origin 
In a historical perspective, the term of “difference contract” was born in the 
nineteenth century, which specifically refers to speculative commodity derivatives 
traded over-the-counter. Namely, the counterparties of the commodity derivative 
contracts do not have the intention to deliver the underlying goods of the contracts, 
such as rice, but for betting the price change of the underlying goods in the future. 
The winner would reap the difference of the prices, so this is why speculative 
derivatives contracts were called “difference contracts.” Be different with hedging 
commodity derivative contracts, for example a forward contract of wheat, usually the 
farmers would be the forward contracts buyers, fixing a future price of the wheat of 
certain quantity with the forward contracts sellers. In doing so, the price fall risk for 
the farmers would be hedged. If the contract seller is a miller that needs wheat in the 
future, also his risk will be fixed as the production cost could be managed. Therefore, 
in essence, the “difference contracts” are those OTC derivatives contracts, in which 
neither of the counterparties have the existed risk with the reference entities. In 
economic view, they are no difference with bets.
115
 Nowadays, the term of 
“difference contract” is rarely seen. Instead, it has been basically replaced by the more 
common term: “speculative contracts.”         
In judicial history, there were not consistent judgments towards the validity of 
“difference contracts” until the second half of the nineteenth century in the U.S. 
common law. The judgments were often conflicting with others among different states 
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 This uncertainty was changed in 1884, when a famous judgment 




In this case, Judge Matthews wrote that: “the generally accepted doctrine in this 
country is, as has been stated by Judge Benjamin, that a contract for the sale of goods 
to be delivered at a future day is valid, even though the seller has not the goods nor 
any other means of getting them than to go into the market and buy them; but such a 
contract is only valid when the parties really intend and agree that the goods are to be 
delivered by the seller and the price to be paid by the buyer. And if, under guise of 
such a contract, the real intent be merely to speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and 
the goods are not to be delivered, but one party is to pay the other the difference 
between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed for 
executing the contract, the whole transaction constitutes nothing more than a wager, 
and is null and void.”118  
Therefore, the rule of “difference contracts” had been clearly articulated in this 
judgment. Namely, firstly the counterparties shall have the intention to deliver the 
underlying goods, and secondly, actual delivery shall be executed when the contract is 
due. After this case, the doctrine of “difference contract” in American common law 
had been established and accepted by all the states.  
It is notable that based on this principle the ambit of “difference contracts” were 
further clarified by the advancement of the term of “purely speculative contracts,” in 
which neither party was seeking to reduce risk but was seeking profits in price 
difference.
119
 Namely, in a purely speculative contract, both counterparties are 
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speculators, and neither counterparties hedge a pre-existed risk.
120
 Meanwhile, the 
contracts that one party is a hedger and the other is a speculator (non-purely 
speculative contracts) are categorized into hedging-purpose derivatives contacts that 
are protected by law.
 121
  
Hence, the common law has seen and appreciated the value of hedging to 
economy, and tolerated a part of people entering into the commodities market with 
speculative intention. Besides, there exists an important exemption of this generally 
unenforceability principle. Even if neither party to a derivative contract expected to 
take delivery of the goods underlying the contract, courts nevertheless would still 
enforce the contract if one party had some preexisting economic interest in the 
underlying good that would be damaged by the very same event that would allow it to 
profit under the contract.
122
 This “indemnity” exception is similar with the “insurable 
interest” principle in the modern insurance law, which is only if the policy holder 




1.2 Consequences of the common law doctrine of “difference 
contracts”  
The direct consequence of this “difference contracts” doctrine is that speculative 
contracts on commodities will be void in law and will not be supported by the public 
court if one party of the contract defaults. But, the “difference contracts” were not 
prohibited by the common law, namely the speculators would not be punished if they 
carry on speculation activities. However, if the speculators want their contracts to be 
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protected by law, the speculative cost would be greatly increased. As the “actual 
delivery” is the core criteria in relation to judge whether a derivatives contract is a 
“difference contract” or not, the speculators, who want legal protection, were forced 
to go to the spot market, buy the underlying goods, deposit them in the warehouse, 
and deliver them to the counterparties ultimately. Hence, as the speculative cost had 
been increased, excessive speculation activities were impeded.  
However, even with the doctrine of “difference contracts”, the ambition of 
speculation on commodities had not been wiped out. In order to solve the problem of 
lack of certainty of their OTC speculative derivatives trading, a bunch of 
private-owned futures exchanges emerged in the late of the nineteenth century in the 
United States.
124
 Most of these future exchanges still existed today and some of them 
have developed to be the most influential derivatives exchanges globally, such like the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).
125
 
Through well-designed mechanism, these private exchanges could basically assure the 
implementation of all the future contracts, both for hedging or speculation purpose.  
In essence, the future exchanges brought the speculative commodity derivatives into 
the exchange that would be in the regulatory oversight of authorities. Besides, in order 
to enjoy the benefit exchanges provide, the main traders in the OTC derivatives 
market shall become “trading members" of the exchange, which shall timely post 
margins, i.e. collaterals, to the exchange on the basis of their risk exposure in 
derivatives trading. And usually the members of the exchange shall put a sum of 
money to the default fund of the exchange to guarantee possible defaults of the 
members of the exchange. The futures traders that are not members of the future 
exchanges could also purchase and sell future contracts on the exchange, yet, they 
need to establish appropriate trading arrangement with the trading members of the 
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exchanges. So commission fees shall be paid to the trading members, and relevant 
margins shall be posted through the trading members. Therefore, the derivatives 
trading on the exchange would also increase some cost for speculators. Moreover, the 
future contracts traded on the exchange are standardized, thus they would be less 
attractive and convenient for some speculators. For example, one predicts the wheat 
price will rise in 9 months, but in the exchange, there are only future contracts related 
to wheat for 6 months or a year, so speculators would find less convenient.
126
 In short, 
speculative transactions on commodity derivatives are also, to some extent, impeded, 
though the emergence of futures exchanges.           
It is therefore that, due to the common law doctrine of “difference contract,” most 
derivatives trading were confined in futures exchanges. And thereby speculative 
transactions were controlled within a reasonable level, which did not undermine the 
stability of the economy.  
2. Codifying the common law doctrine of “difference 
contracts” into statutory law 
The common law doctrine of “difference contracts” successfully drove speculative 
commodity transactions in the future exchanges, complains about these exchanges 
appeared. However, the farmers, small business entrepreneurs, and others who often 
deal with physical commodities complained that commodities prices were often 
manipulated by these future traders.
127
 In response, the U.S. government took a first 
step in regulating the commodities future exchanges. In 1922, the U.S. Congress 
enacted the Grain Futures Act (GFA), which then was amended into the well-known 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936.
128
 
In the CEA 1936, the common law principle of “difference contracts” was 
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codified as a mandatory rule.
129
 It plays a central role in CEA, despite of some small 
changes. In general, the CEA took a more alert view towards speculative derivatives 
transactions. Firstly the CEA prohibited off-exchange commodities trading,
130
 with 
the exemption of real delivery ones.
131
 Secondly, it provided that the off-exchange 
speculative transactions are not just unenforceable but also illegal crimes.
132
 
Moreover, it is strictly provided that only derivatives trading with real delivery could 
be seen as legal trading, which means that the counterparties wanted to hedge 
pre-existed risks related to the underlying goods but without intention of delivery are 
also prohibited. Hence, on the one hand, the ambit of commodities trading was limited; 
and on the other, speculators trading commodities outside the regulated exchange will 
violate criminal law. Compared to the original common law doctrine of “difference 
contracts”, the CEA 1936 was less flexible and might too heavy-handed.  
With the development of the derivatives market, the regulatory ambit of CEA was 
enlarged several times. In 1974 amendment to CEA, its applicable scope has been 
extended to futures trading in all other goods and articles, not just agriculture 
commodities, like cotton and so on.
133
 In fact, there is not a strict definition of 
commodities in CEA. Its ambit is open to lately developed derivatives that traded on 
exchanges. So, in the U.S., CEA could also regulate the financial derivatives traded on 
the exchanges.
134
 It is mentionable that in the same year of 1974, the federal 
regulatory agency of the United States was established by the Commodity Futures 
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Trading Commission (CFTC) Act. CFTC was attributed the full jurisdiction over the 
commodity market, with its main mandate of supervising the commodities 
exchanges.
135




For short, in codifying the common law doctrine of “difference contracts” into 
CEA, speculation on derivatives was strictly regulated. However, this vigilant legal 
approach toward speculative derivatives began to be changed since from the 1980s. 
And finally the U.S. law in relation to regulating the derivatives trading went into the 
other extreme. 
3. The abrogation of CEA and the common law doctrine of 
“difference contracts”  
After the breakdown of the Breton Wood system, the global financial market became 
very volatile. In order to hedging potential risk in relation to financial assets, the OTC 
financial derivatives market rapidly thrived, especially as for the market of interest 
rate swaps and the foreign currency exchange swaps. Essentially, these swaps 
contracts replicated the function of future contracts so as to hedge the future interest 
and foreign currency exchange risk in international trading.
137
 As products of 
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financial innovation, in their early stage, the financial industry did not realize the 
swaps might also be regulated by the CFTC, according to the statute of CEA,
138
 
though the regulatory scope of CEA has been extended to all goods and articles in the 
1974 amendment. And in fact, the CFTC did not intend to regulate the OTC financial 
derivatives market since the 1970s. Therefore, the derivatives industry did not worried 
about the potential regulation under CEA, which would make the OTC speculative 
financial swaps void and illegal. 
However, this situation changed since 1987. In that year, the CFTC posed an 
“advance notice”, firstly trying to regulate the swaps market. In its statement CFTC 
claimed that “swaps and other complex hybrid derivatives, from the sense of 
economic structure, have the same function with on-exchange traded futures, thus the 
CFTC has the jurisdiction over these innovative products.”139 This “advance notice” 
was then hastily criticized by the derivatives industry and incurred significant 
oppositions. The derivatives industry association International - Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) - began its lobby campaign.
140
 The CFTC then 
issued a “swaps exemption” in 1989, declaring that “although it believed that the CEA 
gave it authority to regulate swaps, it would not do so as long as they would differ 
from future contracts.”141 In spite of the exemption, the CFTC, at the same time, 
proclaimed its regulatory right over this market.  
In order to prevent potential regulatory threat, the industry further lobbied to the 
U.S. Congress, requesting the latter to amend the CEA with the excuse of protecting 
the prosperity of this important market. In 1992, the Congress passed the Future 
Trading Practices Act (FTPA), which empowered the CFTC to exempt any class of 
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OTC derivatives from the scope of CEA.
142
 In 1993, the CFTC promptly used its new 
authority to preclude OTC traded swaps off the regulation of CEA.  
After that, OTC financial derivatives market continued to burgeon. But 
meanwhile, a series of disasters occurred in the financial market with concern to the 
OTC derivatives trading. In 1994, Proctor & Gamble announced that it had suffered a 
157 million dollars loss due to speculation on interest rate swaps.
143
 Only a few 
months afterwards, the Orange County’s pension fund filed for bankruptcy protection, 
the failure of which was also due to the huge losses in OTC derivatives 
transactions.
144
 Alarmed by these disasters, in 1998, the new Chairman of CFTC 
Brooksley Born, prepared to regulate this opaque and unregulated market.
145
 Then, in 
the summer of that year, CFTC issued a “Concept Release,” in which it indicated that 
it was considering the possibility of introducing a regulatory framework as for the 
OTC derivatives market.
146
 Brooksley Born’s effort to regulate the OTC derivatives 
market incurred strong opposition from the industry, and furthermore, the CFTC’s 
position was boycotted by other main U.S. federal financial market regulators, namely 
the Federal Reserve, the Treasury and the SEC. In order to suppress the quarrel 
between the regulatory agencies, the U.S. Congress immediately enacted a legislation 
to limit the CFTC’s rulemaking authority in relation to the OTC derivatives market.147 
Afterwards, requested by the U.S. Congress, the Chairmen of the Senate and 
House Agriculture Committees, a “President Working Group” was established, with 
its mandate of re-designing legislative approaches regarding OTC derivatives. The 
group consisted of the Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin, and the Undersecretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, all of who 
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were strongly opposed to the CFTC’s regulatory effort. 148  In 1999, the group 
published a very influential report, i.e. “Over-the-Counter Derivatives and the 
Commodity Exchange Act.” In this report, it was highlighted that “a cloud of legal 
uncertainty has hung over the OTC derivatives markets in the United States in recent 
years, which, if not addressed, could discourage innovation and growth of these 
important markets and damage US’s leadership in these arenas by driving transactions 
off-shore.”149 Thus, the keynote of future legal approach as for the OTC derivatives 
market has been laid down. Promoting financial innovation and maintaining the U.S. 
competition in the financial market prevailed than the concern of potential risk that 
could be brought by the unregulated OTC derivatives market.
150
 
Following the reform blueprint settled down by the President Working Group’s 
report, in 2000, the U.S. Congress promulgated the notorious Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA 2000). It is a victory of the financial derivatives 
industry.
151
 The enactment of CFMA attributed legal certainty of OTC financial 
derivatives trading, in particular for those speculative transactions. Firstly, CFMA 
excluded most of financial derivatives from the regulatory scope of CEA. The 
exempted transactions included most of the derivatives, ranging from the underlying 
assets of interest rates, exchange rates, currencies, securities, indices, credit risk, other 
indices based on commodities with no cash market, prices, or levels that are not in the 
control of either party of the transaction.
152
 In short, most of the OTC financial 
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derivatives contracts were essentially considered legally valid.
153
 Second, CFMA 
introduced an amendment section (2A) to the U.S. 1933 Securities Act, providing that 
no security based swaps will constitute a security under the Securities Act.
154
 
According to this provision, the derivatives based on securities, for instance CDS with 
reference debt of mortgage-backed securities, will not be considered as unregistered 
securities under the US securities regulation.
155
 It is therefore that, the OTC financial 
derivatives, including CDSs, were totally exempted from any substantial regulations. 
Both the CFTC and the SEC could not intervene into this market any more. Moreover,    
since the legislation of CFMA, power at the state level in relation to regulating this 
market has also been preempted.  
Hence, the CEA provisions regarding speculative OTC derivatives, along with the 
traditional common law doctrine of “difference contracts” that had been codified into 
the CEA, were abruptly repealed by the CFMA. After that, speculative OTC 
derivatives, especially swaps transactions, became legally protected. The panic caused 
by derivatives speculation before 2000 was temporally forgot by the public. It could 
be predictable that speculative financial derivatives trading would thrive, since the 
legal barrier has been removed. 
4. CFMA caused excessive speculation on CDSs contracts  
According to data of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), at the end of 1999, 
just prior to the CFMA’s passage, the total outstanding notional value156 of OTC 
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derivatives – mostly consist of interest rate swaps and other financial derivatives 
already exempted from the CEA – was approximately 88 trillion dollars, however the 
volume of the OTC derivatives market grew to more than 670 trillion dollars before 
2008.
157
 In terms of CDS market, the aggregate worldwide notional outstanding value 
grew from 6.4 trillion dollars in 2004 to near 59 trillion dollars at the end of 2007.
158
 
The CDSs market increased from nil to such a huge market in less than 10 years. 
Although they played an important role in risk transferring for the banking sector, we 
believe that the strongest impetus for this growth could be attributed to speculative 
transactions. We could prove this from several evidences.  
First and foremost, it is manifested by the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 
that most of the outstanding CDSs before the 2008 crisis were written on mortgage 
backed securities and a small number of corporate bonds.
159
 However, compared to 
the 59 trillion dollars market of CDSs, in 2008 the aggregate notional value of most of 
the underlying assets, i.e. the mortgage backed securities and corporate bonds, 
amounted only to $ 15 trillion.
160
 And, it is reported that, in 2007, the total 
outstanding value of the American subprime mortgages was just 1.3 trillion dollars.
161
 
Furthermore, as the CDSs on corporate debts were focused on a small number of top 
giant corporations, such as GE.
162
 Therefore, it is reasonable that the scale of CDS 
market is at least four times bigger than the market of all the underlying assets. In 
other words, more than 3/4 of the CDSs trading were not with the intention of hedging 
existed risk of these financial institutions, but speculation. The FCIC’s report also 
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confirmed this conclusion, which claimed that “in many cases, where banks had made 
derivatives bets on mortgage backed bonds in amounts many times larger than the 
value of the bonds themselves.”163 It is observable that, after 2004 the CDSs market 
developed faster than before. This partially due to that CDS market became more 
standard and liquid after the advent of index CDS and synthetic CDOs. In other words, 




Secondly, from the composition of the market participants, it could also be 
deduced that speculative transactions prevailed in this market. Before the passage of 
CFMA 2000, the CDS market was small, and the main transactions were executed by 
commercial banks for transferring existed credit risk. However, the market 
participants became more and more diversified after the CFMA. Hedge funds, other 
types of investment funds and investment firms turned to be the most active players in 
this market. And the market share of these investment funds was continually rising, 
while the market share of commercial banks shrank before the crisis. The 2008 IMF 
report showed that between 2004 and 2006, the CDSs market share of hedge funds 
increased from 16% to 28% as protection buyers, while this data of banks declined 
from 67% to 59%. Similarly, the CDSs market share of hedge funds increased from 
15% to 31% as protection sellers, while banks declined from 54% to 43% in this 
regard.
165
 While the basic business model of these investment funds is speculating,
166
 
this could give us another important proof to claim that the CDSs market was 
becoming dominated by speculative transactions.  
Speculation is a double-edge sward. On the one hand, it could raise the liquidity 
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164
 The index CDSs market is akin to the on-exchange stock market, as the buying and novation of 
index CDSs contract has become much easier and faster, though legally speaking, they are still 
contracts, and unregulated by law as stocks. 
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 See IMF report, “Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risk and Restoring 
Financial Soundness,” April 2008, (Showing a sharp increase in participation by hedge funds in the 
CDS market relative to banks between 2004 and 2006, hedge funds increased from 16% of protection 
buyers to 28%, while banks declined from 67% to 59%. Similarly, hedge funds increased from 15% of 
protection sellers to 31%, while banks declined from 54% to 43%.) 
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 See Lynn Stout, supra117, 2011, p.25. 
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of the OTC derivatives market, and thus lower the hedging cost of risks. However on 
the other hand, not prudently regulated speculation transactions could destroy the 
financial system. When excessive speculation led to the systemic important financial 
institutions fell down, the whole credit system fell into stagnant. Meanwhile excessive 
speculation on CDSs also gave the market a misleading signal that the subprime 
mortgage market was healthy. Therefore, it was made easier to sell those subprime 
mortgage backed securities, which indirectly promoted the brewing of the housing 
bubble in the United States.
167
  
5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, we elaborated the common law approach towards speculative 
commodity derivatives and the codification of this doctrine into the U.S. Commodity 
Exchanges Act of 1936. The doctrine of “difference contracts” developed by the 
American Judges make the speculations on commodities void, namely the 
speculations would not get protection from the courts. So, speculative activities were 
greatly impeded. And under the CEA, this doctrine was further strengthened, 
speculations were considered not just void but also crimes. Hence, speculative 
derivatives transactions were appropriately restricted within a reasonable level. In 
2000, the notorious CFMA was enacted, and the traditional common law doctrine of 
“difference contracts” was totally erosion along with the abrogation of the CEA.168  
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 We believe that excessive speculative CDSs on the sovereign debt also exacerbated the European 
Sovereign debt crisis. Although we did not discuss in detail on this topic, it could be referred here that 
speculative CDSs trading written on the sovereign debt directly drove the rate of return of the debt 
issued by the southern European countries go higher, thus it became more difficult for those countries 
to get finance from the debt market. Moreover, the financial institutions that loaned to these countries 
also bet that these counties would default, because they have bought more than the notional value of 
the granted loan, thus they could also make money if these countries defaulted. It is therefore, the main 
creditors of these countries would not intend to make compromise on the issue of debt repayment, 
which exacerbated the deadlock of these countries. 
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 In fact, the abrogation of the common law rule of “difference contract” also happened in the UK. In 
1986 the UK has made all financial derivatives, whether used for hedging or purely speculation, legally 
enforceable. And, nowadays, most of the main civil law jurisdictions for derivatives trading have also 
exempted speculative OTC derivatives from traditional “game law” rule, including Germany, France 
and so on. In a world of “run-to-the-bottom” in financial market regulation, the restoration of the 
traditional approach of prohibiting purely speculative derivative transactions has become nearly 
impossible. Therefore, another way to confine speculative derivatives in a reasonable ambit will be 
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Our argument is that the CFMA provided a legal prerequisite for the developing of 
speculative OTC derivatives, including CDSs, transactions. Namely, the CFMA 
removed the legal barrier for speculation on CDSs. We also observed and reasoned 
that, in practice, OTC derivatives, in particular, the CDSs market really have 
undergone a rapid growth and dominated by the speculative transactions. It shall be 
stressed that, for sure, the economic motion is the fundamental reason for the market 
thrive. Nevertheless, the erosion of the common law doctrine of “difference contracts” 















                                                                                                                                                                              
 
necessary for keep us from another similar crisis.See Phillip Wood, “Law and practice of international 
finance,” Sweet & Maxwell, University Edition, 31 October 2007, p.506. 
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Chapter 4 The Erosion of the Bankruptcy Law 
“Pro-Debtor” Principle 
  
Apart from the CFMA 2000, which opened the gate for speculative OTC derivatives 
transactions, we also thoroughly investigated other laws in relation to the trading of 
OTC derivatives. It is astonishing that OTC derivatives, including CDSs, not just 
could be legally traded, but the trading of which could get a priority status than 
normal financial transactions, such as loans. In this regards, we have observed that the 
trading of OTC derivatives have eroded one of the fundamental doctrine in modern 
bankruptcy law, i.e the principle of “pro-debtor.” It is the fact that, before the 2008 
crisis, bankruptcy law of the United States was amended several times for favoring 
the transactions of the financial innovation products: including swaps, securities, and 
repurchase contracts and so on. As a result, a “safe harbor” in bankruptcy law has 
been constructed for these financial transactions, which means that the traders of these 
financial products would be exempted from certain obligations in the bankruptcy law, 
and thus these transactions are more protected than normal transactions. We believe 
that the “safe harbor” in bankruptcy law for OTC derivatives trading facilitated the 
speculative derivatives transactions before the crisis, as a legal-friendly trading 
environment has been established.  
Moreover, the safe harbor for OTC derivatives and the erosion of the pro-debtor 
principle directly pushed down the CDSs protection sellers, like AIG and some 
monoline insurance companies.
169
 When the systemic important institution AIG 
failed, the 2008 crisis suddenly upgraded. Therefore, we are going to argue in this 
chapter that the erosion of the pro-debtor principle in bankruptcy law is one of the 
important underlying reasons for the escalation of the 2008 financial crisis. In doing 
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 The sellers of CDS protection were mainly insurance companies. The reasons is that the CDS 
protection buyer faced the risk that the CDS seller could not have the capability to pay the 
compensation if credit event happens, thus, they tended to buy CDS protections from insurance 
companies that have a stronger ground of capital reserve.   
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so, we will firstly elaborate the bankruptcy law principle of “pro-debtor,” and the 
main legal rules of this principle. Thereafter, we will look into how this principle was 
gradually eroded by OTC derivatives in the U.S. At last, we will reason the 
relationship between the erosion of this principle and the fall of AIG.  
1. The pro-debtor bankruptcy law principle and its main 
rules 
Bankruptcy law, as a sub-division of commercial law originated from the medieval 
commerce practice, inherited the very basic sprite of strengthening the protection to 
creditors, so as to promote the circulation of goods and credits.
170
 Under this doctrine, 
bankruptcy law rules were cruel and even inhuman to the insolvent debtors in 
medieval ages. The debtors that intended to file for bankruptcy protection, discharging 
themselves from burdensome obligations, shall implement incredible requirements. 
For example, historians affirmed that in medieval Italy and France, bankruptcy 
petition appliers shall be nude in a designated spot, usually at the center of the city, 
and would be whipped against a stone as a necessary pre-condition of entering into 
bankruptcy protection procedure. Even worse, in England and German bankruptcy 
applicants shall endure cruel physical punishments, such like being cut an ear.
171
 
Therefore, generally, we could conclude that the bankruptcy was not accepted by the 
law and the society under the name of inhibiting unfaithful behaviors of the debtors. 
Protecting the interest of the creditors might be the utmost principle when the 
commerce was developing at its early stage. But unreasonable limitation for the 
application of bankruptcy might go into another extreme, especially when the society 
needs more entrepreneurs with sprite of adventure, and the society shall tolerate their 
failure and give them legal remedy to get rid of burdensome debts. In fact, bankruptcy 
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 Commercial law originated from the “commerce custom” in the medieval age. As a special law as 
to the common civil law (“ius civile”), the most distinguishing feature is the strengthened protection 
towards creditors. Cf. G. F. Campobasso, Diritto Commerciale vol. 1 Diritto dell’impresa, 6th edition, 
UTET, 2010, pp. 5-6.  
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 In that period, bankruptcy per se was seen as a sin by the law, and this idea was entrenched in the 
whole society, which was influenced by the religion conceptions. 
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law began to take more responsibility on promoting economic development when 
such need of entrepreneurship became more urgent after 19
th
 century, especially in the 
new land of America.
172
 Hence, the attitude of bankruptcy law towards insolvent 
debtors had been gradually reversed. Nowadays, bankruptcy is more seen as a natural 
or probabilistic event in business and economic activities. Discriminative rules against 
the debtors have been removed from the bankruptcy law. To be more exact, the 
modern bankruptcy law has become more debtor-friendly, especially for those 
insolvent debtors with bona fide. Several main bankruptcy law rules aim at promoting 
the rehabilitation of these insolvent debtors so as to maximize the social-economic 
influence. Actually, the pro-debtor principle could be justified by several economic 
theories. First of all, it is argued by some scholars that the assets of the bankruptcy 
debtor are usually ‘firm-specific’ or ‘sector-specific’, for instance the machinery and 
other equipment. This means that other people or the market probably would less 
appreciate the value of these assets than the insolvent debtors themselves. In view of 
maximizing the efficiency of resource, it would be better solution if we leave the 
assets to the insolvent debtors and promote their rehabilitation. Moreover, if the 
insolvent debtors could really survive, many job opportunities could be maintained. 
This result would be definitely welcomed by the policy makers, as the whole society 
will be better off.  
In order to achieve the goal of rehabilitating insolvent debtors, a number of 
pro-debtor rules have been designed and written into the bankruptcy law, among 
which the most important ones include the rule of “automatic stay”, “cherry picking” 
and “preferential and fraudulent transfer.”173 In the following, we are going to 
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 This “pro-debtor” attitude change was firstly happened in the United States of America in the 19th 
century. At that time, the North America was relatively poor and less developed compared with the 
Europe. Yet, the advantage of the America is that there was less constraints from the traditional societal 
conception and the religion. The U.S. government realized that protecting debtors which temporarily 
fell into financial distress could greatly promote the entrepreneurship, which is good for stimulating the 
development of economy. Under this idea, the U.S. advanced a policy of reviving debtors, which is 
called “revival policy,” and more and more pro-debtor rules were written into its bankruptcy law, such 
as the procedure of debt rehabilitation. Until today, the bankruptcy law in the United States is more 
debtor friendly than its European cousin UK. 
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 However, it is worthy to make clear that these provisions also have the function of solving the 
“collective problem” of the creditors, namely promoting a more equal distribution of the debtor’s assets 
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elaborate these rules in America’s Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, these rules have 
been also written into many countries’ bankruptcy laws. 
1.1 “Automatic stay” 
“Automatic stay” means that upon the bankruptcy filing of the debtor, any activity 
related with the debtor’s assets, such as credit right claims, execution of executory 
contracts, payments, collateral delivery etc., shall be automatically stopped. In the 
2005 Bankruptcy Code of the United States, the activities that shall be immediately 
stopped are specifically itemized in section 362 (a).
174
  
In general, the provisions in section 362 (a) could prohibit any potential transfer 
of debtor’s assets after the bankruptcy petition. Actually, once the bankruptcy petition 
has been filed, the debtor’s assets will be immediately “crystalized” into “bankruptcy 
estate,” which will be managed by the “bankruptcy administer” (also called 
“bankruptcy trustee” in the U.S. bankruptcy law). By virtue of this rule, the debtor’s 
assets will be shielded against a “creditor grab-race” at the moment of bankruptcy. In 
other words, the “automatic stay” avoids dismemberment of an insolvent firm, which 
will greatly harm the firm’s rehabilitation capabilities. Then, the insolvent debtors and 
creditors could negotiate for new repayment terms, and under which the firm could be 
preserved with going concern value.
175
 As vividly explained in the legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
amongst sophisticated and mediocre creditors, should the bankruptcy debtor finally entered into the 
liquidation procedure. 
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 See U.S.C 11 Section 362 (a), (“a petition…operates as a stay, applicable to all entities of (1) the 
commencement of continuation… of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against 
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the case, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the case; (2) the enforcement… of a judgment obtained before the case; (3) any 
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control 
over property of the estate; (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; (5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property to the debtor any lien to the extent that 
such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (6) any act to 
collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; (7) the set-off of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of 
the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and (8) the commencement or 
continuation of a proceeding before the US tax court concerning a tax liability of a debtor that is a 
corporation of a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability or a 
debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this 
title.)  
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 See Franklin R. Edwards & Edwards R. Morrison, “Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the 
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document of the U.S. bankruptcy law, the legislators claimed that, “the ‘automatic 
stay’ gives insolvent debtors a breathing spell from their creditors, stopping all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”176 Therefore, the rule 
of “automatic stay” played a very important role in facilitating the rehabilitation of 
insolvent debtors. 
In complementing this rule, the U.S. Bankruptcy code also provided an ipso facto 
clause, prohibiting bilateral agreement between the debtor and its counterparties that 
allow their counterparties to terminate the outstanding contracts when the debtors 
filed for bankruptcy. It was stipulated that any “ipso facto” agreement shall be 
considered nullified and void in section 365 (e) (1).
177
 Besides, other contractual 
provisions, including the debt-acceleration clauses that would affect the integrity of 
the debtors’ assets in the event of financial distress shall also be void.178  
1.2 “Cherry-picking” 
“Cherry-picking” is a jargon in bankruptcy law. The rule of “cherry picking” refers to 
that the bankruptcy administer possess the power to assume the profitable executory 
contracts while reject the implementation of the non-profitable contracts.
179
 Like the 
rule of “automatic stay,” “cherry picking” provision also aims at facilitating the 
revival of the insolvent debtors. But furthermore, this rule attributes the debtor more 
capability to survive, provides that the bankruptcy administer could pick those 
“in-the-money” contracts to fulfill. Meanwhile, the counterparties of the debtor shall 
continue to fulfil the contracts or terminate the contracts according to the decision of 
the bankruptcy administer.  
As generally provided in the section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that, “apart 
from some exemptions, the bankruptcy trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may 
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79 
 
assume or reject any executory contract.”180 More specifically, in a bankruptcy case 
under Chapter 11, namely the bankruptcy reorganization procedure, “the bankruptcy 
trustee may assume or reject an executory contract at any time before the 
confirmation of a plan, but the court, on the request of any party to such contract, may 
order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether to assume or 
reject such contract or lease.”181 
1.3 “Preferential and fraudulent transfer” 
The bankruptcy law rule of “Preferential transfer” has been developed mainly for 
impeding unequal repayment among creditors. Due to kinds of factors, such as 
information advantage, better creditor-debtor relationship and so on, more sophisticate 
creditors might aware the bankruptcy of the debtor before others. In order to prevent 
the potential risk,
182
 they may ask the repayment from the debtor earlier than the 
maturity date of the contract. However, the “preferential transfer” to more sophisticate 
creditors is unfair to other creditors, especially when the bankruptcy of the debtor 
happened soon after such preferential transfers.
183
 Thus, the preferential transfer shall 
be inhibited.  
In the U.S. 2005 Bankruptcy Code, section 548 provides that “ the bankruptcy 
trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property if all of the 
following conditions are satisfied: (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on 
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) 
made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made – (A) on or within 90 days before the 
date of the filing of the petition; or (B) between ninety days and one year before the 
date of the filing of the petition, is such creditor at the time of such transfer was an 
insider; and (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would 
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 Because if the repayment of the creditor’s right go into the bankruptcy procedure like other credit 
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creditors to deal with troubled companies, rather than racing to the court to dismember them.”   
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receive if –the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title”.184 In plain words, under 
the U.S. law, any asset transfer made 90 days before the bankruptcy filing, which let 
the transferee creditor receive more than he could receive in the bankruptcy 
liquidation process, shall be avoided by the bankruptcy administer. And the assets 
transferred shall be called back into the pool of bankruptcy estate. 
Moreover, if the debtor intentionally transferred its assets for insufficient value 
within 2 years before the bankruptcy to certain creditors, that transaction would be 
considered as “fraudulent transfer” in the bankruptcy law, which would be repealed. It 
is provided in section 548 of the U.S. bankruptcy code that “The trustee may avoid 
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of 
the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily – (A) made such transfer or 
incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to 
which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, indebted; or (B) (i) received less than a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and (ii) (I) was insolvent 
on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became 
insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; (II) was engaged in business or a 
transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any 
property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; (III) intended 
to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the 
debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured; or (IV) made such transfer to or for the 
benefit or an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, 
under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.”185 In short, 
any form of fraudulent transfers before the bankruptcy shall be subjected to a longer 
period of abrogation.   
Obviously, the “preferential and fraudulent transfer” rules also played an 
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important role, apart from keeping fairness among creditors, in protecting the loss of 
the debtors’ assets. This is quite important when considering the “agent-principal” 
problem in big companies. The managers of the company could transfer the firm’s 
assets to particular creditors in exchange of personal benefit while damaging the firm 
and other creditors’ benefit. Hence, it is useful providing the rule of “preferential and 
fraudulent transfer” in bankruptcy law so as to protect the integrity of the debtors’ 
assets. Unfortunately, these rules we have elaborated above, were gradually restricted 
in the US bankruptcy law as to the application for OTC derivatives, and thereby the 
debtors that excessively involved into the OTC derivatives trading became more 
easily to be attacked when fall into financial distress. 
2. Conflictions between the “pro-debtor” rules and the OTC 
derivatives practice 
Like CFMA that deregulated speculative OTC derivatives, after 2000 the U.S. 
bankruptcy law was amended several times also for favoring OTC derivatives 
transactions. As we have just mentioned above, the main pro-debtor rules in the U.S. 
bankruptcy law were finally exempted especially in relation to OTC derivatives 
trading. Then, we would wonder why these pro-debtor rules shall be excluded from 
applying to OTC derivatives? And how did this happen? We will argue below that the 
practice of the OTC derivatives market, mainly embodied in the special trading rules 
of the ISDA documentation, is a fundamental factor that underpinned such bankruptcy 
law change. So, firstly we are going to scrutinize these special trading rules 
established by the self-regulation association of the OTC derivatives industry.  
2.1 Special trading rules established by ISDA documentation 
As the self-regulation organization of the OTC derivatives industry, ISDA, i.e. the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, was established by the main 
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derivatives dealers in 1985.
186
Since its birth, ISDA has played a very active role in 
lobbying the legislators (normally lobby the U.S. legislators at first and then the 
European legislators afterwards) to deregulate the OTC financial derivatives 
market.
187
 Besides its lobby activities, the most important thing ISDA has done is 
established a set of common trading rules for the OTC derivatives industry. These 
rules are embodied in the several standardized ISDA documentations, which are 
provided to the trader to use freely.
188
 Although, the contracting parties of a 
derivatives trading have the freedom to choose the usage of ISDA documentation, it is 
estimated that the ISDA documentation is probably used for 90 percent by volume of 
derivatives transactions in the marketplace.
189
  
Before the crisis, ISDA had developed several editions of the Master Agreement, 
namely the 1987, 1992, and 2002 ISDA documentation respectively.
190
 The ISDA 
documentation consists of three documents, i.e. the “Master Agreement,” “Schedule,” 
and “Confirmation.” The Master Agreement sets forth standardized terms in relation 
to the general provisions of derivatives contracts, mainly including the terms of credit 
events, netting, early termination, alignment, currency, and others.
191
 If the parties 
need to modify part of the provisions in the Master Agreement for specific 
transactions, they could amend relevant terms through the “Schedule.” For instance, 
the types of credit events could be selected in the Schedule.
192
 But in order to finalize 
every single transaction under the Master Agreement, the contracting parties shall sign 
a “Confirmation,” in which the main terms, such like the reference entity, payment 
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structure, credit events, settlement provisions, of single derivatives trading contract 
shall be clearly reiterated.
193
 The master agreement, the schedule and the 
confirmation formed the complete documentation for any single transaction between 
the contract parties.
194
 In order to promote the trading efficiency and prevent any 
legal regulation, special rules have been formed in the ISDA documentation. 
2.1.1 Single agreement system 
The first legal effect of the ISDA master agreement is that all transactions entered into 
by the derivatives counterparties will constitute a single agreement. Both the 1992 and 
2002 ISDA Master Agreement provided this rule. For example, Clause 1 (c) of the 
2002 Master Agreements provides that “all transactions are entered into in reliance on 
the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations form a single agreement 
between the parties … and the parties would not otherwise enter into any 
transactions.”195 To be more exact, CDS market participants would enter into CDSs 
contracts with each so many times, each with its one confirmation. However, if the 
counterparties have chosen to sign their contracts under the Master Agreement, all 
their single CDSs transaction will form a single agreement, thereby if credit event 
happens in one transaction, the default of all other transactions will also be triggered 
at the same time. It is argued that this practice is aimed at fighting with the 
bankruptcy-administers’ cherry-picking power, given that the trustee could not pick 
those in-the-money derivatives contracts, while repudiate other out-of-the-money 
contracts. 
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 There are several ways of signing a Confirmation, for example, a Confirmation for each transaction 
along with a schedule, or a master confirmation for all credit derivative transactions between the parties, 
or along with a transaction supplement for each transaction. See Vinod Kothari, supra, p.371. 
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2.1.2 Close-out netting  
Close-out netting is a fundamental rule under ISDA Master Agreement. It is provided 
by the ISDA Master Agreement that when one party to a transaction defaults the 
non-defaulting party can calculate a single settlement amount by offsetting its 
scheduled future payments and delivery obligations to the bankruptcy party against 
the bankruptcy party’s obligations to it.196 The benefit of netting is significant. To 
illustrate this, one can imagine two banks that have entered into dozens of CDSs with 
one another, each bank holding both long and short positions. One bank wishes to 
transfer all of its trades to another counterparty and the other bank agrees to the 
novation. Instead of reckoning the balance on each trade, paying piecemeal, the banks 
can calculate the net amount owing under all trades and settle the account in one net 
payment.
197
 Namely, the “close-out netting” clause allows the non-default derivatives 
party avoid of entering into bankruptcy procedures with other creditor of the insolvent 
debtor. 
Moreover, the ISDA documentation also provides cross-transaction netting, that 
is set-off between different types of transactions, for example the netting of credit 
derivatives and interest rate derivatives that are under two master agreements. Usually, 
the Schedule would provide the trading parties the right to choose cross-netting 
among different types of OTC derivatives.  
2.1.3 Margins-exchange  
Apart from netting, collateralization is the most important private tool of managing 
counterparty risk in the derivatives market. Collateral provides the in-the-money party 
with the funds that would allow it to replace the terminated derivatives transactions if 
its counterparty were to default.
198
 Under the ISDA Master Agreement, ISDA 
                                                             
 
196
 See, Flanagan, p.230-31 
197
 R. Schwarz, supra, p. 196. 
198
 ECB, supra 69, 2009, p.44, (It is important to note that this collateral is available even if the 
in-the-money party is the defaulting entity. This practice is potentially more important for the 
85 
 
provided standardized collateralization document, i.e. Credit Support Annex (CSA),
 
199
 annexed to the master agreement for the contracting parties. There are different 
versions of CSA, among whist the most used are the 1994 Credit Support Annex 
(under New York law), and the 1995 Credit Support Annex (under English law).
200 
The selection between the two documents is depended on which type of legal nature 
of collaterals the parties pursued. Under the CSA of English law, the title of the 
collateral is transferred to the receiver, while under the CSA of New York law, the title 
of the collateral remains with the payer, and the receiver simply gets the security 
interest over the collateral.
201
 CSAs set out collateralization rules that apply to the 
entire portfolio of the OTC derivatives (based on the standardized 2003 ISDA 
Collateral Asset Definitions), including, inter alia, details of the frequency with which 
collateral is to be posed, eligible collaterals, thresholds and minimum transfer 
amounts, the requirements for initial margin calls, re-hypothecation
202
 and so forth.
203
 
According to ISDA’s 2009 Margin survey, 87% of market participants choose the 
ISDA CSAs for collateralization arrangement as opposed to the bespoke bilateral 
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same netting possibilities as dealers.) 
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ISDA used a more general term “credit support” in lieu of “collateralization.” 
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The collateral posting requirements provided by CSAs for OTC are very similar 
with the margin-call practice in the futures exchanges. In effect, CDSs parties, who 
entered into the contracts using the CSA of ISDA master agreement, shall firstly post 
initial margins, then exchange collateral margins with each other on a daily basis or 
weekly basis according to the netting result of mark-to-market (MTM) risk exposures. 
The frequency of regular collateral margin calls can range from daily to biannual. 
Payments are often more frequent for riskier exposures.
205
 As required, the collateral 
margin calls should cover the changes in MTM values, following the bilateral netting 
of positions across the entire portfolio of derivatives, in the event that the residual 
exposure exceeds a given threshold.
206
 And the rating of the counterparty can 
determine this threshold, which can range from zero to large amounts.
207
 In the 
framework of CDS transaction, the protection buyer is the recipient of collateral when 
spreads are widening, while it is the other way round when spreads are declining. 
Nevertheless, the collateral to be posted is calculated on the basis of the aggregated 
value of portfolio of transactions covered by the ISDA Master Agreement, not on the 
basis of any individual transaction or only CDSs exposures.
208
 
Therefore, according to the “margin-call” rule, it is the practice that before the 
bankruptcy of the CDS counterparties, the collaterals are posting between the CDS 
parties daily or weekly, and the in-the-money counterparty (collateral receiver), could 
either possess the full title of the collaterals using the CSA under English law, or take 
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the collateral as pledge with the CSA under New York law.  
2.2 The trading rules of ISDA Master Agreement conflict with the 
pro-debtor bankruptcy rules  
The bankruptcy law pro-debtor rules, as elaborated above, aim at promoting the 
revival of those firms that temporarily fall into financial distress, while the trading 
rules laid down in the ISDA Master Agreement aim at promoting the efficiency and 
safety of the OTC derivatives. The different goals these two set of rules pursue collide 
with each other, in particular in the case that a derivatives trader is on the brink of 
bankruptcy or has filed for bankruptcy.  
Firstly, the single agreement mechanism under the ISDA Master Agreement is in 
confliction with the bankruptcy law cherry-picking rule. The cherry-picking provision 
empowers the bankruptcy administer to assume the profitable executory contracts and 
reject the continual implementation of the non-profitable executory contracts, thereby 
raising the debtors’ rehabilitation capability. However, the ISDA Master Agreement 
intentionally laid down a “single agreement” clause, under the umbrella of which all 
single transactions will be seen as a part of the whole transaction between the certain 
counterparties who have chosen the application of ISDA Master Agreement. Hence, if 
one of the counterparties of the derivatives trading filed for bankruptcy protection, the 
bankruptcy administer could not execute their cherry-picking power, as the other 
counterparty would defend that all those derivatives transactions form a single 
transaction under the umbrella of the ISDA Master Agreement. So, either the 
bankruptcy administer can assume the continual implementation of all the single 
contracts or reject all of them. 
Secondly, the “close-out netting” provision conflicts with the bankruptcy law 
“automatic stay” and “preferential transfer” rules. The “close-out netting” term in the 
Master Agreement enable the counterparties of derivatives transactions terminate the 
contracts when one of the party defaults, including the event of bankruptcy filing. Yet, 
the “automatic stay” rule requires any unfinished transactions and cash flows should 
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be stopped in order to keep the integrity of the “bankruptcy estate.” Therefore, the 
counterparties in derivatives trading could terminate all transactions between them if 
the other party filed for bankruptcy protection, thereby reducing potential losses 
respected with other creditors. 
Thirdly, the “margins-exchange” practice collides with the bankruptcy law 
“preferential transfer” rule as well. The “margins-exchange” between the derivatives 
traders is the main mechanism established by the ISDA Master Agreement. As the risk 
exposure of the outstanding derivatives contracts changes every day, so the 
counterparties shall post or call back collaterals from their counterparties every 
certain period. Hence, this rule will be in confliction with the “preferential transfer” 
provision in the bankruptcy law, given that these collaterals posted shortly before the 
bankruptcy petition of the counterparties would be seen as illegitimate preferential 
transfer if that counterparty has already been on the brink of insolvent. Obviously, the 
“preferential transfer” rule is also a concern for financial derivatives traders as to the 
operation of “close-out netting.”209  
All in all, the OTC derivatives transaction practice, including CDS trading, under 
the ISDA master agreement institution collides with the pro-debtor rules in the 
bankruptcy law. As the ISDA Master Agreement is internationally used, the OTC 
derivatives practice was in collision with the bankruptcy laws in many countries, not 
just the U.S., but also EU member states. In order to cope with the bankruptcy law 
threat to the OTC derivatives industry, the main financial institutions, headed by the 
industry association ISDA, started to lobby legislators in those countries. Since the 
U.S. is the most important country for derivatives trading, they firstly targeted the U.S. 
Congress for limiting the application of pro-debtor rules to derivatives. Afterwards, as 
Professor Morrsion argued, the financial lobbyists re-used their achievement in the 
United States to persuade other jurisdictions’ legislators, especially the EU, to do the 
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same amendments.”210 It shall be mention here that the countries reformed their 
bankruptcy laws following the U.S., giving bankruptcy law exemption to OTC 
derivatives industry, have their own consideration of keeping the competitiveness in 
this important financial sector around the world.  
3. The erosion of the “pro-debtor” bankruptcy law rules in 
the U.S. 
3.1 “Patch-work” exemptions for OTC derivatives trading before 
2005 
The United States was one of the earliest jurisdictions in the world providing 
bankruptcy law exemptions to derivatives. In 1978, when the U.S. bankruptcy law 
was codified into the Bankruptcy Code, special exemptions were given to commodity 
futures and commodity forwards. According to legislative material, this exemption 
was promoted by a financial lawyer Stuart D. Root, who was invited to testify before 
the U.S. Senate subcommittee on improvements regarding Judicial Machinery. The 
lawyer proposed that, “the commodity futures market is fragile, which extremely 
depends on the capital adequacy of the market participants, and unless the Bankruptcy 
Code addressees this fragility, the system will remain unnecessarily exposed.”211 
Specifically, the operation of commodity market is based on margin calls, the 
immediately posting of collaterals and liquidation the accounts that are lack of 
adequate margin would be essentially important for maintaining a safe and efficient 
commodity futures market. Thus, the provisions of “automatic stay” and “preferential 
transfer” in the Bankruptcy Code have already posed threat to this market. Under the 
name of protection the safety of the commodities futures market, the U.S. Congress 
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granted a limited exemption of “automatic stay” and “preferential transfer” for 
commodity futures and forwards.
212
 This exemption opened the green-light for 
financial derivatives. In 1982, the “safe harbor” for financial trading was further 
expanded to “securities and derivatives contracts.” In this amendment, it is also added 
narrow exemption from the automatic stay for “mutual debt and claim setoff” for the 
OTC derivatives.
213
 The new “contractual right to liquidate” also gave certain 
counterparties the power to terminate and liquidate derivatives contracts upon 
insolvency of the debtor, thereby circumscribing the Bankruptcy Code’s ban on “ipso 
facto” clauses.214 Then in 1984, the Bankruptcy Code was amended again, adding the 
repurchase agreements to the classes of derivatives.
215
   
With rapid market development of swaps, particularly the interest rate swaps, the 
OTC derivatives industry became worried about the existed bankruptcy law 
exemptions would not be sufficient to protect the swaps transactions, given that there 
were no explicit exemptions for swaps. In 1988, Senators DeConcini and Grassley 
introduced a bill to amend the Bankruptcy Code for swaps.
216
 The bill was endorsed 
by ISDA, which urged the Congress of the United States to eliminate the risk that 
market liquidity would be restricted due to application of the Bankruptcy Code to 
swap transactions, particularly in periods of volatility.
217
 Hence, in 1990 the 
Bankruptcy Code of the U.S. was amended again under the urge of ISDA. In the 1990 
amendment, swaps transactions were added into the scope of bankruptcy law “safe 
harbor.” Also in this amendment, the concept of netting was firstly introduced to the 
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Through the several times amendment to U.S. bankruptcy law, we observed that 
the U.S. legislators did not intend to give bankruptcy law exemption to all OTC traded 
derivatives, thereby they complied with a “patch-work” approach: stating from 
exemption for commodity and forward contracts in 1978, then successive exemptions 
for securities contracts in 1982, repurchase agreements in 1984, and swaps in 1990.
219
 
It seems that the U.S. legislators were cautionary and reluctant to promptly exempt 
these OTC financial contracts from the bankruptcy law. Even though, this 
“patch-work” amendment caused some confusion for the market, particularly about 




Firstly, the definition of “swap agreement,” though set down in 1990 amendment 
with a non-exhaustive list of swap-like transactions regarding the underlying assets of 
rates, currency, commodity, and cross-currency rate swaps; interest rate and currency 
options; rate caps, floors, and collars; and any other similar agreements.
221
 None of 
these transactions was clearly defined by the Bankruptcy Code, thus the judges 
usually rely on standard market definitions.
222
 Moreover, although flexible and 
seemingly exhaustive in scope, the definition proved worrisome because it had to be 
stretched to cover equity swaps, credit default swaps, total return swaps, weather 
derivatives, and other transactions that became increasingly popular after 1990.
223
 
Secondly, the definitions of protected contractual rights have been equally 
problematic. The problem stemmed largely from the structure of the Code, which 
described the protected rights separately for each type of financial contract.  Section 
362 (b)(6) protected contractual setoff rights with respect to commodity, forward, and 
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securities contracts, section 362 (b)(7) did the same for repurchase agreements, and 
362 (b)(17) did it for swaps. Yet, the setoff between different type transactions under 




Therefore, even after several times amendments, there still did not exist clear 
bankruptcy exemptions for those lately developed types, like the CDSs. Besides, the 
cross-product transactions, for example the close-out netting between a CDS with a 
non-CDS transaction, were not included into the exemption scope.   
3.2 The blanket exemption of Bankruptcy law pro-debtor rules in 
2005 BAPCPA  
In retrospect, the America’s 2005 bankruptcy law reform was precipitated by the 
disaster of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). In 1999, the President 
Working Group (PWG) on Financial Market published a report,
225
 titled “Hedge 
funds, leverage, and the lessons of LTCM,” in which, inter alia, made comments on 
the need to make further amendments to US bankruptcy laws to expand netting 
legislation.
226
 The PWG report highlighted the role “close-out netting” could play in 
preventing systemic turmoil. As claimed by the PWG, “the ability to terminate most 
financial market contracts upon an event of default is central to the effective 
management of market risk by financial market participants; close-out netting serves 
as a ‘domino effect’ constrainer, because it reduces the risk exposure of the 
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counterparties to a failed debtor.”227 Namely, if the government would not have 
bailed out LTCM, the use of close-out netting rights by derivatives counterparties 
would have mitigated their losses, and hence reduced the “contagion risk” in the 
financial market. Based on this report, PWG urged the U.S. Congress to further 
exempt financial contracts from the application of bankruptcy law so as to promote 
efficiency and stability of the financial system.  
The recommendations in PWG were then incorporated into the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1999, which was finally enacted in 2005 as the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)
228
. In section 561 of the new 
Bankruptcy Code, the ipso facto clause was exempted for the securities contracts, 
commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements, 
and master netting agreements.
229
 The termination, liquidation, or acceleration of or 
to setoff or net termination of those contracts by contractual terms, thereby shall not 
be stayed and avoided if the counterparties file for bankruptcy.
230
 Section 362 clause 
(b) provides for exceptions to the automatic stay rule. Among the various exceptions, 
the 2005 amendments have amended the existing exemptions under item (17), and 
added a new exception under item (27). The item (17) regards the right of set-off 
under swap agreements,
231
 while the item (27) relates to the master netting 
agreements.
232
 All in all, this amendment resulted in a “whole-market” exemption for 
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3.2.1 Re-define “swap agreements” 
As has been argued before, the definition of “swap agreements” was provided in the 
1990 U.S. Bankruptcy Code amendment. In fact, that definition is also wide enough, 
which could include almost every kind of swaps referring different underlying assets, 
such as interest rate, foreign currency exchange, commodities and any others.
233
 In 
the new form of the definition, the ambit was unlimited broadened, even surmounted 
the essential structure of a “swap.” We could say that the U.S. legislators created a 
new definition for swap, which could encompass, though with some limitations, 
nearly every other type of derivatives. As explained in the BAPCPA, “now a swap 
agreement includes swaps, options, forwards, and futures on debt or equity,
234
 and 
there is also the familiar opening clause, making clear that nearly all “similar” 
agreements are covered as well.
235
 Hence, Professor Morrison and Riegel 
commentated that, “in its new form, essentially all derivatives have become ‘swap 
agreements’;” all parties to them, and all transfers under or in connection with them, 
could thereby enjoy the Bankruptcy Code’s protection.”236 It is the fact that nearly all 
the OTC derivatives contracts can be reduced to the form of options, forwards, swaps 
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and the combination of them.
237
  
Apart from the re-definition of “swap agreements,” the BAPCPA, meanwhile, 
re-defined conceptions of other individual financial contracts.
238
 The BAPCPA 
inherited the structure of the earlier Bankruptcy Code, in the sense that it still 
provided the five basic types of protected financial contracts, namely the securities 
contract, swaps, repurchase agreements, forwards, and commodity contracts.
239
 Every 
definition now begins with a description of the product itself and then lists various 
related transactions, ending with an opening clause.
240
 For a swap transaction, all 
types of participants could get the bankruptcy protection, by contrast, the participants 
to other financial contracts would be eligible only after a series of qualifications have 
been achieved, yet the conditions for such qualifications are also loosed in 
BAPCPA.
241
 Then the type of financial contracts would be decided by the judges.   
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However, the discretional re-characterization power of the judges has been 
greatly limited. The judges shall refer the case to an expert’s opinion about the 
commercial practice of the trading contracts.
242
 In other words, if the trade was 
marked a swap, or a forward, if such trades were accepted by the market as those, 
then the judges shall make their decisions on the practice. The BAPCPA provided 
clearly that only in the circumstance that the derivatives traders “with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud the debtor’s other creditor, a judge can unwind settlement 
payments.” 243 But the evidence of such fraud is rare.244 Essentially, the broad 
definition of the swap agreement could prevent judges from re-characterizing the 
swaps, even though from the economic essence, the so called swaps are, in fact, 
forwards or options. In other words, the definition power of a derivatives contract 
would be largely granted to the financial market itself, and the judges shall respect to 
their practice. Thus, the judges’ power to intervene this complex market became 
extremely narrow before the crisis. 
3.2.2 The provision of master netting 
Before the BAPCPA amendment, the contractual right of netting across different 
financial derivatives transactions was not so unequivocal, which brought uncertainty 
for the OTC derivatives market, and it is the reason why in the U.S. the financial 
market tended to enlarge the ambit of “swap agreements,” given that under the ISDA 
master agreement, the derivatives parties could have the option to choose netting 
across different type of transactions, such as between CDSs and forwards. In this 
BAPCPA, a new definition of “master netting agreements” has been inserted as 
section 101 (38A), as a super-category with respect to the five basic financial 
contracts, which provided the rights of termination, acceleration, and setoff within and 




 Before BAPCPA, the judges also relied on standard market definitions and the expert opinions to 
decide the nature of a complex financial contract. 
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across multiple financial transactions within a master agreement.
245
 Therefore, the 
primary effect of adding this new category is to give legal certainty to the clause of 
cross-product netting under the ISDA master agreement. But even beyond that need of 
ISDA master agreements, the BAPCPA amendment set forth the master netting, not 
just between derivatives contracts, but also amongst all the financial contracts, like 
securities contracts and repos. Hence, the close-out netting between CDSs contracts 
and other derivatives contracts under the same ISDA master agreement, when debtors 
fall into bankruptcy, became legally approved after the adding of this section of 
“master netting agreement.”  
Till now, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code has changed the traditional patchwork 
approach (exempt the financial products one by one, i.e. the 1978 exemption of 
commodities futures, 1982 exemption of securities contracts, 1984 exemption of 
repurchase agreements, 1990 exemption to swap contracts) regarding to the protection 
against financial contracts. As argued the protection has become a whole market 
exemption from the bankruptcy law rules. To OTC derivatives, especially for the 
CDSs market, the new amendment means a total protected “safe harbor” that preclude 
the application of bankruptcy “automatic stay”, “preferential transfer” and the 
“cherry-picking” provisions. The financial derivatives industry succeeded in the lobby 
campaign in the U.S. Although the direct effect of the bankruptcy “safe harbor” is 
benefiting the derivatives trading institutions, the industry was brandishing a 
public-benefit slogan of “preventing systemic risk” due to the tightly interconnected 
derivatives market. Therefore, any contracts with the title of financial contracts would 
enjoy the safe harbors. Any collateral collected immediately before a bankruptcy 
petition and following the termination of a swap agreement cannot be attacked as a 
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preference or fraudulent transfer.
246
 
4. The bankruptcy safe harbor caused a “bank run” on 
“too-big-to-fail” OTC financial derivatives traders 
As we have argued, the bankruptcy law amendments in the U.S. created a 
“bankruptcy safe harbor” for OTC derivatives trading, and the pro-debtor rules have 
been surmounted. Therefore, the OTC derivatives transactions were further favored 
by the law, which also is the underlying legal reason for the rapid growth of the 
speculative CDSs market. However, we intend to argue here that the “bankruptcy safe 
harbor” not only facilitated the CDSs transactions, but also caused a “bank run” effect 
to the “too-big-to-fail” traders, and directly caused the breakdown of these 
corporations, such as AIG. The collapse of these “too-big-to-fail” institutions directly 
escalated the 2008 financial crisis. 
It is the fact that almost all the Wall Street financial institutions fell down in this 
financial crisis have relationship with their OTC derivatives trading, but we could not 
allege that the failure of the companies like Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers are totally 
because of the derivatives trading, though the failure of these companies also affected 
by the “bank run” of their derivatives counterparties. However, when Lehman 
bankrupted, its massive derivatives positions greatly complicated its bankruptcy, he 
impact of its bankruptcy through interconnections with derivatives counterparties and 
other financial institutions contributed significantly to the severity and depth of the 
financial crisis.
247
 As a best example to elaborate the “bank run” effect caused by 
derivatives trading, the failure of AIG could exactly show this problem. We affirm 
that AIG was directly pushed down by the “bank run” of its CDSs counterparties.    
As we have detailed the failure process of AIG in Chapter 1, the sudden demise 
of AIG was resulted from the rapidly increased collateral margins requirements of 
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AIG’s derivatives counterparties. In AIG’s report of August 2008 for the second 
quarter of this year, it was disclosed that 17 billion dollars value collaterals, mostly 
cash and Treasury bonds, had been posted for its CDSs counterparties.
 248
 On 16 
September, AIG was downgraded by the main rating agencies, in response, the AIG’s 
counterparties suddenly requested more collaterals according to the Model-to-Market 
margins call arrangement under the ISDA Master Agreement. After calculating, AIG 
estimated that it shall post about 20 billion dollars collaterals to its derivatives 
counterparties in the following weeks. But at that time, AIG’s liquidity had already 
been nearly exhausted.
249
 Therefore, the analogous “bank run” on AIG occurred. 
However, this time it is not the line of people outside the bank hurry to take their 
deposits back, but the financial institutions asking for increased margin calls adjusted 
every day in accordance with the mark-to-market risk. It could be said that the bank 
run in the form of collaterals directly dismembered this insurance giant. Hence, AIG 
had to request the government’s emergent capital injection. AIG was so 
interconnected with many large commercial banks, investment banks, and other 
financial institutions through counterparty credit relationships on CDS and other 
activities. The government concluded AIG was too-big-to-fail and had to deliver an 
aggregate number of 180 billion dollars to rescue it. Without the bailout, AIG’s 
default and collapse could have brought down its counterparties, causing cascading 
losses and collapses throughout the financial system.
250
 
Yet, according to the debtor-protection bankruptcy rules, this “bank run” could 
hardly happen to the OTC derivatives traders, as the early-termination, debt 
acceleration, and the increased collateral posting could be taken as the “preferential 
transfer”, which will harm other creditors’ benefit. Not even the termination and 
collateral requirement after the filing of bankruptcy of the debtor, which is forbidden 
by the “automatic stay” and the “cherry-picking” provisions. Therefore, if without the 
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“safe harbor” in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code for derivatives trading, AIG would not 
have worried about the potential required collaterals on 16 September 2008 and 
thereafter.  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we elaborated in detail the bankruptcy law “pro-debtor” principle and 
its main rules, namely the rule of “automatic stay”, “cherry-picking” and “preferential 
and fraudulent transfer.” Thereafter, we looked into the special trading rules for the 
OTC derivatives practice established by the OTC derivatives industry association 
ISDA. Those special trading rules include the “single-agreement arrangement,” the 
“close-out netting” and “margins exchange.” We argued that the collisions between 
the bankruptcy pro-debtor rules and the ISDA Master Agreement rules is the direct 
reason drove the OTC derivatives industry to lobby the U.S. Congress and EU 
parliament to exempt bankruptcy law pro-debtor rules from applying to OTC 
derivatives. Furthermore, we advanced that the exemptions caused a bankruptcy “safe 
harbor” for OTC derivatives transactions, which not only promoted the proliferation 
of speculative derivatives, including CDSs trading, but also caused a similar “bank 
run” as to the derivatives traders, such as AIG. Therefore, it could be claimed that the 
erosion of the bankruptcy pro-debtor principle is the direct institutional reason for the 
escalation of the 2008 financial crisis when AIG failed. 
On the other hand, we are always wondering that why AIG could sell out such a 
huge amount (400 billion notional value) of CDSs protections? Did the counterparties 
of AIG not worry about the creditworthiness of AIG? The “bankruptcy safe harbor” 
provision might be the answer. We are going to deeply inquiry this problem in the 







Chapter 5 The Circumvention of the Common Law 
Doctrine of “Secret Lien” 
 
In the prior chapter, we advanced the question that why AIG could sell out the huge 
amount of CDSs protection, and didn’t the counterparties fear about the 
creditworthiness of AIG? After analysis of law, we found that the fundamental reason 
is that the common law doctrine of “secret lien” has been erosion by OTC derivatives 
transactions. To illustrate the logical reasoning, we are going to firstly elaborate this 
common law doctrine of “secret lien.”      
1. Elaborate the common law doctrine of “secret lien”  
1.1 Origin of the doctrine of “secret lien”        
The famous commercial law Professor Peter Coogan once argued that “the history of 
commercial law could be deemed as the four-hundred-year struggle by debtors and 
their secured creditors to create security interests of various sorts in the debtors’ 
property without affording any notice to other creditors, and the following demands 
by unsecured creditors for notice when all or part of the debtor’s assets become 
subject to security interests.” 251  Dishonest debtors usually would ask some 
sophisticated secured creditors to collaborate with them to create “secret liens” 




The original intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine of “secret lien” could be 
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dated back to the sixteenth century England.
253
 In 1517 the England Parliament 
passed an Anti-Fraudulent Conveyance Statute that is commonly known as the 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth.
254
 According to this statute, any property transfers with the 
intention of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors shall be deemed as illegal 
and void.
255 This statue could be considered as the first legislation of “fraudulent 
law,” from which the general attitude of common law towards debtors’ unfaithful 
behaviors was clarified. However, the common law doctrine of “secret lien” was 
developed till the early of the nineteenth century in the case of Clow vs. Woods in 
Pennsylvanian of the United States.
256
   
In this case, a tanner, Hancock, conveyed security interests on the hides and 
tanning equipment to his creditors, i.e. Clow and Sharp. However, the secured 
creditors neither took possession of these collateralized hides and tanning equipment 
nor recorded the security interest in the public register.
 
In this circumstance, the 
tanner’s former partner, Poe, sued Hancock for his share of the value as to the firm. 
Then he obtained a positive judgment, which was then enforced by the local sheriff. 
In order to fulfil the enforcement, the sheriff auctioned the same hides and 
equipment that had been collateralized. Then the secured creditors, Clow and Sharp, 
sued the local sheriff to recover the proceeds of the sale, arguing that their security 
interest had priority over Poe’s claim.257 
The appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Judge Gibson 
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opined: “a creditor ought not be suffered to secure himself by means that may 
ultimately work an injury to third persons … where possession has been retained 
without any stipulation in the conveyance, the cases have uniformly declared that to 
be, not only evidence of fraud, but fraud per se. such a case is not inconsistent with 
the most perfect honesty; yet a court will not stop to inquire, whether there be actual 
fraud or not; the law will impute it, at all event, because it would be dangerous to the 
public to countenance such a transaction under any circumstances. The parties will 
not be suffered to unravel it, and show that, what seemed fraudulent was not in fact 
so. Would it be less against sound policy to suffer a vendor to remain in possession, 
under an agreement to that effect expressed in the conveyance, and thus to create a 
secret encumbrance on his personal property, when to the world he appears to be the 
absolute owner, and gains credit as such.”258 This judgment went beyond the 
sixteenth century anti-fraudulent law because the judges were not required to verify 
the “fraudulent intention” of the debtors. According to Judge Gibson’s articulation, 
the “secret” or “un-disclosure” status of the security interests per se constructed 
“fraud” to other creditors. The tanner’s ownership of his property, ostensibly free and 
clear of the rights of all others, would induce unwitting, and perhaps unsophisticated, 
creditor to extend unsecured credit at their peril.
259
 It is therefore that public 
disclosure (public notice) became a fundamental requirement in perfecting a security 
interest in Common law, while the “secret liens” shall be considered void and illegal. 
1.2 Functions of the “secret lien” doctrine 
The first and foremost function of the “secret lien” doctrine is its role in protecting 
contracting parties from credit risk of the counterparties. While sophisticated 
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creditors usually could require collaterals from the debtors, the less sophisticated 
creditors, such as small business creditors might not get collaterals when their 
counterparties are more powerful. Thus, the unsecured creditors will take more 
dangers of counterparty risk than the secured sophisticated creditors. However, if the 
debtors have rendered lots of “security liens” on its assets to the sophisticated and 
collaborative creditors without any record or transfer of possession, then the debtors 
could appear to be more creditworthy, thereby could get more loans from other 
creditors. Under this situation, the normal creditors could not accurately estimate the 
creditworthiness of the debtor, thus granted more loans to the debtor or do more 
business with the debtor. If the debtor bankrupted, the unsecured creditors would 
assume the losses while the secured creditors could get repayment from selling the 
collaterals. In this sense, the “secret lien” doctrine could protect the unsecured 
creditors from the counterparty risk. 
Moreover, the doctrine of “secret lien” is also essential to maintain the healthy 
and stability of the whole financial system. Credit market is mainly based on 
confidence. In the aforementioned Clow case Judge Duncan concluded that “a lack 
of transparency threatens not only individual creditors, but the financial system as a 
whole.”260 In fact, if “secret lien” were permitted, the credit loaners will lose 
confidence to the borrowers, as they could not see the exact credit situation of the 
borrowers. Thus, the credit cost will arise, as the credit supply in the whole market 
would decline, if the credit risk rises upside since the opaqueness of the borrowers’ 
credit situations, which is detrimental to the health of the whole credit market. As 
argued by Professor M. Simokovic “a secret mortgage to secure a creditor … should 
be valid and bind the property against creditors … would be a reproach to the law. It 
ought not, it cannot be so. If it were so, it would put an end to all credit. Credit is 
given on ‘faith.’ I know not any doctrine that would tend to annihilate all credit, 
more than the establishment of such a principle.”261 Therefore, the common law 
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principle of prohibiting “secret lien” has the function of maintaining the confidence 
of the credit market, and thus promoted the health and stability of the whole financial 
system. 
2. From the common law doctrine of “secret lien” to the 
Uniform Commercial Code  
After the secret lien doctrine has been developed in the U.S., non-possessory security 
interest would be considered as void. However, this doctrine actually would greatly 
restrict the guarantee function of movable property, especially as for the valuable 
machinery. For instance, on the one hand the small business owner wants to pledge 
one machine in exchange of a favorable loan; on the other hand he must use that 
machine for manufacturing. But according to the secret lien doctrine, the pledger must 
transfer the possession to the pledgee, otherwise, the pledge would be illegal. This is 
the dilemma for the application of the “secret lien” doctrine. Therefore it is necessary 
to develop another way to publish the situation of security interest apart from the 
conventional way of possession transfer.
262
 In order to deter and correct the problems 
of secret liens, the common law “recordation system” has been developed. 263 
Recording has been viewed as a best means of publishing existed security on one’s 
assets while maximizing the usage of these assets. 
In the 19
th
 century America, actually, there already existed the recordation system 
for real property, so this system later became the basis for constructing the recordation 
system as for movable property.
264
 After the “secret lien” had been clearly articulated, 
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the U.S. recordation system for the movable property mortgage gradually developed.
 
265
 However, in its early years, the requirements in relation to the perfection of these 
securities interest on movable properties were quite different among the different 
American states, which caused complexity and conflictions.
266
 
In order to deal with this disordered situation, the U.S. enacted the Uniform 
Commercial Code (for short, UCC) in 1952 after more than 10 years legislation 
efforts.
267
 There are 9 articles in the UCC, actually an article equals to a chapter. The 
Article 9, i.e. “secured transactions,” aims at governing the creation of security 
interests on movable properties, including the “fixtures,” namely the goods that have 




The UCC article 9 confirmed the “secured lien” doctrine, and moreover laid 
down a set of rules regarding how to perfect the security interests on movable 
properties, solving the disordered provisions among the different American states. 
According to different types of personal properties, such as financial assets, 
agricultural commodities, the UCC-9 provided very detailed perfection rules for 
creating security interests. In this dissertation, we do not intend to discuss all of them. 
But the common rule is that the perfection of the non-possessory security interest 
shall comply with the “debtor-location” rule.269 In other words, the debtors shall file 
the mortgage documents in their business operation location, and thereby the 
information searchers would be more easily to find the information of security interest 
on relevant debtor’s assets. And the searchers or filers no longer will have to make 
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difficult discriminations of classes of collateral in order to determine whether to 
search or file in the jurisdiction where the debtor is located or where the collateral is 
located, except the exceptions.
270
 
3. The “bankruptcy safe harbor” for OTC derivatives and 
the circumvention of the common law “secret lien” doctrine  
Although “secret lien” mostly occurred in the case of security interest on movable 
properties, the “secret lien” could also take on other forms. In the essence, we believe 
that any form of transactions that attribute certain creditor priority in repayment, 
while other creditors do not know such priorities, such transactions could be deemed 
as “secret lien,” given that the inherent objectiveness of “secret lien” doctrine is 
always focused on impeding debtors’ efforts of increasing its apparent 
creditworthiness. After a complex recordation system has been established, “secret 
lien” transactions could hardly happen in relation to movable properties. However, 
before the 2008 financial crisis, with the rapid development of OTC financial 
derivatives market, a new form of “secret lien” had been created, especially regarding 
the CDSs transactions. 
In fact, the perfect creation of a “secret lien” should just satisfy the following two 
conditions: (i) the creditors could get a priority in repayment when the debtor 
bankrupted, and the priority would not subject to any “secret lien” laws; (ii) the debtor 
is not required to carry out any disclosure obligation in relation to the transactions, in 
which “priority” have conveyed to certain creditors. According to the two criteria, 
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OTC derivatives contracts could become perfect form of secret liens.
271
  
First of all, the OTC derivative transactions have been totally exempted from the 
pro-debtor bankruptcy rules after the 2005 amendment of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Namely, the OTC derivatives, including CDSs transactions were not subjected to the 
“automatic stay” “cherry-picking” and the “preferential and fraudulent transfer” 
provisions in the bankruptcy law. When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the 
counterparty could set-off the transactions between them. Besides, most of the OTC 
derivatives contracts were signed under the ISDA Master Agreement, so the 
counterparties periodically exchange margin collaterals to each other according to the 
risk exposure variation. Hence the counterparties of the OTC derivatives could take 
relatively adequate collateral before the bankruptcy of their counterparties. As the 
consequence, the counterparties of the OTC derivatives transactions are basically 
guaranteed. It is also reasonable that if the insolvent debtor was a “too-big-to-fall” 
financial institution, then the derivatives counterparties would have more confidence 
that their transactions could be secured, as usually the government will bail these 
systemically important financial institutions out. Therefore, we believe the potential 
government bailout expectation reinforced the effect of secret lien.  
Second, the CDSs, as other OTC traded derivatives, are privately negotiated. So, 
the traders were not required to disclose the contract information to the regulators and 
not even the public. And moreover, it is argued that unlike exchange traded 
derivatives, which are standardized, simplified, and priced by the market through 
frequent trading, the OTC traded CDSs are much more complex, and there are not 
market prices for them. So even though the CDSs traders voluntarily publish the 
trading information at times, the counterparties of the CDSs trader could not 
understand and estimate the real risk exposure of those CDSs contracts. In short, the 
CDSs market is extremely opaque.  
Therefore, OTC derivatives, especially the CDSs, are perfect “secret liens,” the 
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traders of which could get protection against the counterparties’ bankruptcy while the 
latter do not need to disclose the derivatives trading information. However, no OTC 
derivatives were considered void before the crisis. Thus, the “secret line” doctrine had 
been eroded due to the OTC derivatives transactions.     
4. The circumvention of the common law “secret lien” 
doctrine and the failure of AIG 
Before the crisis, AIG, and some other financial companies were the net CDS 
protection seller, while banks were the net protection buyers.
272
 AIG was a typical 
one-way seller, though the gross notional exposure was only a tenth of the size of the 
gross exposures of the current largest CDS dealer,
273
 it is very risky once credit event 
happens. On 30 September 2008 the aggregate gross notional amount of credit 
derivatives sold by AIG was $ 493 billion – or $ 372 billion on a net basis.274 AIG 
fell into liquidity crisis in a very short period because of the suddenly increased 
collateral requirement and termination of the CDSs contracts mainly by its investment 
bank counterparties.
275
 However, we advanced in chapter 2 that the fundamental 
reason of AIG’s failure is that it sold out too much CDS protections on mortgage 
related assets. Before the crisis, AIG sold roughly $ 90 billion CDSs protection on 
CDOs. Then our question is always that why AIG could sell out this huge amount of 
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CDSs, while lots of investment banks, hedge funds did not worry about AIG’s own 
capability to compensate those CDSs protection should credit event happens? It seems 
that AIG used the secret lien strategy through CDSs to raise its leverages. 
In fact, in the CDSs transactions, AIG, the protection seller, resembled a borrower 
who accepts a relatively small amount of money now in return for a promise to pay a 
larger amount of money in the future. The difference between a CDS contract and a 
traditional loan is that the repayment amount and date are contingent on a credit event. 
Put differently, AIG mixed borrowing with a directional bet.
276
 As Prof. Morrison and 
Riegel argued that “many financial contracts have a credit component; one party 
temporarily extends credit to the other.”277 In this sense, AIG could be deemed as the 
potential debtor and its CDSs counterparties are the creditors. Although almost all 
AIG’s counterparties are shrewd financial institutions,278  most of them did not 
actually realize the counterparty risk of AIG.
279
 As revealed in 2009, the AIG’s net 
risk exposure to CDS contracts was $ 372 billion, yet, this data was not known to 
AIG’s counterparties, because that most of the CDSs contracts AIG sold were bespoke, 
which were not covered by the public data. In a scant regulation environment, no one 
will exactly know the risk exposure of AIG’s CDS portfolio. Moreover, the CDSs 
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transactions are off-balance sheet of AIG, which made the investigation of the real 
exposure of AIG on CDSs impossible. And the industry organization ISDA actively 
resisted voluntary disclosure of CDS documentation before the crisis, insisting that 
this information is proprietary and shall be protected.
280
  
Meanwhile, the CDSs counterparties of AIG have surely taken into account that 
their transactions could be terminated when AIG bankrupts or they could ask AIG to 
post collaterals corresponding to the underlying risk when the ratings of the 
underlying mortgage-backed assets depreciate. Thus, the bankruptcy safe harbor 
protection for CDSs counterparties render them a superior status vis-à-vis other 
creditors of AIG, which constructed a guarantee to them. Moreover, the potential 
government backup against a systemic important financial institution, like AIG, would 
further consolidate the guaranty effect to the CDSs trading counterparties. However, 
as for other creditors in general, the undisclosed CDSs transactions became a type of 
“secret lien,” which greatly damaged the creditors’ judgment ability as to the 
creditworthiness of AIG. Therefore, theoretically, the apparent creditworthiness and 
the leverage of AIG was raised than it actually was, which is a sound underlying legal 
reason that why AIG could sold excessive CDS protections on mortgage assets.  
Just like the nineteenth century Judge asserted “the secret lien would not just hurt 
the unsecured creditors, but would probably threat the systemic stability of the 
financial market.” The “secret lien” of CDSs trading discouraged AIG’s 
counterparties to diversify the transactions with AIG, provided that only if they could 
be secured when AIG fell into bankruptcy. This scenario is the very description of 
“common land tragedy,” in economic theory, because no one would seriously consider 
the stability of the whole financial system when they bought too much CDS 
protection with relatively low cost from AIG. This could also be one of the reasons 
that why the CDSs market was so interconnected.  
We mentioned before that the margin-exchange mechanism laid down could 
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inhibit counterparty risk and at the same time control too risky transactions. But in 
AIG’s case this mechanism did not work as normal, as the derivatives transactions 
with AIG were highly under-collateralized. The reason lies in that AIG, as an 
insurance company, was regulated by the state insurance regulators, and the capital 
reserve of an insurance company is much higher than an investment bank. So 
generally, CDS protection buyers had a stronger confidence towards AIG’s 
creditworthiness. The reason might also be that AIG could give those counterparties 
who asked less or no collaterals favorable price of buying the CDSs protection. 
We also would like to add an argument here that “losses act as a spark; 
widespread leverage is the powder keg.”281 Leverage can be “regulated” privately by 
creditors or regulated by government, but only if the extent of leverage is known.
282
 
The high leverage employed by AIG is embodied in two levels, one is that the “secret 
lien” of CDSs transactions made AIG looks more creditworthy, and less collateral 
were posted to its counterparties, thereby AIG could use its limited capital to sell 
more CDSs protections. Secondly, the CDSs contracts, per se, are high leveraged, as 
AIG need put little collateral before the contracts get matured, however, once credit 
event happens AIG shall repay the whole notional value of the contacts that are 
usually many times bigger than the premium fees AIG has reaped. For the high 
leverage of AIG, when the mortgage market declined in the end of 2007, AIG suffered 
rapidly increased collateral requirements from its CDSs contracts counterparties, and 
its equity was rapidly wiped out. If the CDSs transactions of AIG were transparent to 
the market, the CDSs market participants would have the ability to control AIG’s 
leverage by buying less CDS contracts from it, however, as there is no regulation that 
required the market transparency, risk accumulated in AIG and ultimately threatened 
the whole financial system. As AIG was a systemic importance financial institution, 
the failure of which would cause most of the financial institutions suffer losses due to 
CDSs trading,
283
 the U.S. government had to use the taxpayers’ money to rescue it.  
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In this chapter, we developed the argument that the “bankruptcy safe harbor” for OTC 
derivatives caused the erosion of the traditional common law doctrine of “secret lien.” 
After the erosion of this doctrine, the counterparty risk private-monitoring mechanism 
has been broke up. It seems to us that AIG used the CDSs trading to make money but 
with potential obligation to repay the money. While CDSs contracts could be 
quasi-secured under the bankruptcy safe harbor and the trading information was 
unknown to others, so the AIG always seems more creditable to others. This caused 
AIG could do much more transactions, and the counterparties of AIG were less 
vigilant to investigate and monitor AIG’s real creditworthiness. Therefore, we believe 
that the erosion of the common law doctrine of “secret lien” is an underlying 
institutional reason why AIG could sell out the huge amount of CDSs contracts and its 
final breakdown. 
Till now in this part, we have argued the deregulation to OTC derivatives and the 
resultant erosion of the valuable legal doctrines undermined the integrity and stability 
of the financial system. So, the provisions regarding OTC derivatives in CFMA and 
the 2005 BAPCPA are imputable. But the question is that “should they be abrogated 
after the crisis?” This is a tough question, which entails strict cost-benefit analysis. So, 
firstly we shall appreciate the benefits of these rules regarding OTC derivatives. In 
fact, as we have advanced in this part, these pro-derivatives trading rules really have 
their positive sides. In terms of CFMA, which opened the gate for speculative 
transactions, promoted the liquidity of the derivatives market and thereby could 
reduce the cost of buying CDSs for hedging risks. As for the BAPCPA, which totally 
exempted OTC derivatives from the application to bankruptcy law pro-debtor rules, 
could also favor derivatives trading, but most importantly, cut down risk contagion 
chain among the derivatives traders and thus, to some extent, prevent the systemic 
risk of the financial system. But we think that without proper regulation, when one 
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kind of systemic risk was prevented, another form of systemic risk has been created 
before the crisis, given that excessive speculative CDSs transactions promoted the 
U.S. housing bubble and directly pushed down too-big-to-fall companies, especially 
the AIG.       
Therefore, the wise way to re-regulate the OTC derivatives market is giving 
considerations to both the advantages and the disadvantages of these pro-derivatives 
trading legal rules that already existed. Namely, the regulation should impede 
excessive speculative derivatives trading from harming the stability of the financial 
system, meanwhile keeping the adequate liquidity of this industry. In the next part, we 
will focus on the regulatory reforms against the OTC derivatives trading in the 
European Union. The new regulations in EU against derivatives trading would be the 
institutional shield for preventing us from another similar crisis resulted from the 


















Part III Re-regulate the OTC Derivatives Market: 
European Union’s Regulatory Reform after the Crisis 
 
Chapter 6 EU’s Regulatory Reform I: Establish New 
Trading Infrastructure for the OTC Derivatives 
Market 
 
After the 2008 financial crisis, the financial market regulators across the world have 
realized that un-regulation and de-regulation to the OTC derivatives market is one of 
the main reasons of this one-hundred-year-once crisis. In light of this, the main 
jurisdictions of international financial market began to re-regulate the OTC 
derivatives market, including the U.S. and the EU. In general, the initiatives in both 
jurisdictions across the Atlantic are similar to each other, though exist differences in 
special regulatory technical provisions, as the international regulatory reform against 
the financial market has been coordinated at the international level. This is necessary 
because the regulators have realized that without coordinated actions financial 
transactions will flow to those regions with the least regulation, thereby regulatory 
efforts in single state would be ineffective. In this part, we will focus on analyzing 
EU’s comprehensive regulatory reform regarding to the OTC derivatives market, 
while the America’s new regulations will be mentioned where relevant so as to give a 
comparative perspective. 
The most important task for the new regulations is solving the systemic risk OTC 
derivatives trading could pose to the financial system. Specifically, we think the new 
regulations shall cope with three problems of this market, the too-interconnectedness 
of the market participants, the non-functioning mechanism of collateral management 
between the counterparties themselves, and the unlimited speculative transactions. 
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However, at the same time, the new regulations shall not inappropriately reduce the 
market efficiency. In achieving the two overarching goals, EU in 2012 enacted the 
“European regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and the trade 
repositories,” also as usually called the “European Market Infrastructure Regulation” 
(for short “EMIR”). Beside this fundamental regulation specifically against the OTC 
derivatives market, EU also successively enacted several other specific laws dealing 
with particular risks of the OTC derivatives market. These laws consist of 
comprehensive regulatory rules against derivatives transactions, one complements 
another.  
In the following, we are going firstly to analyze this fundamental EU regulation 
against OTC derivatives market, namely the EMIR. In our view, the approaches laid 
down in the EMIR are different with the traditional regulatory approaches, i.e. 
reinforcing administrative regulation. EMIR approaches mainly focus on creating a 
sound market trading infrastructure, and refraining unregulated OTC derivatives 
transactions within this infrastructure. Nevertheless, first of all, we will give a 
background introduction of the EMIR and then elaborate the regulatory approaches 
provided by EMIR.      
1. Background introduction to the EMIR  
1.1 International financial regulatory reform in relation to OTC 
derivatives 
The 2008 global financial crisis has manifested the international regulatory 
collaboration system was functionless. In comparison, this financial crisis was 
resulted also due to the international “regulatory competition.”284 Namely, in order to 
compete with others in the sector of OTC derivatives, the main jurisdictions in the 
world, mainly the UK and the US, deregulated their laws as to derivatives trading, as 
                                                             
 
284
 See e.g. Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization 
and Centralization of International Securities Law, Seton Hall L. Rev. 1581, 2010. 
117 
 
we have articulated in Part II. This is, in effect, a “race-to-bottom” regulation 
competition. After the crisis, the regulators across the Atlantic clearly realized this 
problem. Thus, an international regulatory collaboration framework shall be set up 
before regulatory initiatives in individual jurisdictions. In fact, without coordinating 
with its international counterparts, EU’s own goal in “establishing a safe, responsible 
and growth-enhancing financial sector” would not be achieved.285 
In the peak of the crisis in 2008, all spot lights were focused on the financial crisis. 
The leaders in the EU and the US also took the response to the crisis as the first 
priority. However, before the crisis, there does not exist an international organ, or 
coordinated mechanism to regulate the OTC financial derivatives. In this 
circumstance, the G-Twenty (G20) group was established.
286
 Soon the G20 organized 
an emergent Summit in Washington as of November 2008. The leaders collectively 
agreed on a comprehensive coordinated-strategy as to financial regulatory reform.
287
 
Then in April 2009, the G20 held its second summit in London. In this summit, the 
G20 transformed the former Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to Financial Stability 
Board (FSB). Thus, a new international organ has been established with its mandate 
of coordinating national authorities, international standard setting bodies and 
international financial institutions to collectively address the vulnerabilities in the 
international financial system.
288
 In effect, the FSB became the executive organ, 
aiming at promoting consistent implementation of G-20 decisions among different 
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 In November 2009, the G-20 held its third Summit in Pittsburgh, in 
which a broad international financial reform programme, based on clear 
recommendations and timetables, has been advanced. The reform to the OTC 
financial derivatives market is one of the center pieces.
290
 Based on the FSB’s earlier 
recommendations, the basic principles to re-regulate the OTC financial derivatives 
market was clearly declared in the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit Statement.
291
 It states that 
“all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported 
to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subjected to higher 
capital requirements. We ask the FSB and its relevant members to assess regularly 
implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives 
markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse.”292 Hence, the 
framework of the reform to the OTC financial derivatives market was already clear. 
After the Pittsburgh Summit, the G-20 members, the U.S., the EU etc., were starting 




Therefore, a new international coordinated mechanism in regulating the financial 
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market has been established. Although with potential limitations, the G-20 has 
injected substantial strength in international cooperation as to international 
coordinated financial regulatory reforms. Since then, the Members of the G-20 shall 
take consistent activities under this new framework. And the FSB will be responsible 
for monitoring the compliance of the G-20 commitments in the G-20 member states. 
However, we shall point out that, as this new international cooperation framework in 
coordinating financial regulation was not based on a formal international treaty, thus 
there is not legally binding effect of the G-20 summits commitments, and the 
efficiency of which might be restricted.  
1.2 EU’s financial regulatory architecture reform 
In the 2008 crisis, apart from the lack of European Union level regulations to the 
financial market, it is also identified that the EU current financial market supervisory 
authorities were lack of appropriate regulatory power to timely and effectively 
intervene into the financial market.
294
 Thus, after the crisis it is urgent to reconstruct 
the European regulatory and supervisory structure, especially attribute more 
regulatory power to the European level authorities. In 2010, the EU enacted 
successively four regulations, in which a new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) was set up. the new structure includes a macro-level risk 
preventing body the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and three micro-level 
risk monitoring bodies, namely the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which are collectively called the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). These new regulatory and supervisory organs have 
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started their work since January 2011. The ESRB is a newly established organ, which 
was created for preventing potential systemic risk of the European financial system, 
while the three ESAs are upgraded from their formers, namely the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European Security 
Regulators (CESR) and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) respectively. Before the reform, the CEBS, CESR 
and the CEIOPS were only consultative organs that did not have direct power to 
regulate the financial market,
295
 which manifested the inefficiency of the EU 
financial regulatory and supervisory structure.  
The underlying rationale for setting up the ESAs was to ensure closer cooperation 
and exchange of information among national supervisors, facilitate the adoption of 
EU solutions to cross-border problems, and advance the coherent interpretation and 
application of EU regulatory rules.
296
 By preparing uniform standards and ensuring 
supervisory convergence and coordination the ESAs should shape the further 
development of a single rule book applicable to all 28 EU member states and thus 
contribute to the functioning of the single market. To this end, the ESAs have been 
assigned in the founding regulations and subsequent secondary Union legislation, 
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In terms of the supervision to the OTC derivatives market, ESMA was the organ 
in charge of the supervision to the securities and derivatives market. In particular, 
ESMA will foster supervisory convergence both amongst securities regulators and 
across financial sectors by working closely with other ESAs. It is expected that the 
ESMA will maintain the advisory role. Nevertheless, the ESMA will be entitled to 
develop technical standards that, subject to the Commission’s enforcement, will then 
be adopted as delegated or implementing acts. The ESMA, specifically, will have full 
responsibility to supervise the trade repositories established in EU territory and the 
European CCPs that operate their businesses across national borders. These aspects 
will be discussed in detail below. In short, a more powerful and efficient regulatory 
and supervisory structure in EU has been established. In terms of the regulation of the 
OTC derivatives market, the ESMA will play a very active and critical role. 
1.3 The enactment process of EMIR 
The reaction of the European Commission to the financial crisis is very rapid. Since 
October 2008, the European Commission has been working actively on an in-depth 
review of derivatives markets.
298
 On 17 October, the European Commissioner for 
internal market and services, Mr. McCreevy, called for a systemic look at derivatives 
markets, learning lessons from the financial crisis.
299
 On December 2008 the Council 
of the financial ministers claimed, as a first step and as a matter of urgency, it is 
necessary to create at least one European-based central counterparty for OTC 
derivatives clearing.
300
 After the breakout of the Eurozone Sovereign debt crisis, the 
legislative response to regulate the OTC derivatives market was further accelerated. 
On 3 July 2009, the European Commission published its first Communication – 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
situations; (6) ESMA exercises direct supervisory powers for Credit Rating Agencies and Trade 
Repositories; (7) Collecting the necessary information to carry out their mandate. See supra, European 
Commission, Report on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), Com (2014) 509 final.  
298
 European Commission, “Communication: Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets,” 




 European Commission, “”Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Commission 
Communication – Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets,” SEC (2009) 905 final. 
122 
 
“Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets” – which systemically 
analyzed the characteristics, especially the risk character, of the whole derivatives 
market and particular derivatives markets. Furthermore, in this communication, the 
Commission identified four complementary tools to reduce the negative impact of 
OTC derivatives market on financial stability: (i) increase standardization; (ii) use 
trade repositories; (iii) strengthen the use of Central Counterparty clearing houses 
(CCPs), and (iv) increase the use of organized trading venues.
301
 These proposals 
were highly praised in the September Pittsburgh G-20 Summit by the national leaders, 
and in this Summit, the leaders committed that: “all standard OTC derivative 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC 
derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared 
contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.”302 It means that EU’s 
regulatory programme was basically accepted by other G-20 countries. On 20 October 
2009, the European Commission published the second Communication – “Ensuring 
efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets: Future policy actions.” This 
Communication examines one by one the main shortcomings of the current 
derivatives market, both including the OTC market and the exchange-traded market. 
And it outlines the policy actions to address these problems, including reinforce 
international cooperation, distinguishing financial and non-financial counterparties, 
establishing stringent risk-preventing requirements for CCPs and some others.
303
 
Based on these two Communications and abundant of consultations excised by the 
European Commission, the legislative procedure was initiated. On 15 September 2010 
the Commission proposed to the Parliament and the Council the draft of the regulation. 
On 9 February 2012, the European Parliament and the Council reached an important 
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agreement on a Regulation for more stability, transparency and efficiency in 
derivatives markets. It was a key step in the effort to establish a safer and sounder 
regulatory framework for European financial markets. On 4 July 2012, the regulation 
on OTC derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (also “EMIR” – 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation) was adopted and entered into force on 16 
August 2012. This was a major development, which symbolized the fulfillment of the 
EU’s commitment in the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit. 
Generally speaking, the Regulation ensures that information on all European 
derivative transactions will be reported to trade repositories and be accessible for 
supervisory authorities, including the ESMA, to give policy makers and supervisors a 
clear overview of the market situation. The regulation also requires standard 
derivative contracts shall be cleared through central Counterparties. Moreover, 
stringent organizational, business operation and prudential requirements as for the 
central clearing parties have also been laid down. In the following, we will analyze 
these newly established rules, aiming at mitigating systemic risk, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of them. 
2. Main content of EMIR I: mandatory clearing through 
central counterparties 
2.1 What is central counterparty clearing? 
From the historical inquiry, central counterparty (also for short CCP) clearing has 
been used for more than a century as to various financial instruments.
304
 Since from 
the mid nineteenth century, equities have already been cleared through central 
counterparties since the mid of the nineteenth century. Shortly after the success in the 
stock market, CCP clearing was gradually introduced into the commodity futures 
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 In the late of the nineteenth century, a bunch of private-operated 
commodity futures exchanges were established, in order to control the counterparty 
risk, the exchanges requested their traders to meet certain solvency standards and post 
margin collaterals. Actually, in the initial period, the exchanges are the body to 
manage the collaterals exchange activity for the trading counterparties. But they did 
not guarantee the losses of the traders. This situation changed afterwards. In 1891, the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange firstly began to assure its trading members against 
nonperformance of their counterparties in specific transactions. Then in 1925, the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) clearinghouse agreed to serve as a “counterparty to 
all transactions on the exchange,” thus it became the first central counterparty to all its 
traders,
306
 which symbolized the advent of CCP clearing for derivatives market.  
Actually, the CCP provides a guarantee mechanism for all its trading members. 
Thus the single traders, in general, would not have to worry about the counterparty 
risk. After entering into CCP clearing, all the bilateral negotiated derivatives contracts 
shall be novated through the central counterparty. In other words, the CCP will act as 
a “middle-man,” who will become the buyer of the seller and the seller of the 
buyer.
307
 Hence, the clearinghouses themselves will directly bear the costs of a 
party’s default, rather than the original contracting parties. In the CCP’s history, apart 
from few exceptions, CCPs have functioned consistently stable since CBOT’s 
landmark innovation.
308
 Even in times of market stress, CCPs have withstood high 
volatility and counterparty failures without incidents. Notably as well, the recent 
market crisis did not cause significant CCP disruptions. Until now, no CCPs have 
defaulted on the guarantees to their trading members.
309
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2.2 Mechanism of central counterparty clearing in mitigating 
risk 
In fact, the original birth of CCP was a market-driven product due to the derivatives 
traders’ need of reducing counterparty default risk. CCPs have proven their value 
during this financial crisis risk management. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the 
default of its huge volume of exchange traded derivatives contracts actually did not 
cause market turmoil. However, before the crisis the CCP clearing only apply to the 
derivatives traded on exchanges. The termination of OTC derivatives after Lehman, 
AIG and others failure, unfortunately, resulted in great market panic.  
Compared to its original market driven approach, the CCP clearing requirements 
after this financial crisis was pushed by international financial market regulators. 
Having seen the advantages of CCP clearing, the London G-20 summit, held in April 
2009, called for CCP clearing for all credit derivatives. Then in the 2009 September 
G20 Pittsburgh Summit, the leaders urged that all qualified OTC derivatives shall be 
clearing through central counterparties before the end of 2012, although CCP clearing 
would increase cost for the market participants. To justify this international reform 
proposal, it is warrant to firstly scrutinize the mechanism of CCP clearing in 
mitigating risk, including both the counterparty risk and the financial systemic risk. 
2.2.1 Multilateral netting 
The first and foremost value of CCP clearing is its function in multilateral netting. 
Netting is a jargon in financial practice that has the same meaning with the legal term 
“set-off.” Netting could reduce the risk exposure of the derivatives traders and raise 
the efficiency of capital usage. However, in a derivatives marketplace without 
employing CCP clearing, the counterparties of derivatives transactions could only 
offset their risk exposure in a bilateral manner. However, the risk mitigation role of 
bilateral netting was greatly restricted in the derivatives market, given that this market 
is highly interconnected. In order to appreciate the merit of multilateral netting 
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through central counterparties, we shall firstly have a look at the difference between 
bilateral netting and multilateral netting.  
In case of bilateral netting, for example, we assume that Party A owes Party B 50 
dollars, and Party B owes party A 100 dollars. Should Party A defaults, after bilateral 
netting, it is not necessary for Party B to pay A 100 dollars, instead just 50 dollars. 
Thus Party B’s risk exposure would be halved since Party B does not need to pay 
Party A 100 dollars firstly and then sue A for the 50 dollars back. (See chart 7 below). 
 
Chart 7: Bilateral netting 
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As for multilateral netting, let us suppose a simplified example. Assume there are 
three OTC derivatives traders in the market. They did business with each other in 
sequential transactions. Party A bought a derivatives contract of 100 dollars from 
Party B, Party B bought a dollars value derivatives contract from Party C 150, and 
Party C bought a dollars derivatives contract from Party A. In this case, each party 
traded with another, yet there are no reciprocal transactions. Hence, bilateral netting 
could not be employed.
310
 Even though Party A has a net positive exposure of 100 
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decentralized netting has inherent limitations compared to netting through a CCP. While some 











dollars, he still needs to pose collateral to Party B for guarantee. For the whole market, 
the aggregate risk exposure is 450 dollars (See the Chart 8 (1) below).  
Now, suppose that a central counterparty has been introduced into the market, and 
all the three bilateral contracts shall be novated in the CCP. Namely, the CCP became 
direct counterparties of the Part A, B, and C. As the consequence, the relevant risk 
exposures between the parties were then turned to be the following. First, between the 
CCP and Party A, CCP buys a 200 dollars contract from Party A, and the Party A buys 
a 100 contract from the CCP; Party B buys a 150 dollars value contact from the CCP, 
and the CCP buys a 100 dollars value contract from Party B; Party C buys a 200 
dollars value contract from the CCP, and the CCP bought a 150 dollars contract from 
Party C (See the Chart 8 (2) below). After novation, the bilateral netting could be 
done between the CCP and the respective parties, then the net risk exposures are：the 
CCP has a net negative risk exposure of 100 dollars against Party A, and two positive 
risk exposures of 50 dollars each against Party B and C (See Chart 8 (3) below).  
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Therefore, the total risk exposure of the whole market has been reduced to 200 
dollars (100$+50$+50$). The potential risk of the whole financial market was 
mitigated thereof. And, multilateral netting could also reduce the putting of collaterals, 
thereby promoting the market efficiency. Take the situation of Party B for instance, if 
there does not exist a CCP in the market, it shall put collaterals to Party A due to the 
100 dollars risk exposure for A. However, after CCP clearing, Party B would be the 
net risk exposure holder, thereby it shall not put any collateral to the CCP, instead, 
receives collaterals from the CCP. 
More importantly, as the CCP will become the counterparty to all other 

















interconnectedness will be greatly loosened. Take an extreme example, if all the 
derivatives transactions shall be centrally cleared through CCPs, the derivatives 
traders in the market will not have connection with each other anymore. Hence, the 
derivatives market would be interlocked. If one trader defaults, there would be no 
contagion risk because that the linkages between the derivatives traders have been cut 
down.
311
 In spite of this great merit, we should take into mind that the risk of the 
default of derivatives traders will not disappear, but the risk will be concentrated to 
the CCPs. A clearinghouse, just like an individual firm in a bilateral transaction, might 
be managed poorly or experience a series of unfortunate events. If CCPs default, the 
whole financial market could be exploded. Thus, the stable operation of CCPs is 
critical to maintain the safety of the whole financial system.  
2.2.2 Professional risk management   
Apart from the multilateral netting mechanism that would play a fundamental role in 
preventing counterparty risk and systemic risk, CCPs as professional risk 
management institutions could better prevent potential risk than the traders in several 
other respects. First, compared to the derivatives traders, CCP is a professional risk 
management institution. It was evidenced that, before the crisis bilateral collateral 
exchange usually did not function. For example, in many derivatives transactions with 
AIG, the counterparties did not require AIG to timely and periodically post collaterals. 
However, the CCPs could establish a more strict collateral procedure. And the 
derivatives traders who want to use the central clearing mechanism shall strictly obey 
with these collateral rules. And as a professional risk management organ, the CCPs 
could have more resources to efficiently manage the posted collaterals.            
Moreover, centralized clearing can homogenize counterparty credit risk. CCPs 
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 It is also believed that, through the CCP clearing, market exit will be facilitated. To illustrate, if 
Party C wants to exit the market, it could enter into an offsetting transaction with Party A; however, 
party A is unlikely to want to exit a profitable transaction and, if does so, he might demand a very high 
price. Alternatively, Party C could enter into an offsetting transaction with a different counterparty, but 
that arrangement would fail to eliminate credit risk from the system. 
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standardize the credit risk to which their members are exposed through novation; 
instead of facing the varying credit qualities of their trading partners, all clearing 
members of a CCP are exposed to a single, uniform credit risk of the CCP. Credit risk 
homogenization could significantly reduce the risk monitoring cost for the derivatives 
traders. Centralized clearing not only standardizes, but also might reduce, credit risk. 
Indeed, a CCP is likely to pose less counterparty risk to its members than bilateral 
parties would pose to one another.  
Besides, it is also argued that CCPs can serve as an information gathering organ, 
as most of the derivatives transactions will be novated through the CCPs. The trading 
information, such as prices and volume could be recorded and preserved by the CCPs. 
Hence, the market transparency could be increased. This is another benefit of 
introducing CCP clearing. 
2.3 Mandatory central counterparty clearing provisions in EMIR 
The provision of mandatory CCP clearing as to the eligible classes of OTC 
derivatives is the core part of the EMIR in relation to implementing the G-20 meeting 
commitment of “central clearing all standardized OTC derivatives before the end of 
2012.” We believe that, in the domain of legislation for regulating the OTC 
derivatives market, EU has erected a model for other countries to take experiences 
from. Notwithstanding, the OTC derivatives market is complex, not all the derivatives 
are suitable for central clearing. It is therefore that a sound rule for deciding the 
eligible CCP clearing derivatives shall be designed. 
In implementing the central clearing obligation, the OTC derivatives counterparty 
that is subjected to the clearing obligation, shall become a “clearing member”312 of 
one CCP. The derivatives traders could not avoid the clearing obligation by deciding 
not to participate in a CCP. If those counterparties are not interested in becoming 
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 European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), (EU) No.648/2012, Art. 2 (14) (“clearing 
member” means an undertaking which participates in a CCP and which is responsible for discharging 
the financial obligations arising from that participation.) 
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clearing members or they do not meet the participation criteria settled by the CCPs, 
they must enter into the necessary arrangements with clearing members to access the 
CCPs as “clients.”313 It means that all the financial counterparties and non-financial 
counterparties subject to central clearing obligation shall enter into the CCP either as 
“clearing members” or as “clients.” The clearing members that clear transactions on 
behalf of their clients shall have the necessary additional financial resources and 
operational capacity to perform this activity. The CCP’s rules for clearing members 
shall allow it to gather relevant basic information to identify, monitor and manage 
relevant concentrations of risk relating to the provision of services to clients. Clearing 
members shall, upon request, inform the CCP about the criteria and arrangements they 
adopt to allow their clients to access the services of central clearing.
314
   
However, in order to mitigate the risk of the CCP, a set of stringent criteria of 
clearing member participation shall be justified. It is provided in EMIR that “a CCP 
shall establish, where relevant per type of product cleared, the categories of 
admissible clearing members and the admission criteria,” and “such criteria shall be 
non-discriminatory, transparent and objective so as to ensure fair and open access to 
the CCP.”315 A CCP may deny the derivatives market players to become its clearing 
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 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories,” (European Commission Proposal for 
EMIR, hereinafter) COM(2010) 484 Final, P.7. And, it is provided in Art.2 (15) of EMIR that “Client 
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that undertaking to clear its transactions with that CCP.” 
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 EMIR, Art. 37 (3). 
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 EMIR, Art. 37 (1). The criteria that restrict access shall be permitted only to the extent that their 
objective is to control the risk for the CCP. 
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 See EMIR, Art.37 (5). 
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2.3.1 The ambit of mandatory central counterparty clearing  
2.3.1.1 The determination process of eligible clearing OTC derivatives 
CCP clearing is internationally agreed as the most important approach to re-regulate 
the OTC derivatives market. The European Commission believes that there is no 
adequate incentive for the derivatives traders to voluntarily enter into central clearing. 
It is therefore mandatory CCP clearing for standardized OTC derivatives contracts is 
necessary to deliver its international commitment. Nevertheless, not all kinds of OTC 
derivatives are standardized and hence suitable for central clearing. Forcing a CCP to 
clear OTC contracts that it is unable to risk-manage may have adverse repercussions 
on the stability of the system.
317
 In order to increase the function of CCP clearing, a 
delicate process shall be devised to ensure that a clearing obligation for OTC 
derivatives contracts will in practice achieve its final objective of reducing risk in the 
financial system, rather than increasing it.
318
 There are strong reasons for CCP 
clearing being located in Europe, relating to regulatory, supervisory and monetary 
policy concerns. If a CCP is located in Europe, it is subject to European rules and 
supervision. EU Supervisors will have undisputed and unfettered access to the 
information held by CCPs. It is also easier for European authorities to timely 
intervene to monitor the risks of a European based CCP. Under this consideration, the 
European Commission proposed a “two-way” approach for identifying eligible types 
of OTC derivatives, namely the so called “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches.  
Firstly, the “bottom-up” approach means that where a competent authority of the 
EU member states authorizes a CCP to clear a class of OTC derivatives, that 
competent authority shall immediately notify the authorization to ESMA.
319
 Within 
six months of receiving notification from the relevant competent authority, ESMA 
shall, after conducting a public consultation and after consulting the ESRB and, where 
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 EMIR, Art.5 (1). 
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appropriate, the competent authorities of third countries, develop and submit the 
regulatory technical standards to the European Commission for endorsement, 
specifying whether that kind of derivatives contract is suitable for mandatory central 
clearing obligation.
320
 Essentially, this approach is a market-driven approach on the 
base of derivatives traders’ applications. In practice, the derivatives market players 
want the CCP clearing service shall firstly submit application to CCPs, and then the 
CCPs request clearing authorization from the member state regulatory authority. It is 
the fact that market participants sometimes voluntarily enter into CCP clearing for 
mitigating the counterparty credit risk, though with increased transaction costs. But in 
most cases, the traders do not want the increase of the cost, and thus escape from 
central clearing. So, it is not wise to leave the fulfilment of G20 commitment entirely 
on the initiatives of the derivatives industry itself.
321
 
Secondly, the “top-down” approach has also been stipulated in the EMIR, 
implementing the “bottom-up” approach. It provides in the EMIR that, “ESMA shall, 
on its own initiative, after conducting a public consultation and after consulting the 
ESRB and, where appropriate, the competent authorities of third countries, identify, in 
accordance with the predetermined criteria, the classes of derivatives that should be 
subject to the clearing obligation, but for which no CCP has yet received 
authorization.”322 As regards to the criteria of deciding the eligibility for central 
clearing, the ESMA has been entrusted to draft “regulatory technical standards.” 
ESMA shall take into account the following three standards: (i) the degree of 
standardization of the contractual terms and operational process of the relevant class 
of OTC derivatives; (ii) the volume and liquidity of the relevant class of OTC 
derivatives; (iii) the availability of fair, reliable and generally accepted pricing 
information in the relevant class of OTC derivatives.
323
 Potential systemic risk of the 
class of derivatives contracts is the main concern of ESMA in determining the 
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322
 EMIR, Art.5 (3).  
323
 EMIR, Art.5 (4). 
134 
 
qualified CCP clearing derivatives and in drafting concrete regulatory technical 
standards. The power in relation to the adoption of the relevant regulatory technical 
standards has been delegated to the European Commission.
324
 Therefore, under the 
“top-down” approach, ESMA, per se, will have the right to identify and capture those 
contracts in the market that are qualified for central clearing, but not yet being cleared 
by any European based CCP.
325
  
2.3.1.2 Differentiate clearing obligation between financial 
counterparties and non-financial counterparties 
Although the legislation of EMIR aims at controlling and reducing systemic risk with 
regard to unregulated OTC derivatives transactions, the drafters of EMIR did not want 
to see the new mandatory central clearing obligation improperly damage the 
efficiency of this market. The legislators especially did not want to improperly affect 
the hedging-purpose transactions traded by non-financial counterparties. 
Non-financial counterparties often enter into the derivatives market for hedging the 
existed risks derived from their commercial activities. For example, the airline 
companies bought oil futures for avoiding the risk of oil price appreciation in the 
future. Thus, except for some corporations, most of them do not frequently traded 
derivatives, and they usually are not systemically important to the financial system in 
terms of trading volume and the interconnectedness with other financial institutions. 
Hence, it is necessary to differentiate the mandatory central clearing requirement 
between the financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties. As declared by 
the European Commission, non-financial counterparties will in principle not be 
subject to the rules of this regulation, unless their OTC derivatives positions reach a 
threshold and are considered to be systemically important.
326
      





 European Commission, Proposal for EMIR, COM(2010) 484 Final. 
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 European Commission, Proposal for EMIR, COM(2010) 484 Final. (For example, this may be the 
case for energy suppliers that sell future production, agricultural firms fixing the price at which they are 
going to sell their crops, airlines fixing the price of their future fuel purchases or any commercial 
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EMIR specifically distinguished the different mandatory central clearing 
requirements towards financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties.
327
 
First of all, it is provided that all the transactions concluded between two financial 
counterparties shall be subjected to the clearing obligation.
328
 Yet, as to the 
transactions involving non-financial counterparties, namely those contracts entered 
into between a financial counterparty and a non-financial counterparty or between two 
non-financial counterparties, mandatory central clearing obligation should only be 
triggered when certain provided conditions are satisfied.   
In the proposal of EMIR, the European Commission claimed that “excluding 
non-financial firms entirely from the mandatory clearing obligation would diminish 
the effectiveness of the CCP clearing.”329 Firstly, some non-financial counterparties 
are active participants in the OTC derivatives market, and they may also take 
systemically important positions. Secondly, a full exclusion of non-financial 
counterparties could lead to regulatory arbitrage. A financial counterparty could easily 
circumvent the central clearing obligation by establishing a new non-financial entity 
and direct its OTC derivative business through it.
330
 The Commission also considered 
that EU’s approach should promote global regulatory convergence. As the U.S. does 
not provide a complete exemption for non-financial counterparties, EU shall not as 
well.
331
 In views of the above, EMIR provides a procedure that helps to identify the 
non-financial institutions with systemically important positions in OTC derivatives 
and subject them to the clearing obligation. The essential part of this procedure is the 
“clearing threshold” provision.332  
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
companies that must legitimately hedge the risk arising from their specific activity) 
327
 In EU’s legal framework, financial counterparties encompass investment firms, credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings, assurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities (UCITS), institutions for occupational retirement, and alternative 
investment fund, provided by respective EU regulations. 
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 EMIR, Art.4 (1).  
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 In determining the “clearing thresholds,” ESMA will draft the regulatory technical standards, taking 
into account the systemic relevance of the sum of net positions and exposures per counterparty and per 
class of OTC derivatives. 
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Firstly, where a non-financial counterparty takes positions in OTC derivatives 
contracts and those positions exceed that clearing threshold, the non-financial 
counterparty shall immediately notify ESMA and the competent authority of the 
member state.
333
 The timely notification of the reach of the “clearing threshold” will 
allow financial authorities to identify non-financial counterparties that have 
accumulated significant positions and monitor its potential systemic risk. The 
non-financial counterparties that have traded derivatives above the “clearing threshold” 
might be requested to explain the motivation of these transactions.  
Secondly, if the “rolling average position” over 30 working days exceeds the 
threshold, that non-financial counterpart will become subject to the clearing 
obligation for the future contracts, and clear all relevant future contracts within four 
months after becoming subject to the clearing obligation.
334
 In other words, if that 
non-financial counterparty, has become subject to the clearing obligation, 
subsequently demonstrates to the competent authority that its rolling average position 
over 30 working days does not exceed the clearing threshold, it shall no longer be 
subject to the clearing obligation.
335
  
Therefore, the value of the “clearing threshold” would be very important for the 
non-financial counterparties in the derivatives trading, once the volume of their 
derivatives position exposure exceeded the threshold, they might be subject to the 
clearing obligation, depending on its rolling average positon in the next 30 working 
days and whether that kind of derivatives have been authorized by ESMA to be 
mandatory for CCP clearing. If the non-financial counterparties do not intend to 
assume the increased CCP clearing cost, they could monitor their trading position 
under the “clearing threshold.”    
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2.3.2 Requirements for maintaining the stability and resilience of 
CCPs 
After mandatory CCP clearing requirement entering into effect, the majority of OTC 
derivatives trading will be centrally cleared in CCPs. Correspondingly, the default 
risks of the counterparties of CCPs will also concentrated on them. It is therefore that 
how to control the potential risk of the failure of CCPs is the utmost important 
consideration legislators shall take into account. Especially, CCPs will locate in the 
center of the derivatives market, and thereby becoming the systemically important 
institutions, the failure of which will directly break down the whole financial system. 
Thus, a set of stringent risk-prevention rules shall be designed so as to control 
excessive risky operations of CCPs. Based on this consideration, the European Union 
proposed a series of rules aiming at increasing the CCP’s capability of coping with 
extreme but plausible risk, especially in exceptional market circumstances. These 
rules were finally written into the EMIR, which include strict authorization and 
supervision, sound “risk-prevention capital composition,” “default water-fall,” and 
stringent organizational and operational requirements.  
2.3.2.1 Authorization and supervision to CCPs 
To ensure that a CCP could have adequate capability to carry on central clearing and 
assume the corresponding risk, a strict and harmonized authorization and supervision 
arrangement will be very important in the European Union. In the legislation process, 
the European Commission considered that “the national competent authorities should 
retain the responsibility for authorizing (including withdrawal) and supervising CCPs, 
as they will remain best placed to examine how the CCPs operate on a daily basis, and 
to carry out regular reviews and to take appropriate actions, where necessary.”336 This 
opinion was adopted by the European legislators. It is stipulated in article 14 of the 
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EMIR that, “where a legal person established in the Union intends to provide clearing 
services as a CCP, it shall apply for authorization to the competent authority of the 
Member State where it is established.”337 In specific, the applicant shall firstly submit 
an application in relation to central clearing authorization to the competent authority 
of the member state, providing all information necessary to satisfy the examination by 
the competent authority when the applicant was established. The information 
provided in the application shall prove that the applicant has established, at the time 
of authorization, all the necessary arrangements to meet the requirements for 
operating central clearing service laid down in EMIR.
338
 
Once a CCP has been authorized in one member state, it could effectively 
exercise central clearing around the EU territory.
339
 Given this cross-border business 
nature and the systemic importance of CCPs, uniform criteria in the EU for 
authorization shall be justified.
340
 EMIR requires that the competent authority of the 
member states shall immediately transmit all the information received from the 
applicants to ESMA and the “College.”341 In deciding whether a CCP is qualified for 
authorization, the competent authority shall take reference to the opinion of the 
College and ESMA. Where the CCP’s competent authority does not agree with a 
positive opinion of the College, its decision shall contain full reasons and an 
explanation of any significant deviation from that positive opinion. Where all the 
members of the College, excluding the authority of the member state that applicant 
CCP located, reach a joint opinion by mutual agreement, that the CCP shall not be 
authorized, that CCP shall not be authorized. Furthermore, if two-thirds of the College 
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 On the other hand, a CCP’s clearing members may be established in different member states and 
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impact, namely selected clearing members, trading venues, interoperable CCPs and central securities 
depositories. See Recite 53 of EMIR, and see EMIR article 18.  
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has expressed negative opinions, when a joint opinion by mutual agreement has not 
been reached, the final decision will be taken by the ESMA, and the member state 
authority shall comply with that decision of EMSA.
342
    
Regarding the daily supervision and oversight to CCPs, except for exceptional 
circumstances, EU level regulator will not intervene, and the supervisory power has 
been entrusted to member state authorities. Nevertheless, EMIR requests member 
states to ensure appropriate administrative measures that can be taken or imposed 
against the natural or legal persons responsible for non-compliance with this 
regulation, and those measures shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
343
   
2.3.2.2 Risk-prevention financial capital wall 
In order to prevent potential losses due to the liquidity risk, operational risk and 
especially the default risk of the CCPs’ clearing members, a CCP should have 
adequate financial resources in place to deal with the default of these potential risks. 
In this regard, EMIR requires the CCPs to establish adequate risk-prevention financial 
resources to ensure their stability and continual business operation. In deciding the 
amount of the risk-prevention financial resource, the CCPs must take consideration of 
the extreme but plausible market situations. 
First, to be authorized by the competent authority, a CCP shall have a permanent 
and available initial capital of at least EUR 7.5 million.
344
 The CCPs’ initial capital, 
including retained earnings and reserves, shall be proportionate with the risk 
stemming from their activities. A CCP’s own capital is the last line of defense in the 
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event of the default of one or more members.
345
 Thus, It is required that the CCPs’ 
initial capital shall at all times be sufficient to ensure an orderly winding-down or 
restructuring of the activities over an appropriate time span and an adequate 
protection of the CCP against credit, counterparty, market, operational, legal and 
business risks which are not already covered by other specific financial resources.
346
 
If the CCPs’ own capital has been exhausted, the CCPs will bankrupt, which is out of 
the tolerance of the EU regulators and also the financial market.   
Second, a CCP shall impose, call and collect appropriate margins to limit its risk 
exposures from its clearing members and, where relevant, from CCPs with which it 
has interoperability arrangements.
347
 Margins are considered to be the primary line of 
defense for CCPs, which shall consist of the initial margins and variation margins.
348
 
They shall ensure that the risk exposures with all the clearing members of a CCP shall 
be fully collateralized, at least on a daily basis.
349
 It is required that “the margins CCP 
collected shall be sufficient to cover potential exposures that the CCP estimates will 
occur until the liquidation of the relevant positions, and they shall also be sufficient to 
cover losses that result from at least 99% of the exposures movements over an 
appropriate time horizon.” Besides, the CCP shall regularly monitor and, if necessary, 
revise the level of its margins to reflect current market conditions, taking into account 
any potentially procyclical effects. The CCP could invest the margins it collected, but 
shall make particular efforts to ensure adequate protection to the margins so as to 
guarantee that they could be completely returned to the non-defaulting clearing 
members in a timely manner. With regard to eligible collaterals, it is principally 
provided in EMIR that “a CCP shall accept highly liquid collateral with minimal 
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credit and market risk.”350 After consulting EBA, the ESRB and the ESCB, ESMA 
shall develop regulatory technical standards to specify what types of collaterals could 
be considered eligible. Anyway, the highly liquid collateral could include cash, gold, 
government and high-quality corporate bonds and covered bonds.
351
 By the way, 
when accept collaterals, the CCPs shall apply adequate haircuts to asset values that 
reflect the potential for their value to decline over the interval between their last 
revaluation and the time by which they can reasonably be assumed to be liquidated.
352
 
Third, EMIR requests the CCPs to establish at least one “default fund.” The 
“default fund” will be formed by financial contributions of the clearing members of 
the CCPs. It is required that “the default fund shall at least enable the CCPs to 
withstand, under extreme but plausible market conditions,
353
 the default of the 
clearing member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second and third 
largest clearing members, if the sum of their exposures is larger.
354
 The default funds 
will cover losses that exceed the losses to be covered by margin requirements, arising 
from the default, including the opening of an insolvency procedure, of one or more 
clearing members.
355
 Regarding the responsibility of single clearing members in 
establishing such default funds, EMIR provides that “the minimum size of the 
financial contributions to the default fund and the criteria to calculate the 
contributions of the single clearing members, which shall be proportionate to the 
exposures of each clearing member.”356 Actually, the establishment of default funds 
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enables the functions of loss-mutualisation mechanism, which will also promote 
diligent derivatives transactions of the clearing members.
357
  
Fourth, apart from the default funds, a CCP shall also maintain a sum of sufficient 
pre-funded available “dedicated financial resource” to cover potential losses that 
exceed the losses to be covered by margin requirements and the default fund.
358
 It is 
required that such financial resources plus the default fund shall, at all times, enable 
the CCP to withstand the default of at least the two clearing members to which it has 
the largest exposures.
359
  Such dedicated financial resources shall be freely available 




2.3.2.3 Risk absorbing “default waterfall” 
After the above-discussed multi-level financial resources have been established, A 
Sound procedure to use these financial resources will be very important. In EMIR, A 
“default waterfall” rule has been designed to efficiently use these financial resources 
in order to better promote the stability of the CCPs.  First, it is provided in EMIR 
that “a CCP shall use the margins posted by a defaulting clearing member prior to 
other financial resources in covering losses.”361 And the CCPs shall never use the 
margins posted by non-defaulting clearing members to cover the losses resulting from 
the default of another clearing member.
362
  
Secondly, “where the margins posted by the defaulting clearing member are not 
sufficient to cover the losses incurred by the CCP, the CCP shall use the default fund 
contribution of the defaulting member to cover the losses.”363 Hence, these two 
provisions aims at prevent the default of one clearing member from damaging other 
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clearing members’ benefit, meanwhile it aims at impeding “moral hazard” of the 
defaulting clearing member and thus, promote their prudent transactions.   
Thirdly, after the default-fund contributions of the default members having been 
exhausted, the CCPs’ pre-funded “dedicated financial resources” shall be used.364 
Then, if these financial resources still could not cover the losses, the CCP could use 
the default-fund contributions of other non-defaulting clearing members.
365
 So, the 
CCP shall use its own dedicated financial capital before using the contributions of the 
non-defaulting clearing members, in doing so, losses would be firstly assumed by the 
CCPs, and thus promote the CCP to prudently operate the central clearing business. 
Namely, the CCPs shall take more vigilant actions to control potential risks of its 
clearing members, such as raise the standards of collaterals for the clearing members 
that might be in danger.        
 
And lastly, the CCP’s own capital reserve will be exposed to further losses as the 
last defense line. When all these risk-prevention financial resources have been 
depleted, the CCP will go into bankruptcy if without emergent external capital 
injection from central banks or commercial banks. If this scenario really happens, the 
whole financial system would be endangered, and a systemic risk might breakout. 
Therefore, we strongly argue that a timely access to adequate liquidity resources is 
essential for a CCP. It is possible for such liquidity to derive from access to central 
bank liquidity, creditworthy and reliable commercial bank liquidity, or a combination 
of both.
366
 But, the EMIR did not make appropriate arrangements in relation to such 
external liquidity resources to CCPs. 
2.2.2.4 Account segregation and portability  
In order to protect the sound of the derivatives market after mandatory central 
clearing obligation entering into effect, the clients of clearing members that clear their 
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OTC derivative contracts with CCPs should be granted a high level of protection. To 
this end, the intermediaries, i.e. the clearing members of CCPs, should segregate their 
assets from those of their clients. For this reason, CCPs should keep updated and 
easily identifiable records, in order to facilitate the transfer of the positions and assets 
of a defaulting clearing member’s clients to a solvent clearing member or, as the case 
may be, the orderly liquidation of the clients’ positions and the return of excess 
collateral to the clients.
367
 The requirement laid down in EMIR on the segregation 
and portability of clients’ positions and assets should therefore prevail over any 
conflicting laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States that 
prevent the parties from fulfilling them.
368
 Therefore, it is provided that “a CCP shall 
keep separate records and accounts that shall enable it, at any time and without delay, 
to distinguish in accounts with the CCP the assets and positions held for the account 
of one clearing member from the assets and positions held for the account of any 
other clearing member and from its own assets.”369 
However, the actual level of protection depends on the level of “account 
segregation” that those clients choose, with different costs. It is stipulated in EMIR 
that “a CCP shall offer to keep separate records and accounts enabling each clearing 
member to distinguish in accounts with the CCP the assets and positions of that 
clearing member from those held for the accounts of its clients.”370 This approach is 
called “omnibus client segregation.” Meanwhile, the CCP shall offer to keep separate 
records and accounts enabling each clearing member to distinguish in accounts with 
the CCP the assets and positions held for the account of a client from those held for 
the account of other clients, which is called “individual client segregation.”371 A 
clearing member shall offer its clients, at least, the choice between omnibus client 
                                                             
 
367
 See EMIR, Recite 64. 
368
 See EMIR, Recite 64.  
369
 EMIR, Art.39 (1).  
370
 EMIR, Art.39 (2). 
371
 EMIR, Art.39 (3). When a client opts for individual client segregation, any margin in excess of the 
client’s requirement shall also be posted to the CCP and distinguished from the margins of other clients 
or clearing members and shall not be exposed to loses connected to positions recorded in another 
account. See EMIR, Art.39 (6). 
145 
 
segregation and individual client segregation and inform them of the costs and level 
of protection with each option, and the client shall inform its choice to the clearing 
member in writing.
372
 Moreover, the clearing member shall also keep separate 
records and accounts that enable it to distinguish both in accounts held with the CCP 
and in its own account its assets and positions from the assets and positions held for 
the accounts of its clients at CCP.
373
 
3. The main content of EMIR II: mandatory trading 
information report to trade repositories 
3.1 The importance of the mandatory information report 
provision 
As we illustrated in chapter 2, the opaqueness of the OTC derivatives market is the 
one of the most important reason relating to the 2008 financial crisis. OTC derivatives 
are complex and traded off-the-exchange, thus the trading information, like the size of 
risk exposure, market participants, and trading motivation etc., were not understood 
by the financial regulators, not even the market participants themselves.
374
 On one 
hand, such scarcity of transparency hindered financial market regulators from 
efficiently monitoring and supervising the potential risks accumulating in the financial 
system.
375
 On the other, the opaqueness of the OTC derivatives trading also 
threatened the market participants themselves. After the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers and the bailout of AIG, all the financial market participants were worrying 
about their counterparties’ creditworthiness because of the potential losses in 
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derivatives transactions. Simply speaking, due to the opaqueness of the derivatives 
trading, panic prevailed throughout the financial market, which directly shut down the 
financial market. Having seen this problem, the global financial regulators realized 
that raising the transparency of the OTC derivatives market shall be the first priority 
in relation to restore the healthy and stability of the financial market. Hence, in the 
Pittsburgh Summit of G-20 in September 2008, the leaders collectively declared that 
“all OTC derivatives contract shall be reported to trade repositories.” Then, what are 
trade repositories? Trade repositories are private entities equipped with a centralized 
electronic recording and storage system.
376
 The trade repositories will play a central 
role in collecting OTC derivatives trading information. And apart from this function, 
trade repositories could also provide other services to the financial market, such as 
trade confirmation, trade matching, credit event servicing, portfolio reconciliation or 
portfolio compression services,
377
 namely providing a string of auxiliary services that 
would promote the market efficiency.
378
 Till now, in order to fulfill the international 
commitment, the U.S. has provided the mandatory trading report obligation in its 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, and the EU also has laid down this obligation in the EMIR. 
After the trading report obligation enter into force, at least several benefits would 
be generated. First, the trading information of the OTC derivatives market would be 
timely available to the financial regulators, which is essential for enhancing regulators’ 
competence to monitor the potential risk and intervene into this market, where 
necessary. Secondly, the raised transparency of the market would also benefit to most 
of the market participants, especially the hedging purpose “end-users”, because the 
market participants could more accurately evaluate the credit risk of their 
counterparties with transparent information, and besides, a fairer and more efficient 
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price-formation mechanism would be formed.
379
 However, in spite of the benefits 
more transparency could bring. To achieve this goal, it is impractical depending 
merely on the voluntary disclosure of the derivatives traders, though the OTC 
derivatives industry has promised to increase transparency. Even though the 
transparency would be beneficial for the overall market, in single cases, the 
derivatives traders might lose interest to disclose the contracts information. They 
might think that, apart from the cost for disclosure, their single effort to make the 
market more transparency might be helpless as most of others might not disclose their 
contracts information. And also the counterparties of the contracts probably would not 
allow the disclosure. As the powerful derivatives dealers took advantage in the 
environment lack of fair market prices before the crisis, they may become 
counter-transparency strength. It is therefore that a mandatory disclosure obligation 
should be justified and necessary to ensure the transparency of the OTC derivatives 
market. As the European Commission argued, “in order to fulfill the commitment in 
the G20 summits of promoting the transparency of the OTC derivatives market, EU 
could not solely rely on the initiatives of the industry itself.”380  
3.2 Mandatory information report provisions in EMIR 
3.2.1 Scope of mandatory information report to the trade repositories 
The obligation of mandatory report regarding derivatives trading information is 
provided in the article 9 of EMIR. It is stipulated that “the counterparties and CCPs 
shall ensure that the details of any derivative contract they have been concluded and 
of any modification or termination of the contract shall be reported to a trade 
repository.”381 Be different with the mandatory central clearing provision, according 
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to which the clearing obligation of the financial counterparties and non-financial 
counterparties are differentiated. However, regarding to the trading report obligation, 
there is no such division. EMIR requires all the derivatives dealers, traders and CCPs 
should be subjected to the reporting obligation.  
After the derivatives contracts being novated through the CCPs, CCPs will 
become the counterparties to most of the derivatives traders. Hence, most of the 
derivatives trading information could also be achieved from the CCPs. In spite, EMIR 
provided that the counterparties and CCPs shall rapidly report all the trading 
information.
382
 The legislators of EMIR explained that “even though information of 
trades made on-exchange or cleared through a CCP can be provided to regulators 
directly, financial regulators need to have a complete overview of the derivatives 
market so as to protect against the systemic risk.
383
 However, in order to avoid 
duplicative report, EMIR also provided that “proper arrangement shall be established 
among the counterparties and CCPs.”384  
As for the specific information of the derivatives contracts that shall be reported 
to a trade repository or where a trade repository is not available, to ESMA,
385
 ESMA 
shall develop regulatory technical standards (RTSs) to specify the details and types of 
reports regarding to different classes of derivatives. Nevertheless, the necessary 
information shall, at least, include the counterparties to the derivative contracts, the 
main characteristics of the derivative contracts, ranging from their types, underlying 
maturity, notional value, price, and the settlement date.
386
 The European Commission 
has been empowered to adopt the RTSs, when they have been developed.
387
  
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
trade repository.” A TR established in the EU territory is called “European TR”, and a TR established in 
a third country which provides recording services to EU entities and recognized by the ESMA 
according to legal procedures is called “third-country TR”. The recognition procedure of a 
third-country TR is provided in art.77 of EMIR. 
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3.2.2 Trade repositories’ obligation to publish the received 
information  
Increasing the transparency of the OTC derivatives market is the overarching role of 
trade repositories. To achieve this objective, EMIR provides that the received trading 
information of OTC derivatives contracts shall be properly published to the market 
and reported to the regulatory authorities.   
Firstly, EMIR sets up a disclose-to-market provision, which requires that “a trade 
repository” shall regularly, and in an easily accessible way, publish the ‘aggregate 
positions’ by class of derivatives on the contracts reported to it.”388 Namely, the 
information the market could get is limited, without including individual transactions, 
not even, the trading information of a certain derivatives trader. This means that the 
market participants could not know exactly their counterparties risk exposure already 
accumulated in derivatives trading.    
Secondly, as for the information shall be “disclosed-to-the-authorities”,  EMIR 
provides that, “the trade repositories shall collect and maintain data and shall ensure 
that the entities, such as ESMA, ESRB and competent regulatory authorities in the 
member states, have direct and immediate access to the ‘details’ of derivatives 
contracts they need to fulfil their respective responsibilities and mandates.” 389 
Therefore, the regulatory authorities, both at the European level and at the national 
level, could have direct access to the specific trading information of single derivatives 
contract.  This provision is essential for the regulators to monitor the market abuse 
activities and excessive risk that has been accumulated by individual traders, 
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especially, those systemically important financial institutions. In order to achieve this 
goal, EMIR requires that “the trade repositories shall record the derivatives 
information not only according to different classes, but also shall calculate and 
maintain the trading information based on single entities.”390   
3.2.3 Trade repositories’ obligation of prudential operation  
As claimed by the European Commission that, “after mandatory trade reporting 
obligation entering into force, the trade repositories would be the trading information 
center, and those information received and maintained by trade repositories would be 
essential for regulator, policy makers and also for the market participants.” Hence, it 
is extremely important to ensure the information maintained by the trade repositories 
is safe and accurate. To achieve this goal, EMIR shall set down rules to make sure that 
the trade repositories will be soundly regulated so as to ensure that they are operated 
in a safe, sound and efficient way.
391
 
Firstly, the European Commission holds that ESMA should be responsible 
authority to authorize and supervise the EU trade repositories given that once they are 
registered, they will provide services across the European Union.
392
 Therefore, in 
EMIR, it is provided that a legal person wants to operate trading information 
recording business for OTC derivatives in the EU shall firstly submit an application to 
the ESMA for authorization. In order to be registered, a trade repository shall be a 
legal person established in the EU territory and meet other prudential operation 
requirements laid down in EMIR. 
Secondly, in order to make sure that the information, maintained by trade 
repositories, is reliable, secured and protected, trade repositories will be subjected to a 
set of organizational and operational requirements.
393
 In terms of organizational 
requirements, EMIR generally provided that, “trade repositories to set down a clear 
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organizational structure with well defined, transparent and consistent lines of 
responsibility and adequate internal control mechanism, including sound 
administrative and accounting procedures, which prevent any disclosure of 
confidential information.” 394  In this regard, EMIR also provides that “a trade 
repository shall maintain and operate an adequate organizational structure to ensure 
continuity and orderly functioning of the trade repository in the performance of its 
services and activities. It shall employ appropriate and proportionate systems, 
resources and procedures.”395It is notable that “where a trade repository offers 
ancillary services such as trade confirmation, trade matching, credit event servicing, 
portfolio reconciliation or portfolio compression services, the trade repositories shall 
maintain those ancillary services operationally separated from the trade repositories’ 
function of centrally collection and maintaining records of derivatives.”396 As regards 
to operational requirements, a trade repository, in general, shall identify sources of 
operational risk and minimize them through the development of appropriate systems, 
controls and procedures. Such system shall be reliable and secure and have adequate 
capacity to handle the information received.
397
 It is especially important that a trade 
repository shall “establish, implement and maintain an adequate ‘business continuity 
policy’ and ‘disasters recovery plan’ aiming at ensuring the maintenance of its 
functions, the timely recovery of operations and the fulfilment of the trade 
repositories’ obligations, and such a plan shall at least provide for the establishment of 
backup facilities.
398
 Besides, where a trade repository has been withdrawn the 
registration, it shall ensure orderly substitution, including the transfer of data to other 
trade repositories and the re-direction of reporting information flows to other qualified 
trade repositories.
399
       
Thirdly, in order to reinforce the trading data safeguarding, EMIR principally 
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provided that, “a trade repository shall ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
protection of the information received.”400 More specific, “a trade repository may 
only use the data it receives for commercial purposes if the relevant counterparties 
have provided their consent.”401 And “a trade repository shall maintain and operate 
effective written organizational and administrative arrangements to identify and 
manage any potential conflicts of interest concerning its managers, employees, or any 
person directly or indirectly linked to them by close links.”402 In this regard, “a 
natural person who has a close link with a trade repository or a legal person that has a 
parent undertaking or a subsidiary relationship with the trade repository shall not use 
confidential information recorded in a trade repository for commercial purpose.”403 
Moreover, a trade repository shall promptly record the information it has received and 
shall maintain it for at least 10 years following the termination of the relevant 
contracts.
404
 The information shall be calculated by class of derivatives and by 
reporting entity based on the details of the derivative contracts reported in accordance 
with article 9. And “a trade repository shall allow the parties to a contract to access 
and correct the information on that contract in a timely manner.”405 
4. Main content of EMIR III: increase risk-prevention 
requirement for non-central clearing derivatives 
Although Central Clearing is an efficient way to prevent counterparty risk, not all the 
OTC derivatives are suitable and eligible for central clearing. To keep the stability of 
CCPs, CCPs could only accept those standardized and liquid contracts as the risk of 
which could be more easily calculated and controlled. Unreasonably request CCPs to 
handle those contracts they could not appropriately control the risk would be 
detrimental also to the stability of the whole financial system. As provided in Article 5 
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of EMIR that “ESMA shall, after conducting a public consultation and after 
consulting the ESRB and, where appropriate, the competent authorities of third 
countries, develop and submit to the Commission for endorsement draft regulatory 
technical standards (RTSs), specifying the class of OTC derivatives that should be 
subject to the clearing obligation.”406 “With the overarching aim of reducing systemic 
risk, the RTSs shall take into consideration the following criteria: (a) the degree of 
standardization of the contractual terms and operational processes of the relevant class 
of OTC derivatives; (b) the volume and liquidity of the relevant class of OTC 
derivatives; (c) the availability of fair, reliable and generally accepted pricing 
information in the relevant class of OTC derivatives.”407 
Therefore, even after the entering into force of EMIR, there would still remain lots 
of OTC derivatives that will not be centrally cleared. However, compared with those 
centrally cleared contracts, the counterparties of non-centrally derivatives should 
manger the counterparty risk themselves. If such risks not be soundly regulated, these 
non-centrally cleared derivatives trading might pose risk to the whole financial system. 
Thus, the EMIR also provided rules specially aiming at raising the risk-prevention 
requirements regarding to the non-CCP clearing derivatives. However, on the other 
hand, the legislators of EMIR also agreed that highly customized derivatives contracts 
play an important role in transferring particular risks, and usually do not involved into 
the speculative transactions. Therefore the new regulations also shall not 
unreasonably increase the cost of trading non-centrally cleared derivatives. In fact, the 
balance between safety and efficiency always exists in the regulation to the financial 
market. But, considering that although the financial system locates in the center of the 
economy, but compared with real economy, the contribution of the financial sector is 
very low, thus the priority in regulating the financial market is to maintain its stability. 
In principle, EMIR provides that, “financial counterparties and non-financial 
counterparties that enter into an OTC derivative contract not cleared by a CCP, shall 
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ensure, exercising due diligence, that appropriate procedures and arrangements are in 
place to measure, monitor and mitigate operational risk and counterparty credit 
risk.”408 Meanwhile, EMIR also stipulates several concrete requirements. 
First, EMIR requires that, “the counterparties enter into the non-centrally cleared 
OTC derivatives contracts shall, where available, timely confirmed the terms of the 
relevant contracts by electronic means.”409 The electronic confirmation requirement 
aims at promoting trading efficiency. 
Second, in order to prevent potential disputes between counterparties, EMIR 
requires that “a formalized process to reconcile portfolios shall be in place so as to 
manage the associated risk and to identify disputes between parties early and resolve 
them.”410 
Third, the risk exposure against the counterparties shall be timely calculated. In 
this regard, EMIR provides that, “the financial counterparties and non-financial 
counterparties shall “mark-to-market” the value of outstanding contracts on a daily 
basis.”411 “When the market conditions do not allow mark-to-market calculation, the 
counterparties shall ensure there exists a reliable and prudent “marking-to-model” 
approach be employed.”412 In doing so, potential risk could be timely understood by 
the contract parties. 
Fourth, be different with CCP clearing, the counterparties of non-centrally cleared 
derivatives contracts shall manage the collaterals exchange themselves. Before the 
crisis, the derivatives transactions of main financial institutions were all not 
adequately collateralized. In light of this lesson, EMIR stipulated that, “financial 
counterparties shall have risk-management procedures that require the timely, 
accurate and appropriately segregated exchange of collateral with respect to OTC 
derivative contracts. Non-financial counterparties shall have risk-management 
procedures that require the timely, accurate and appropriately segregated exchange of 
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collateral with respect to OTC derivatives contracts that are entered into on or after 
the clearing threshold is exceeded.”413 
Fifth, the financial regulators also learned the lesson that the financial institutions 
were badly capitalized in respect to derivatives trading, given that derivatives 
transactions per se are more risky with higher leverage ratio. Therefore, raising the 
financial institutions’ own capital reserve became a consensus among the international 
financial regulators. In fact, the G-20 leaders have collectively declared, in the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit, that “we committed to act together to raise capital standards, to 
improve the OTC derivatives market and to create more powerful tools to hold large 
global firms to account for the risks they take.”414 In response to this commitment, 
EMIR also provided that, “financial counterparties shall hold an appropriate and 
proportionate amount of capita to manage the risk not covered by appropriate 
exchange of collateral.” 415  The EU regulators also believe that higher capital 
requirement would reflect higher risk in these contacts, and thus this requirement 
would also drive more OTC derivatives into CCP clearing.
416
 It is notable that the 
non-financial counterparties are not mentioned in this requirement. As this article is 
very principle, concrete capital standards provisions will be provided in the European 
Union’s Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV). We will analyze the CRD IV in the 
next chapter. 
Till now, we have thoroughly discussed the approaches in EMIR to regulate the 
OTC derivatives market so as to prevent a next crisis. In light of the lessons we have 
learned from the crisis, the financial regulators clearly realized that systemic risk 
could be resulted from the risky derivatives transactions. Therefore, in order to 
impede the happen of systemic risk, EMIR mainly focused on two methods, one is the 
mandatory requirement of central clearing, which aims at cut down contagion links 
between the private financial institutions; the other is the mandatory trade reporting 
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requirement, which aims at significantly raise the transparency of this market. The 
European based CCPs and trade repositories has been gradually authorized and 
established in EU after the EMIR entering into effect on 16 August 2012, which 
would form the new European market infrastructure for EU OTC derivatives trading. 
However, could we believe that the regulatory approaches laid down by the EMIR 
could sufficiently inhibit a next crisis from the OTC derivatives market? In other 
words, could they impede systemic risk because of OTC derivatives transactions? We 
will question about the drawbacks of the EMIR below so as to identify potential 
problems still shall be considered by the policy-makers and regulators. 
5. Potential drawbacks of the EMIR regulatory approaches 
The mandatory CCP clearing and trading report obligations in EMIR are fully in line 
with EU’s commitment in G-20 Summits. We consider that these approaches are not 
the traditional regulatory methods that reinforce financial regulators’ intervening 
power and limit the risky transactions. The legislators of EMIR intend to construct a 
new derivatives trading infrastructure and raise the transparency of this opaque 
market. The mandatory trading information requirement could significantly raise the 
transparency of this market, which will be beneficial for the regulators and all the 
market participants. But, regarding to the CCP clearing approach laid down in EU, 
could it successfully impede systemic risk due to the derivatives trading? We have 
several dubious arguments. 
Firstly, after the EMIR entered into force, most of qualified OTC derivatives will 
be novated through a European based CCP, or an accepted CCP of the third counties. 
Till February 2015, there have been 16 CCPs have been authorized by the competent 
authorizes of the EU member states (See the table below). Thus, these CCPs will 
become the counterparties of all the European derivatives traders. Namely, the 
defaulting risk of the traders will be concentrated on the CCPs at the same time. But 
due to several reasons, the risk will be continually concentrated on these CCPs, which 
might be overburdened for them, even the EMIR has laid down prudential operational 
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rules for the CCPs. First, as we argued in Part II, the bankruptcy law favored the OTC 
derivatives trading, in which the derivatives transactions are exempted from the 
pro-debtor bankruptcy law rules. Therefore, the incentive for trading derivatives, 
instead of normal financial contracts, like traditional loans, still exists. The new 
regulations did not directly inhibit speculative derivatives transactions. Namely, these 
speculative transactions would still be valid, even with raised costs. Second, the CCPs 
would become the systemically important institutions. Thus the counterparties and 
also the CCPs per se would think that even bankruptcy risk happens, the government 
will bail them out as they are “too-big-to-fail” and “too-interconnected-to-fail.” Hence 
a “moral hazard” would be resulted in, namely the counterparties of the CCPs will 
take no account into the creditworthiness of the CCPs and concentrate their 
transactions on single CCPs. The CCPs would also be badly managed, given that they 
could decline their prudential operation standards in order to attract more transactions 
be centrally cleared through them. And there would be competition between these 
CCPs.  
Secondly, the peculiarity of CDSs clearing could potentially stumbled the CCPs. 
Clearinghouse proponents reason that sophisticated CCP risk management techniques 
adequately protect against systemic shocks, mitigating concerns and rendering CCP 
failure unlikely. However, even though CCPs have performed reasonably well for 
some derivatives, there is little reason to believe they are equally safe for clearing 
CDSs. In fact, due to meaningful differences between CDSs and other derivatives, 
CCPs that clear CDSs may be significantly riskier than traditional clearinghouses. 
Specifically, the “jump-to-default risk” is likely to increase systemic risk for CDS 
CCPs.
417
 Recall that jump-to-default risk is the danger that a reference entity 
experiences a credit event suddenly, necessitating immediate payments from 
potentially illiquid counterparties. This possibility of sudden increase in CDS 
premiums confounds risk management practices for CCPs that clear CDSs to demand 
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margins or collateral that varies smoothly with the risk of the loans insured.
418
 
Conceptually, jump-to-default risk can never be fully covered without requiring 
clearing members to collateralize any large net sales of protection completely. The 
only way to eliminate counterparty risk for bilaterally traded OTC derivatives would 
be through 100% collateralization. However, full collateralization would require too 
much capital, rendering CDS trading un-economic.
419
 
Imagine, for instance, that all of AIG’s credit derivatives positions had been 
cleared through a CCP. The CCP’s default fund likely would have been insufficient to 
satisfy obligations on AIG’s 440 billion CDS portfolio.420 Without recourse to the 
default fund, CCP members – many of whom were likely experiencing their own 
liquidity or solvency crises – would have had to absorb the losses. In contrast to a 
bilateral market, wherein only AIG’s counterparties would have experienced direct 
losses, all clearing members would have felt the systemic impact of AIG’s default and 
the CCP’s insolvency. Thus, centralizing jump-to-default risk in a clearinghouse 
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underlying single-name CDSs may precipitate margin coverage shortfalls on portfolios with highly 
concentrated exposures to the defaulting reference names.”) Further, some market commentators have 
noted that legislative proposals requiring centralized clearing of illiquid CDSs might exacerbate the 
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Chart 9: list of CCPs that have been authorized to offer services and activities in the 
Union (last updated 25 February 2015) 
 
 Name of the CCP Country   
establishemen
t 
Competent authority Date of authorisation 
1 Nasdaq OMX Clearing AB Sweden Finansinspektionen 18 March 2014 






1 April 2014 
3 KDPW-CCP Poland Komisja adzoru 
Finansowego (KNF) 
8 April 2014 
4 Eurex Clearing AG Germany Budesanstalt fur 
Finanzdienstleistungs 
aufsiche (Bafin) 
10 April 2014 
5 Cassa di Compensazione e 
Garanzia S.p.A 
Italy Banca d’Italia 20 May 2014 
6 LCH.Clearing AG France Autorite de Controle 
Prudentiel et de Resolution 
(ACPR) 
22 May 2014 
7 European Commodity Clearing Germany Bafin 11 June 2014 
8 LCH.Clearnet. Ltd UK Bank of England 12 June 2014 
9 Keler CCP Hungary Central Bank of 
Hungary (MNB) 
4 July 2014 
1
0 
CME Clearing Europe Ltd UK Bank of England 4 August 2014 
1
1 
CCP Austria (CCP.A) Austria Austrian Financial 
Market Authority (FMA) 
14 August 2014 
1
2 
LME Clear Ltd UK Bank of England 3 September 2014 
1
3 
BME Clearing Spain Comison Nacional del 
Mercado de Valores 
16 September 2014 
1
4 
OMIClear – C.C.,S.A. Portugal Commissao do 
Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliarios (CMVM) 
31 October 2014 
1
5 




12 December 2014 
1
6 
Athens Exchange Clearing 
House (Athex Clear) 
Greece Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission 
22 January 2015 
Source: Website of ESMA 
6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, we focused ourselves on analyze the EU’s regulation on “OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories,” also shortly named as 
EMIR (European Market Infrastructure Regulation). Before analyzing concrete rules 
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of EMIR, we firstly discussed the background of the drafting of EMIR, specifically 
we have talked about the international regulatory reform against the OTC derivatives 
market after the crisis, and we argued that EU’s regulatory efforts shall be in line with 
the internationally coordinated regulatory actions, without which a single 
jurisdiction’s regulatory effort regarding the derivatives market would be greatly 
dampened. In fact, after completely reviewed the EMIR, we consider that EU’s 
regulatory approaches toward the OTC derivatives market are fully consistent with its 
international commitments. We also introduced the regulatory and supervisory 
architecture reform in the EU. Before the crisis, EU’s regulatory and supervisory 
structure was based on the “Lamfalussy four-level” design, under which there was no 
strong regulatory and supervisory power at the EU level. In light of the borderless 
nature of derivatives trading, after the crisis the EU has greatly raised regulatory 
power of the EU level authorities. A new European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS) was set up. Now, ESMA is the organ responsible for regulating the derivatives 
market, which has the power to develop concrete supervisory standards as to the 
CCPs and ESMA directly supervise the EU based trade repositories. 
The EMIR has entered into force on 16 August 2012. We argued that under the 
EMIR a new trading structure of the OTC derivatives market will be formed. The 
EMIR regulatory approaches are different with traditional regulatory ones, given that 
EMIR entrusts the regulators less “direct intervene power” in relation to the private 
transactions, but emphasizes on establishing a new market transaction infrastructure 
for derivatives trading. In sum, there are two main approaches that have been laid 
down in EMIR in relation to the regulation of the OTC derivatives market. One is the 
central clearing obligation. Under this provision, the financial counterparties and the 
non-financial counterparties with the derivatives trading volume beyond the “clearing 
threshold” shall novated their derivatives contracts in qualified CCPs and cleared 
through the CCPs. We agree with the EMIR legislators that the CCP clearing 
requirement could reduce systemic risk in the sense that the original 
high-interconnected derivatives market could be unlocked, and hence a “domino 
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effect” or the “contagion risk” when one main derivatives trader default would spread 
across the financial system could be prevented. But, as the CCPs will become the 
counterparties of every derivatives traders, risks will be correspondingly concentrated 
on CCPs. Thus, CCPs shall be strictly regulated. In this regard we also elaborated the 
detailed provisions in EMIR, such as the authorization, the prudential operation rules. 
The second approach of EMIR is the provision of mandatory trading report obligation. 
Namely, all the derivatives transactions shall be timely reported to a qualified trade 
repository. As manifested in the 2008 crisis, the opaqueness of the derivatives trading 
is the main reason of the escalation of the crisis. This provision could greatly increase 
the transparency of the OTC derivatives market, which is essential to maintain the 
integrity and stability of this market. The EMIR also noticed that not all OTC 
derivatives contracts would be suitable for central clearing, thus, some provisions to 
reinforce the risk-management of those non-centrally cleared derivatives contracts 
were also laid down in this regulation.        
At last, we questioned the effectiveness of the CCP clearing approach of EMIR in 
preventing systemic risk. Particularly, we advanced the concern about the 
concentration of risk in CCPs, which might exceed CCPs’ ability to assume. In the 
current legal environment, there are several incentives for derivatives traders to 
novated their contracts in CCPs but without caring about the creditworthiness of the 
CCPs. Moreover, the prudential rules laid down by the EMIR could also not function, 
given that the competition between CCPs would result in loosening the standards of 
central clearing. And the “jump-t0-default” risk of CDSs clearing might directly push 
down a CCP, the margins and the default funds would not absorb the losses of even 
one clearing member’s default, for example a trader like AIG. Anyway, the 
effectiveness of the CCPs clearing will be further examined, and the concrete 
provisions shall be gradually refined according to the practice.  
As we have proposed above, after the crisis, EU has been carrying on a 
comprehensive regulatory reform. EMIR is the regulation that specifically regulates 
the OTC derivatives market. However, there are some other newly enacted EU laws 
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related with the regulation to the OTC derivatives market, which would complement 
with the EMIR. In order to have a complete analyze to the European Union’s 
regulatory reform against the derivatives market, we are going to examine these laws 

























Chapter 7 EU’s Regulatory Reform II: Reinforce 
Traditional Regulatory Approaches 
 
In chapter 6, we have analyzed the regulatory approaches against the OTC derivatives 
market provided in the EMIR, namely the CCP clearing and the trade information 
reporting. These rules in EMIR will construct a new transaction market infrastructure, 
which is considered by the EU as the main approach to prevent potential systemic risk 
due to the derivatives market. But, apart from the new market infrastructure, the 
regulators need other regulatory measures to impede illegitimate derivatives 
transactions, such as market abuse transactions. Hence, the EU also enacted or 
updated several other laws to deal with specific perverse derivatives trading. These 
specific laws will complement the EMIR, forming a comprehensive regulation 
network to the risky OTC derivatives market. In the remainder, we are going to 
analyze the relevant legal rules in these specific laws one by one.   
1. European Market in Financial Instrument Regulation and 
OTC derivatives  
The EC’s investment-services regime experienced a seismic shift with the adoption of 
the 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).
421
 The MiFID is the 
leviathan of the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP),
422
 which aims at improving 
the competitiveness of the financial markets by creating a single market for 
investment services and activities in the European Community.
423
 MiFID replaced the 
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 See Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (second edition), Oxford EC Law Library, 2008, 
p.356. 
422
 Ibid, p.356. FSAP is EC’s financial service action plan in 1999, which sets out a programme of 42 
measures that would radically change the shape of EC financial services and securities regulation. It 
was as significant for the single market in investment services and securities as the 1992 programme 
for the single market generally. See Moloney, p.18. 
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 See the introduction of MiFID I, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/isd/MiFID/index_en.htm>   
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prior Investment Service Directive (ISD) and fundamentally reforms and regulates 
almost all aspects of the investment-services industry, providing the comprehensive 
regulatory regime regarding the regulation towards financial investment services 
provided by banks and investment firms in the Union.
424
 In particular, MiFID 
governs the activities of traditional stock exchanges and alternative trading venues.
425
  
While MiFID created competition between these services and brought more 
choices and lower prices for investors all over the EU, shortcomings of the legal 
system laid down by MiFID were also clearly exposed in the 2008 financial crisis. 
Therefore, the revision of MIFID constitutes an integral part of the reforms aimed at 
establishing a safer, sounder, more transparent and more responsible financial system, 
as well as ensure a more integrated, efficient and competitive EU financial market.
426
 
From 2011 the European Commission has advanced the MiFID revision proposal. But, 
the European parliament and the European Council enacted the revision until 15 May 
2014. The revision of the MiFID consists of two parts, namely a Regulation 
(MiFIR)
427
 and a Directive (MiFID II).
428
 While the MiFIR shall be directly 
applicable to the member states, the MiFIR would be transposed to national laws that 
will be applicable starting January 2017. To the end of our research, the most 
important provision might be the “mandatory trading obligation” for OTC derivatives 
provided in the MiFIR.
429
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 It has been described as a ‘sprawling directive with far-reaching implications for any firm involved 
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 See the regulatory ambit of MiFID, available at 
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 European Commission, “Proposal of for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
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obligations applicable to providers of data services, power available to competent authorities, sanctions, 
and rules applicable to third-country firms operating via a branch. See Proposal of MIFIR. 
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1.1 Mandatory trading on regulated venues 
As part of the significant efforts underway to improve the stability, transparency and 
oversight of OTC derivatives markets, the G-20 has agreed that trading in 
standardized OTC derivatives should move to exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms.
430
 In order to fulfill this commitment and to be consistent with the central 
clearing requirement in EMIR, the revision of MIFID aims at requiring trading in 
qualified OTC derivatives only on eligible platforms, i.e. the regulated markets, MTFs 
or OTFs. While the regulated markets (RMs) and the Multilateral Trading Facilities 
(MTFs) are regulated trading venues provided in the MIFID I since 2004, the 
Organized Trading Facilities (OTFs) is a newly created type of trading venue by the 
MIFIR. OTF is an electronic trading system operated by an investment firm or a 
market operator, in which multiple third party buying and selling interests in financial 
instruments are able to interact in the system. As argued, “there is not a clear scope of 
OTFs, but they could encompass a wide range of organized trading venues for 
non-equity instruments, such as broker crossing systems and some derivatives trading 
systems that have not been caught as RMs or MTFs.” Some OTC derivatives trading 
facilities could be included into OTFs, and thus be regulated by MIFIR.  
Generally speaking, this “trading obligation” will be imposed on both financial 
and non-financial counterparties exceeding the “clearing threshold” as provided in 
EMIR. it is required in MIFIR that financial counterparties
431
 and non-financial 
counterparties that become subject to the clearing obligation, namely the rolling 
average position over 30 working days exceeds the clearing threshold,
432
 shall 
conclude transactions with other financial counterparties or non-financial 
counterparties subject to centrally-clearing obligation, only on regulated markets, 
MTFs, OTFs or recognized third country trading venues, if that class of derivatives 
contracts has been declared subject to the trading obligation as laid down in 
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433And regarding to the classes of derivatives subject to mandatory “trading 
obligation”, ESMA has been empowered to develop draft regulatory technical 
standards, specifying the classes of derivatives declared subject to the clearing 
obligation shall be traded on the venues and the date or dates from which the trading 
obligation takes effect.
434
 In developing the regulatory technical standards, ESMA is 
required to take into consideration of the liquidity of the relevant type of derivatives. 
In other words, ESMA needs to consider the average frequency and size of trades over 
a range of market conditions, the number and type of market participants, and also the 
average size of the spreads.
435
 Lastly, ESMA shall take into consideration the 
anticipated impact that trading obligation might have on the liquidity of a class of 
derivatives or a relevant subset thereof and the commercial activities of end users 
which are not financial entities.
436
 
Moreover, the “trading obligation” shall also apply to third country entities that 
would be subject to the clearing obligation if they were established in the Union, 
which enter into derivatives transactions pertaining to a class of derivatives that has 
been declared subject to the trading obligations, provided that the contract has a direct, 
substantial and foreseeable effect within the European Union, or where such 
obligation is necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of the 
trading obligation of MiFIR. In order to promote timely centrally-clearing, the 
operator of a “regulated market” shall ensure that all transactions in derivatives that 
are concluded on that regulated market are cleared by a CCP.
437
 The CCPs, trading 
venues and investment firms which act as clearing members of CCPs, shall have in 
place effective systems, procedures and arrangements in relation to cleared derivatives 
to ensure that transactions in “cleared derivatives,” including mandatory clearing 
                                                             
 
433
 MiFIR, Art. 28 (1). 
434
 MIFIR, Art.32 (1). 
435
 MIFIR, Art.32 (3). 
436
 Ibid. There are two main factors determining whether or not a class of derivatives subject to the 
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derivatives or voluntary clearing derivatives,
438
 are submitted and accepted for 
clearing as quickly as technologically practicable using automated systems.
439
 
“Indirect clearing” is also acceptable, arrangements with regard to exchange-traded 
derivatives are permissible provided that those arrangements do not increase 
counterparty risk and ensure that the assets and positions of the counterparty benefit 
from protection with equivalent effect to that required in EMIR.
440
 
In order for the trading obligation to take effect, the relevant classes of derivatives 
must be admitted to trading or traded on at least one trading venue, and there must be 
sufficient third-party buying and selling interest in the class of derivatives or a 
relevant subset thereof so that such a class of derivatives is considered sufficiently 
liquid to trade only on the qualified venues.
441
 It is argued that the “trading on 
regulated venues obligation” would facilitate standardization of the OTC derivatives 
contracts and thus promote the CCP clearing. Secondly, the “trading obligation” will 
increased the trading transparency, especially giving the supervisors a whole view of 
the trading of OTC derivatives. Thirdly, the trading obligation would reduce 
operational risk through automated procedures.  
1.2 Pre and post trading data publication by trading venues 
MIFIR I introduced the pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements for shares 
and equity-based financial instruments, which is deemed as inadequate to cope with 
the potential risks resulted from the market of other financial instruments, especially 
the derivatives. The 2008 crisis has reflected the weaknesses of the transparency 
regime. Hence, MIFID II extends the pre and post trade transparency requirements for 
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1.2.1 Pre-trade transparency requirement 
It is provided in Article 8 of MIFIR that, “market operators and investment firms 
operating a trading venue shall make public current ‘bid and offer’ prices and the 
depth of trading interests at those prices which are advertised through their systems 
for bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances and derivatives on that 
trading venue.”443 The operators of the trading venues shall make that information 
available to the public on a continuous basis during normal trading hours.
444
 However, 
it is also notable that the publication obligation does not apply to those derivative 
transactions of non-financial counterparties which are objectively measurable as 
reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity.
445
 It shall be mentionable 
that competent authorities of member states have been given the power to waive the 




1.2.2 Post-trade transparency requirement 
Likewise, the MIFID II also extended post-trade publication obligation regarding the 
non-equity instruments, such as derivatives. It is provided in MiFIR that “market 
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 MIFIR, Art.9 (1). (regarding to the non-equity financial instruments that could be waived from the 
pre-trade obligation, competent shall take into considerations: a)orders that are large in scale compared 
with normal market size and orders held in an order management facility of the trading venues pending 
disclosure; b)actionable indications of interest in request– for-quote and voice trading system that are 
above a size specific to the financial instrument, which would expose liquidity providers to undue risk 
and takes into account whether the relevant market participants are retail or wholesale investors; 
c)derivatives which are not subject to the trading obligation and other financial instruments for which 
there is not a liquid market.) However, before granting a waiver, competent authorities shall notify 
ESMA and other competent authorities of the intended use of each individual waiver and provide an 
explanation regarding their functioning. And the notification of the intention shall be made not less 
than four months before the waiver is intended to take effect. The competent authorities of member 
states could also withdraw a waiver, either on their own initiative or upon request by other competent 
authorities, if they find that the waiver is being used in a way that derivates from its original purpose or 
if they consider that the waiver is being used to circumvent the requirements of pre-trade publication 
laid down by MIFIR II. Furthermore, the competent authority responsible for supervising the trading 
venues, on which a class of derivatives and other non-equity financial instruments traded, may 
temporarily suspend the obligation of pre-trade publication obligation if that class of derivatives falls 
below a specified threshold. 
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operators and investment firms operating a trading venue shall make public the price, 
volume and time of the transactions executed in respect of derivatives that are traded 
on a trading venue.”447 The operators of the trading venues shall make details of all 
such transactions public as close to real-time as is technically possible.
448
  
Furthermore, the post-trade disclosure obligations also attributed to investment 
firms, including the systematic internalisers (SIs). It is provided that “investment 
firms which, either on own account or on behalf of clients, conclude transactions in 
bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances, and derivatives traded on a 
trading venue shall make public the volume and price of those transactions and the 
time at which they were concluded, that information shall be made public through an 
approved publication arrangement.”449 It is therefore that after the MIFID II, the 
transparency requirements will cover also derivatives eligible for clearing or traded on 
RMs, MTFs, and OTFs. 
2. European Capital Requirement Regulation and OTC 
derivatives 
In the 2008 crisis, another problem exposed is that the banks generally did not have 
strong own fund to withstand the losses. Therefore, the global regulators realized the 
current capital requirements for the banking industry under the Basel regime was not 
sufficient to maintain the stability of the banks. In the G-20 summit, the leaders also 
declared that “non-centrally cleared derivatives shall subject to higher capital 
requirements in order to properly reflect the higher risks associated with them.”  
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 MIFIR, Art.21 (1). (APA, namely means an approved publication arrangement as defined in article 
4(1)(52) of Directive 2014/65/EU.) The competent authorities of Member States have the right to 
authorize investment firms to provide for deferred publication, or may request the publication of 
limited details of a transaction or details of several transactions in an aggregated form, or a 
combination thereof, during the time period of the deferral or may allow the omission of the 
publication of the volume for individual transactions during an extended time period of deferral, or in 
the case of non-equity financial instruments that are not sovereign debt, may allow the publication of 
several transactions in an aggregated form during an extended time period of deferral, or for an 
indefinite period of time, and may temporarily suspend the obligations. MIFIR, Art.21 (4). 
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Following the G20 leaders’ call, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
started to review the existed regulatory capital regime. The BCBS identified that the 
treatment to counterparty credit risk in the current Basel II was insufficient, which 
shall be substantially revised. The new regime in Basel III strengthened the capital 
requirements for counterparty credit exposures arising from derivatives trading, repo 
and securities financing activities.  
To transpose the Basel III into EU law, the European Commission began to revise 
its Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) regime, setting new prudential requirements 
for European banks (including credit institutions and investment firms). In the 
legislative framework of the EU, the CRD IV forms an integral part of EU’s 
comprehensive financial regulatory reform agenda. Particularly, it complements the 
specific regulation on OTC derivatives, i.e. EMIR, in regards of promoting a more 
stringent regime for derivatives that will remain over-the-counter traded, and thus 
incentivize banks entering into CCP clearing. The CRD IV consists of two 
instruments, namely a Directive governing the access to deposit-taking activities and a 
Regulation (CRR), establishing the prudential requirements institutions need to obey 
with. In order to avoid national divergences, a Regulation is justified as the CRR will 
be directly applicable to all the EU member states.
450
 As regards our research in OTC 
derivatives, we will focus only on the CRR, which stipulates new capital requirements 
as to OTC derivatives. 
2.1 Increase own fund requirement as to Credit Valuation 
Adjustment risk 
In fact, the Basel II regulatory capital regime had already addressed the risk of 
counterparty default in derivatives transactions, but it did not address the Credit 
                                                             
 
450
 Parts of the current CRD, where the degree of prescription is lower and where the links with 
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Valuation Adjustment (CVA) risk. CVA risk is the risk of loss caused by changes in 
the credit spread of counterparties due to changes in their credit quality. It has also 
been described as “the difference between the hypothetical vale of the derivative 
transaction assuming a risk-free counterparty and the true value of the derivative 
transaction that takes into account the possibility of changes in creditworthiness of the 
counterparty, including the possibility of the counterparty’s default.” The purpose of 
CVA is to quantify the risk that counterparties to derivatives transactions may be more 
or less creditworthy at any given time during the life of a transaction because this will 
affect the value of the transaction to the counterparties.
451
 It is explained by the 
European Commission that, “nearly two-thirds of the losses stemming from 
derivatives during the crisis were a direct consequence of the deterioration of the 
credit quality of the counterparty, and not necessarily triggered by the default of the 
counterparty.”452 Therefore, the BCBS started to revise the current regulatory regime, 
and introduced a new capital requirement as to the CVA risk in the Basel III, aiming at 
improving banks’ resilience against the written-down/off losses due to the downgrade 
of creditworthiness of their counterparties.
453
 Indeed, in the derivatives market, the 
mark-to-market losses being a greater source of losses than those arising from outright 
defaults. 
The CVA risk is also addressed by the CRR, although it differs in some 
significant respects with the Basel III proposal. The European CVA provisions have 
taken effect from 1Jaunary 2014 and applies to credit institutions and investment 
firms entering into non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives transactions. Under the 
CRR, credit institutions and investment firms are required to hold additional own 
funds due to CVA risk arising from OTC derivatives (other than credit derivatives 
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 It is imperative that this value is as accurate as possible, particularly during times of market stress 
when markets are more volatile, so that counterparties can ensure that transactions are correctly valued 
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 European Commission, Consultation on counterparty credit risk- frequently asked questions, 9 
February 2011, available at http://europa.eu/rapIbid/press-release_MEMO-11-77_en.htm?locale=en, 
last visited on 10 March 2015. 
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 See BCBS: Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems 
dated June 2011 at Section A, paragraph 2(14)(b).  
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used for credit risk mitigation
454
 purpose), and if CVA risk exposures are material, 
securities financing transactions.
455
 The measures target financial institutions 
specifically as they are perceived as being the most sensitive to systemic risk due to 
the sheer volume of derivatives exposures concentrated within a relatively small 
number of counterparties which could, as it did in 2008, lead to a simultaneous 
deterioration of credit quality at times of market stress and pro-cyclicality. It is worth 
noting that, in respect of un-cleared derivatives transactions, the EMIR also requires 
financial counterparties to hold an appropriate and proportionate amount of capital to 
manage the risk not covered by appropriate exchange of collateral. It is expected that 
this requirement will be satisfied by compliance with the CRR.
456
  It is, however, 
unclear how financial counterparties will be expected to comply with their EMIR 
capital obligations to the extent they are not subject to the CRR, i.e. they are not 
institutions. 
2.2 Distinguish risk-weight calculation between centrally cleared 
and non-centrally cleared derivatives  
Under the Basel capital regime, the risk weight is calculated by multiplying (a) the 
value of the asset by (b) the risk weight of the asset by (c) a credit conversion factor 
(if the asset is off-balance sheet), which is then multiplied by (d) 8% to come up with 
the amount of pillar one capital required to be held against the relevant exposure.  
After the CRR entering into effect, the derivatives transactions are subject to 
specific valuation procedures under the chapter 4 provisions. It is provided that, “in 
case of certain repurchase transactions and derivative transactions that subjected to 
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 Article 92(3)(d) CRR. “OTC derivatives” are not specifically defined in the CRR but derivative 
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 See Joint ESMA/EIOPA/EBA Discussion Paper on Technical Standards on Risk Mitigation 
Techiques for Uncleared OTC Derivatives dated 6 March 2012. 
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daily marking-to-market model, a risk weight of 0% or 10% can be achieved.
457
 A 
nominal 2% risk weighting for certain derivative transactions that entered into CCP 
clearing, while there is not such favorable provision for non CCP clearing ones.  
3. European Short Selling Regulation and OTC derivatives 
In the modern financial system, especially during the last twenty years, different 
sectors, like the equity, bond and the derivatives market have been more and more 
tightly interconnected. The market participants could achieve similar economic 
interest in these different sectors. For example, if the market trader holds a short view 
to a certain stock, he could sell the stocks if he has, or he can buy CDSs against the 
depreciation of that stock. As transactions across different financial sector is 
becoming more and more easily, regulatory measures focused merely on one sector 
could be undermined by the cross-sector trading strategies. This regulatory loophole 
has been vividly manifested in this 2008 financial crisis. 
When the crisis was escalated in the autumn 2008, U.S. and many European 
member states promulgated temporary ban on short selling financial share, trying at 
reducing the volatility of the stock market. However, their regulatory efforts generally 
did not work. To illustrate, on 19 September 2008, the SEC enacted the temporary 
short selling ban on 799 financial shares.
458
 But, it was demonstrated that the bid-ask 
spreads to the shares of these financial companies even widened, and the investor 
confidence declined significantly after this ban.
 459
 So, one commentator referred to 
the short selling ban as one of the dumbest financial regulatory moves in 2008.
460
 It 
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 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012, (CRR, for short), Article 222(4) and Article 222(5)  
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 SEC chairman Chris Cox spoke candidly about the purpose of these regulations in an op-ed the wall 
street journal in July: “the ban is intended as a preventive step to help restore market confidence at a 
time when that is sorely needed.” See Samantha Buker, Short Selling Regulations, 
http://www.whiskeyandgunpowder.com/Archives/2008/20080922.html citing Op-Ed, The Wall Street 
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 Washington Mutual and Wachovia are two good examples of financial companies that saw their 
stock continue to plummet after the SEC banned short selling. 
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was criticized that the main reason of this failure lies in that the temporary short 
selling requirement did not extended to the derivatives market, and the SEC did not 
collaborate with the CFTC.
461
 The underlying reason is that speculators could short 
sell the interest of the relevant financial shares via the short selling of 
economically-related derivatives, thereby achieving the same short selling purpose on 
the financial shares. Thus, the short selling ban did not involve the relevant 
transactions of derivatives made the temporary short selling ban did not function. In 
light of this problem, after the crisis EU enacted its short-selling regulation, namely 
the European Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (SSR, for 
short), extending the short selling regulation regime to the derivatives market.   
3.1 Extend the short-selling regulatory regime to OTC 
derivatives transactions 
Short selling against shares through relevant CDSs has also been clearly realized by 
the EU legislators. Thus, the SSR firstly extend the short selling regulation to relevant 
CDSs transactions. In Article 1 it is provided that “the scope of this regulation shall 
cover financial instruments that are admitted to trading on a trading venue in the 
Union;
462
 derivatives that relate or refer to a financial instrument or to an issuer of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
(last visited on 15 March 2015) (Stating that 'the emergency order temporarily banning short selling of 
financial stocks will restore equilibrium to markets,' Cox promises. But shares in banks, brokerages and 
insurance companies continue to plunge, losing a quarter of their value during the three weeks the 
mid-September order was effective. Some investors say the short ban hastened the flight of capital from 
stock and bond markets, by showing the government could intervene in markets in unexpected and 
troublesome ways."). 
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 See Christopher A. Stanley,” The Panic Effect: Possible Unintended Consequences of the 
Temporary Bans on Short Selling Enacted During the 2008 Financial Crisis,” 4 Entrepreneurial 
Business Law Journal 277, 2009, p.282. 
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 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 March 2012 on 
short selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps (OJ L 86/1) (SSR, for short hereinafter), Art.2 
(1)(a) “financial instrument” means an instrument listed in Section C of Annex 1 to Directive 
2004/39/EC, i.e. MIFID I, according to which the financial instruments include (1) transferable 
securities; (2) money-market instrument; (3) units in collective investment undertakings; (4) options, 
futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative contracts relating to securities, 
currencies, interest rates or yields, or other derivatives instruments, financial indices or financial 
indices or financial measures which may be settled physically or in cash; (5) options, futures, swaps, 
forward rate agreements and any other derivative contracts relating to commodities that must be settled 
in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one of the parties (otherwise than by reason of a 
default or other termination event; (6) options, futures, swaps and any other derivative contract relating 
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such a financial instrument;
463
 sovereign debt instruments and derivatives that relate 
or are referred to such sovereign debt instruments.
464
 Under this provision, almost all 
the OTC traded derivatives shall be included into the regulatory scope. 
Specifically speaking, in order to have a comprehensive oversight to the 
short-sale positions in relation to shares and sovereign debts, the trading positions in 
relevant derivatives shall also be calculated. To achieve this goal, it is provided in 
Article 3 of SSR that, “positons in a transaction, which creates or relates to a financial 
instrument other than the shares and sovereign debts, where the effect or one of the 
effect of the transaction is to confer a financial advantage on the natural or legal 
person entering into that transaction in the event of a decrease in the prices or value of 
the share or debt instrument, shall be considered short positions of the related shares 
or sovereign debts under this regulation.”465 Conversely, “the position in the contract, 
under which the person entering into that contract would get economic advantage as 
the price or value of the responding shares or sovereign debts increase, then such 
positions shall be calculated as long position of that share or sovereign debt.”466  In 
other words, the use of derivatives, such as options, futures, which have the same 
economic interest as short selling shares and sovereign debts, shall be taken into 
account when calculate the short or long positons.
467
  
After the derivatives trading position being calculated into relevant share or 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
to commodities that can be physically settled provIbided that they are traded on a regulated market 
and/or an MTF; (7) options, futures, swaps, forwards and any other derivative contracts relating to 
commodities, that can be physically settled not otherwise mentioned in C.6 and not being for 
commercial purposes, which have the characteristics of other derivative financial instruments, having 
regard to whether, inter alia, they are cleared and settled through recognized clearing houses or are 
subject to regular margin calls; (8) derivative instruments for the transfer of credit risk; (9) financial 
contracts for differences; (10) options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative 
contracts relating to climatic variables, freight rates, emission allowances or inflation rates or other 
official economic statistics that must be settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one of 
the parties (otherwise than by reason of a default or other termination event), as well as any other 
derivative contracts relating to assets, rights, obligations, indices and measures not otherwise 
mentioned in this section, which have the characteristics of other derivative financial instruments, 
having regard to whether, inter alia, they are traded on a regulated market or an MTF, are cleared and 
settled through recognized clearing houses or are subject to regular margin calls. 
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 Derivatives referred to in points (4) to (10) of Section C of Annex 1 to MIFID I. 
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 See SSR, Art.1.  
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 See SSR, Art.3 (1). 
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 See SSR, Art.3 (2). 
467
 SSR, Recite 12. 
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sovereign debt positions, the short-selling regulations to the share and sovereign debt 
will logically cover those relevant derivatives transactions. For example, the 
disclosure requirement to net short positions, the temporary trading restriction 
requirement in exceptional market situations and other specific regulations on short 
selling will automatically applicable to derivatives market. From doing so, the market 
participants who want to circumvent the short-selling regulation via the derivatives 
market would be legally impossible.      
3.2 Ban the trading of naked Sovereign Credit Default Swaps 
As argued before, the speculative transactions on Sovereign Credit Default Swaps 
(SCDS)
468
 exacerbated the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Abundant speculative 
SCDS transactions sent a strong signal to the financial market that the default 
possibility of the southern European countries was becoming higher, and thereby the 
borrowing cost for the peripheral European countries became very burdensome. In 
order to reduce speculations on the sovereign debt market, it is necessary to restrict 
the naked sovereign CDS, especially when the sovereign debt market is becoming 
volatile. In this regard, the European Commissioner at that time, Mr. Barnier argued, 
“we cannot tolerate speculation on uncovered SCDS, the bans on such CDS trading is 
a key provision of the European regulation on short selling.”469  
In this regard, it is provided in Article14 of SSR that “a natural or legal person 
may enter into SCDS transactions only where that transaction does not lead to an 
uncovered position.”470 Hence, this provision clearly bans naked short selling on 
SCDSs. Under the framework of SSR, it is further explained that “an uncovered 
position in a SCDS means that a person enters into a SCDS that does not serve to 
hedge against the risk of default of the issuer where the person has a long position in 
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the sovereign debt of that issuer; or the risk of a decline of the value of the sovereign 
debt where the person holds assets or is subject to liabilities, including but not limited 
to financial contracts, a portfolio of assets or financial obligations the value of which 
is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.”471 Nevertheless, the restriction on 
trading uncovered SCDS could be temporarily suspended by the competent authorities 
of member states, where the competent authorities believe that such restriction might 
have a negative impact on the SCDS market, especially by increasing the cost of 
borrowing or affecting the sovereign issuers’ ability to issue new debt.472 But, before 
the decision of suspending such restriction, the relevant competent authority shall 
notify ESMA and the other competent authorities of the proposed suspension and the 
grounds on which it is based.
473
 The suspension shall be valid for an initial period not 
exceeding 12 months from the date of its publication on the website of the relevant 
competent authority, and the suspension could be renewed for not exceeding 6 months 
if the conditions for the suspension still exist.
474
 Otherwise, if the suspension is not 




Furthermore, certain types of SCDSs transactions could also be prohibited in 
exceptional market circumstances. In the proposal of SSR, the European Commission 
claimed that in exceptional situations it may be necessary for competent authorities to 
prohibit or restrict short selling activities
 476
 Then this idea was accepted by SSR, 
which provides that “a competent authority may restrict the ability of natural or legal 
persons to enter into SCDS or may limit the value of SCDS positions where there are 
adverse events or developments which constitute a serious threat to financial stability 
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 European Commission, Proposal for SSR, COM (2010) 482 final., p.9. 
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or to market confidence in the member state concerned or in one or more other 
member states; and the measure is necessary to address the threat and will not have a 
detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets which is disproportionate to 
its benefits.”477 Such restrictions may apply to SCDS transactions of a specific class 
or to specific SCDS transactions.
478
 But, if specifically provided by the competent 
authorities of member states, the market making activities and primary market 
activities could be exempted from this provision.
479
  
As certain measures may involve monitoring or enforcement against natural or 
legal persons outside the Union, EU regulators should be encouraged to reach 
cooperation agreements with regulators in third countries where EU shares or 
sovereign bonds and associated derivatives are traded. This would facilitate the 
exchange of information and enforcement of the obligations, as well the taking of 
similar measures by third country regulators in exceptional situations where there is a 
serious threat to financial stability or market confidence in the Union. ESMA should 
play a role in coordinating the development of cooperation agreements and the 
exchange of information received from third country regulators. 
4. European Market Abuse Regulation and OTC derivatives 
EU started its regulation on market abuse from 2003, when the Market Abuse 
Directive 2003/6/EU (MAD) was enacted. Although the MAD had played an 
important role in prevent market abuse across the European Union, the weakness of 
this regulation also exposed in the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, the European 
Commission also began to revise the MAD after the crisis, especially aimed at 
fighting against the market abuse activities across the commodity and the related 
derivatives market. In June 2014, the Commission’s proposal on revising the MAD 
was enacted by the European Council and the European Parliament, which includes a 
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Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and a Market Abuse Directive (MAD II). In order to 
fight against cross-market abuse, the MAR greatly extended its regulatory scope to all 
financial instruments traded in qualified European trading venues and the relevant 
commodity spot markets.
480
     
4.1 Extend market abuse regulation to OTC derivatives 
Adopted in early 2003, the MAD has introduced a comprehensive framework to 
tackle insider dealing and market manipulation practices of “financial instruments” 
that are admitted to trade in the regulated markets. However, after the adoption of 
MIFID in 2004, financial instruments have been increasingly traded on MTFs, on 
other types of OTFs, such as Swap execution facilities or broker crossing systems, or 
only traded OTC.
481
 The increase of trading across different venues had made it more 
difficult to monitor possible market abuse activities.
482
 Hence, it is obvious that the 
regulatory ambit of MAD is not sufficient to cover standardized financial instruments. 
Having seen this gap, the MAR extends the regulatory scope to any financial 
instruments traded on MTFs or OTFs, apart from those traded on traditional regulated 
markets, i.e. the exchanges. It is provided in article 2 of MAR that, “this regulation 
will apply to, (a) financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market or 
for which a request for admission to trading on a regulated market has been made; (b) 
financial instruments traded on an MTF, admitted to trading on an MTF or for which a 
request for admission to trading on an MTF has been made; (c) financial instruments 
traded on an OTF.”483 Namely, all the financial instruments, including derivatives, 
will be regulated under the market abuse regulation.
484
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 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on market abuse, 
(MAR hereinafter), Art.2 (1).  
484
 As MIFIR has been adopted, which impels the centrally clearing OTC derivatives to be traded in 
the European trading venues, i.e. regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs, most of the OTC derivatives 
transactions will enter into trading venues, and thus will be subjected to the MAR anti- market abuse 
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Furthermore, in light of the lessons learned from the crisis that the stock market 
abuse could be achieved through the activities in derivatives market, thus, OTC 
derivatives not traded on EU trading venues shall also be included into the market 
abuse regulation. Therefore, the article 2 of MAR also specifically provided that, “this 
regulation applies to the ‘financial instruments’ not traded in the trading venues, the 
price or value of which depends on or has an effect on the price or value of a trading 
venue traded financial instrument, including, but not limited to, credit default swaps 
and contracts for difference.
485
 Hence, under the MAR, not just OTC derivatives 
admitted in the trading venues, but also OTC derivatives related to financial 
instruments traded in trading venues will be encompassed into the regulatory regime. 
And then, the OTC derivatives will comply with the obligations laid down in the 
MAR, such as manager’s transaction report obligation, administrative sanctions and 
so on. 
4.2 Regulating the commodity derivatives related spot 
commodity contracts 
Spot commodity markets and related commodity derivative markets are highly 
interconnected, and market abuse may easily take place across these markets.
486
 
However, before the crisis, the MAD’s rules only apply to exchange traded 
commodity futures, which means that the OTC commodity market is outside the 
purview of the regulators and opaque to the investors. Hence the investors in 
commodity derivatives may be less protected than investors in derivatives of financial 
markets because a person could benefit from inside information in a spot market by 
trading on a related derivative market.
487
 This weakness of the MAD has been clearly 
exposed in the financial crisis, thereby, in order to avoid market abuse in the 
derivatives market through the relative spot commodity market, it is critical to enlarge 
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the regulatory confine to the spot market.
488
   
The MAR will, in substantial, cover the transactions or behaviors in the spot 
commodity markets that are related to and have effects on the derivatives transactions 
traded in the EU trading venues. For this reason, firstly, the definition of inside 
information of commodity derivatives should be aligned to the general definition of 
inside information, extending it to price sensitive information relevant to the related 
spot commodity contract as well as to the derivative itself.
489
in this regard, it is 
provided in MAR that “in relation to commodity derivatives, information of a precise 
nature, which has not been made public, relating directly or indirectly to one or more 
such derivatives or relating directly to the related spot commodity contract, and which, 
if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of 
such derivatives or related spot commodity contracts, and where this is information 
which is reasonably expected to be disclosed or is required to be disclosed in 
accordance with legal or regulatory provisions at the Union or national level, market 
rules, contract, practice or custom, on the relevant commodity derivatives markets or 
spot markets.”490 Secondly, in grappling with market manipulation via spot market, 
the conduct of market manipulation through the transactions of spot commodity 
contracts are deemed as “market manipulation” behavior that shall be prohibited 
under this regulation. It is stipulated in MAR that “the conduct to secure a dominant 
position over the supply of or demand for a financial instrument, related spot 
commodity contracts, which has, or is likely to have, the effect of fixing, directly or 
indirectly, purchase or sale prices or creates, or is likely to create, other unfair trading 
conditions shall be considered as market manipulation behaviors.”491 
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In this chapter, we argued that apart from the EMIR, other EU regulations that enacted 
or updated after the crisis also contributed the sound and comprehensive regulation to 
the OTC derivatives. Then, we elaborated the legal rules in these specific regulations 
that related to the OTC derivatives trading one by one. First, the MIFIR required that 
all derivatives subject to the central clearing obligation shall be traded on a qualified 
EU trading venue. Meanwhile, the MIFIR require the derivatives trading on the 
trading venues shall disclose the relevant pre-trade and post-trade contract 
information as laid down in detail in this regulation. Second, the CRR requires 
financial institutions that trade derivatives shall set aside a sum of own fund in 
preventing Credit Adjustment Risk; and the CRR laid down different credit risk 
weight calculation for centrally cleared and non-centrally cleared derivatives so as to 
incentivize more derivatives entering into central clearing. Third, The SSR extended 
European short-selling regulation to derivatives market, in which naked short selling 
on sovereign credit default swaps is prohibited. Fourth, the MAR extended the market 
abuse regulation to derivatives market. Especially, the MAR restrict market abuse 
across the derivatives market and the spot commodity market. 
In sum, these specific provisions in these regulations elaborated in this chapter 
would complement the EMIR in making the derivatives market more transparency 










CDS, as a product of financial innovation, has incurred controversial views since its 
inception. One the one hand, it is an efficient instrument to transfer burdensome credit 
risk for the banks and other financial institutions, and thereby promoting the stability 
and efficiency of the financial system. On the other hand, the CDSs transaction is 
opaque and risky. Before the crisis, speculative CDSs transactions basically 
dominated this market, which resulted in huge risk accumulated in the financial 
system, and finally imploded the financial system. Therefore, after the Crisis, CDSs 
were widely blamed. In order to prevent ourselves from a next crisis resulted from the 
derivatives trading again, a thorough research both from the economic and law 
perspective shall be justified. In this dissertation, we divided the content in three parts. 
Firstly, we gave a comprehensive introduction to the CDSs and its market 
development before the crisis so as to demystify this continually innovative financial 
product and its market development. Secondly, we had a research on the relationship 
between the CDSs transactions and the 2008 financial crisis so as to understand how 
the CDSs related to the crisis. Then, in Part II we had a thorough inquiry into the legal 
origins of the crisis in terms of CDSs. After that, in Part III, we further analyzed the 
EU’s regulatory reform against the OTC derivatives market. EU’s regulations 
regarding to the OTC derivatives will become a legislative model around the world, 
although its effectiveness still needed to be seen in the future. The research results are 
the followings. 
1. Regarding to the relationship between the CDSs and the 2008 crisis.  
Generally speaking, this relationship is two folds, namely on the one hand, CDSs 
facilitated the creation and selling of mortgage-backed securities, which drove the 
banks to grant more subprime mortgage loans. Thus, the U.S. housing bubble was 
irrationally propagated and huge risk accumulated. In this process, CDSs promoted 
the happening of the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, CDSs exacerbated the 
crisis when it erupted. In this regard, CDSs are imputable for three reasons. First, 
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speculative CDSs transactions, such as naked synthetic CDOs, multiply amplified 
losses relating to mortgage-backed securities. Second, CDSs trading directly stumbled 
systemic important financial institutions, especially the AIG, which directly escalated 
the crisis. Third, opaque CDSs transactions weaved the financial system into a tightly 
interconnected network, thus potential systemic risk had been created. Due to the 
opaque, risky and interconnected of this market, panic easily spread over the financial 
system, and the financial system suddenly froze.      
2. Regarding to the legal origins of the 2008 financial crisis, we developed three 
arguments.  
First, we argued that the CFMA provided a legal prerequisite for the developing 
of speculative OTC derivatives, including CDSs, transactions. Namely, the CFMA 
removed the legal barrier for speculation on CDSs. We elaborated the common law 
approach towards speculative commodity derivatives and the codification of this 
doctrine into the U.S. Commodity Exchanges Act of 1936. The doctrine of “difference 
contracts” developed by the American Judges make the speculations on commodities 
void, namely the speculations would not get protection from the courts. So, 
speculative activities were greatly impeded. And under the CEA, this doctrine was 
further strengthened, speculations were considered not just void but also crimes. 
Hence, speculative derivatives transactions were appropriately restricted within a 
reasonable level. In 2000, the notorious CFMA was enacted, and the traditional 
common law doctrine of “difference contracts” was totally erosion along with the 
abrogation of the CEA. In practice, OTC derivatives, in particular, the CDSs market 
really have undergone a rapid growth and dominated by the speculative transactions. 
It shall be stressed that, for sure, the economic motion is the fundamental reason for 
the market thrive. Nevertheless, the erosion of the common law doctrine of 
“difference contracts” consist of the fundamental institutional reason for the excessive 
speculative CDSs transactions.  
Second, We argued that the collisions between the bankruptcy pro-debtor rules 
and the ISDA Master Agreement rules is the direct reason drove the OTC derivatives 
185 
 
industry to lobby the U.S. Congress and EU parliament to exempt bankruptcy law 
pro-debtor rules from applying to OTC derivatives. We elaborated in detail the 
bankruptcy law “pro-debtor” principle and its main rules, namely the rule of 
“automatic stay”, “cherry-picking” and “preferential and fraudulent transfer.” 
Thereafter, we looked into the special trading rules for the OTC derivatives practice 
established by the OTC derivatives industry association ISDA. Those special trading 
rules include the “single-agreement arrangement,” the “close-out netting” and 
“margins exchange.” Furthermore, we advanced that the exemptions caused a 
bankruptcy “safe harbor” for OTC derivatives transactions, which not only promoted 
the proliferation of speculative derivatives, including CDSs trading, but also caused a 
similar “bank run” as to the derivatives traders, such as AIG. Therefore, it could be 
claimed that the erosion of the bankruptcy pro-debtor principle is the direct 
institutional reason for the escalation of the 2008 financial crisis when AIG failed. 
Third, we developed the argument that the “bankruptcy safe harbor” for OTC 
derivatives caused the erosion of the traditional common law doctrine of “secret lien.” 
After the erosion of this doctrine, the counterparty risk private-monitoring mechanism 
has been broke. It seems to us that AIG used the CDSs trading to make money but 
with potential obligation to repay the money. While CDSs contracts could be 
quasi-secured under the bankruptcy safe harbor and the trading information was 
unknown to others, so the AIG always seems more creditable to others. This caused 
AIG could do much more transactions, and the counterparties of AIG were less 
vigilant to investigate and monitor AIG’s real creditworthiness. Therefore, we believe 
that the erosion of the common law doctrine of “secret lien” is an underlying 
institutional reason why AIG could sell out the huge amount of CDSs contracts and its 
final breakdown. 
3. In terms of the European regulatory reform against the OTC derivatives 
market. 
Firstly, we focused ourselves on analyzing the EU’s regulation on “OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories,” also shortly named as 
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EMIR (European Market Infrastructure Regulation). Before analyzing concrete rules 
of EMIR, we firstly discussed the background of the drafting of EMIR, specifically 
we have talked about the international regulatory reform against the OTC derivatives 
market after the crisis, and we argued that EU’s regulatory efforts shall be in line with 
the internationally coordinated regulatory actions, without which a single 
jurisdiction’s regulatory effort regarding the derivatives market would be greatly 
dampened. In fact, after completely reviewed the EMIR, we consider that EU’s 
regulatory approaches toward the OTC derivatives market are fully consistent with its 
international commitments. We also introduced the regulatory and supervisory 
architecture reform in the EU. Before the crisis, EU’s regulatory and supervisory 
structure was based on the “Lamfalussy four-level” design, under which there was no 
strong regulatory and supervisory power at the EU level. In light of the borderless 
nature of derivatives trading, after the crisis the EU has greatly raised regulatory 
power of the EU level authorities. A new European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS) was set up. Now, ESMA is the organ responsible for regulating the derivatives 
market, which has the power to develop concrete supervisory standards as to the 
CCPs and ESMA directly supervise the EU based trade repositories. 
The EMIR has entered into force on 16 August 2012. We argued that under the 
EMIR a new trading structure of the OTC derivatives market will be formed. The 
EMIR regulatory approaches are different with traditional regulatory ones, given that 
EMIR entrusts the regulators less “direct intervene power” in relation to the private 
transactions, but emphasizes on establishing a new market transaction infrastructure 
for derivatives trading. In sum, there are two main approaches that have been laid 
down in EMIR in relation to the regulation of the OTC derivatives market. One is the 
central clearing obligation. Under this provision, the financial counterparties and the 
non-financial counterparties with the derivatives trading volume beyond the “clearing 
threshold” shall novated their derivatives contracts in qualified CCPs and cleared 
through the CCPs. We agree with the EMIR legislators that the CCP clearing 
requirement could reduce systemic risk in the sense that the original 
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high-interconnected derivatives market could be unlocked, and hence a “domino 
effect” or the “contagion risk” when one main derivatives trader default would spread 
across the financial system could be prevented. But, as the CCPs will become the 
counterparties of every derivatives traders, risks will be correspondingly concentrated 
on CCPs. Thus, CCPs shall be strictly regulated. In this regard we also elaborated the 
detailed provisions in EMIR, such as the authorization, the prudential operation rules. 
The second approach of EMIR is the provision of mandatory trading report obligation. 
Namely, all the derivatives transactions shall be timely reported to a qualified trade 
repository. As manifested in the 2008 crisis, the opaqueness of the derivatives trading 
is the main reason of the escalation of the crisis. This provision could greatly increase 
the transparency of the OTC derivatives market, which is essential to maintain the 
integrity and stability of this market. The EMIR also noticed that not all OTC 
derivatives contracts would be suitable for central clearing, thus, some provisions to 
reinforce the risk-management of those non-centrally cleared derivatives contracts 
were also laid down in this regulation.        
We questioned the effectiveness of the CCP clearing approach of EMIR in 
preventing systemic risk. Particularly, we advanced the concern about the 
concentration of risk in CCPs, which might exceed CCPs’ ability to assume. In the 
current legal environment, there are several incentives for derivatives traders to 
novated their contracts in CCPs but without caring about the creditworthiness of the 
CCPs. Moreover, the prudential rules laid down by the EMIR could also not function, 
given that the competition between CCPs would result in loosening the standards of 
central clearing. And the “jump-t0-default” risk of CDSs clearing might directly push 
down a CCP, the margins and the default funds would not absorb the losses of even 
one clearing member’s default, for example a trader like AIG. Anyway, the 
effectiveness of the CCPs clearing will be further examined, and the concrete 
provisions shall be gradually refined according to the practice.  
Secondly, we argued that apart from the EMIR, other EU regulations that enacted 
or updated after the crisis also contributed the sound and comprehensive regulation to 
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the OTC derivatives. Then, we elaborated the legal rules in these specific regulations 
that related to the OTC derivatives trading one by one. First, the MIFIR required that 
all derivatives subject to the central clearing obligation shall be traded on a qualified 
EU trading venue. Meanwhile, the MIFIR require the derivatives trading on the 
trading venues shall disclose the relevant pre-trade and post-trade contract 
information as laid down in detail in this regulation. Second, the CRR requires 
financial institutions that trade derivatives shall set aside a sum of own fund in 
preventing Credit Adjustment Risk; and the CRR laid down different credit risk 
weight calculation for centrally cleared and non-centrally cleared derivatives so as to 
incentivize more derivatives entering into central clearing. Third, The SSR extended 
European short-selling regulation to derivatives market, in which naked short selling 
on sovereign credit default swaps is prohibited. Fourth, the MAR extended the market 
abuse regulation to derivatives market. Especially, the MAR restrict market abuse 
across the derivatives market and the spot commodity market. 
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